Showing posts with label executive compensation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label executive compensation. Show all posts

Friday, 20 May 2016

Princess Health and No Questions Asked - Journalist Parrots the Talking Points in Support of Hospital Executive Compensation . Princessiccia

Princess Health and No Questions Asked - Journalist Parrots the Talking Points in Support of Hospital Executive Compensation . Princessiccia

The problem of ever rising, amazingly generous pay for top health care managers is a frequent topic for Health Care Renewal.  We have suggested that the ability of top managers to command ever increasing pay uncorrelated with their organizations' contributions to patients' or the public's health, and often despite major organizational shortcomings indicates fundamental structural problems with US health, and provides perverse incentives for these managers to defend the current system, no matter how bad its dysfunction.

In particular, we have written a series of posts about the lack of logical justification for huge executive  compensation by non-profit hospitals and hospital systems.  When journalists inquire why the pay of a particular leader is so high, the leader, his or her public relations spokespeople, or hospital trustees can be relied on to cite the same now hackneyed talking points.

As I wrote last year,  and last week,

It seems nearly every attempt made to defend the outsize compensation given hospital and health system executives involves the same arguments, thus suggesting they are talking points, possibly crafted as a public relations ploy. We first listed the talking points here, and then provided additional examples of their use. here, here here, here, here, and here, here and here

They are:
- We have to pay competitive rates
- We have to pay enough to retain at least competent executives, given how hard it is to be an executive
- Our executives are not merely competitive, but brilliant (and have to be to do such a difficult job).


Yet as we discussed recently, these talking points are easily debunked.  Additionally, rarely do those who mouth the talking points in support of a particular leader provide any evidence to support their applicability to that leader.

Bit at least most journalists who inquire into hospital executive compensation make an attempt to be "fair and balanced" by also quoting experts who question the talking points.

Hospital Executive Compensation in Central Pennsylvania

However, we just found an ostensibly journalistic survey of local hospital executive compensation in the Reading (PA) Eagle which seemed designed to encourage the public to welcome their ever more highly paid corporate health overlords.  This started with its title:
Nonprofit health care organizations pay for the best executives

And its opening paragraph
At first blush, the leaders of area hospitals are handsomely compensated. But a Reading Eagle analysis finds that their compensation is in line with hospital administrators in other areas.

The author was not shy about documenting the munificent pay of local hospital executives, seven of whom received more than $1 million as documented by their organizations' most recent financial reports.
 Harold Paz, CEO of Hershey Medical Center (Penn State University) topped the list in 2014, at $1.57 million.
+++
Second was Thomas E. Beeman, former president and CEO of Lancaster General Health, at $1.5 million.
+++
Third was Clint Matthews, president and CEO of Reading Health System, at $1.44 million in 2014, the most recent year information was available.

Then,
Fourth place in total compensation went to Ronald W. Swinfard, trustee and CEO of the Lehigh Valley Health Network, at $1.32 million in 2014.

Fifth place in total compensation was Kevin Mosser, director and CEO, WellSpan Health at Ephrata Community Hospital, at $1.29 million.

Sixth place was Rod Erickson, former president, Hershey Medical Center, Penn State, $1.28 million.

Seventh place was Richard Seim, president, WellSpan Specialty Services, WellSpan Health, $1.01 million.

In eighth place was Michael F. O'Connor, CFO. WellSpan, Ephrata Community Hospital, $993.618.

Ninth was Charles Chodroff, president, South Central Preferred, WellSpan Health, $906,582.

Tenth was Rodney Kirsch, senior VP, development, Hershey Medical Center Penn State, $860,445.

Eleventh was John Morahan, chair, president and CEO, Bornemann Health Corp. and St. Joseph Regional Health, at $841, 246. Bornemann is an affiliate of St. Joseph Regional Health, and compensation came from Catholic Health Initiatives.

Parroting the Talking Points

But the public should fear not, because, as the talking points say....

We have to pay competitive rates

This was invoked early in the article.
The Reading Eagle review also found that leaders of hospitals in Berks County are compensated in line with their counterparts at other medical centers in Pennsylvania.

Also,
Overall, the compensation of medical nonprofit leaders in Berks County is on par with leaders of similar locations elsewhere, said Chester Mosteller, founder and president of Mosteller and Associates, a human resource professional services firm in Reading.

We have to pay enough to retain at least competitive executives

To support both the first and this talking point, the article cited a local expert,
 Nonetheless, people are sometimes surprised at high compensation levels at nonprofit hospitals, said Tish Mogan, standards for excellence director at the Pennsylvania Association of Nonprofit Organizations in Harrisburg. But, Mogan noted, if the leaders of nonprofit hospitals were not well compensated, they could be poached by for-profit medical centers.

'They have to be competitive,...

Doubling down, the article also cited  "Anna Valuch, director of marketing for Reading Health System," whose CEO, her boss, pulled down $1.44 million. She said
the system's board of directors takes seriously its responsibilities in terms of creating an executive compensation plan that is fair, competitive and consistent with the system's mission to provide the highest quality health care.

Later, the reporter quoted Ms "Cindy Bergvall, co-owner of accounting firm Bee Bergvall and Co in Bucks County and its affiliate, the Catalyst Center for Nonprofit Management," as saying
nonprofit health care organizations are competing with for-profit organizations for talent, so they must offer competitive wages.


Our executives are brilliant

Ms Morgan immediately segued into a claim that executives
have to make sure that somebody's in charge that has the capability to make sure that, if I'm on that procedure table, things are in place to take care of me,

Mr Mosteller had a different version of the brilliance argument.
'It's been extremely challenging with the Affordable Care Act and Medicare, and that all results in some very big challenges within the health care arena,' he said. 'It is by no means an easy nonprofit to run and manage. It's become increasingly complex to operate and fulfill your mission in those environments.'

Similarly, "J Andrew Weidman, chairman of the board of directors for Penn State Health St. Joseph," put all three talking points into one sentence,
'To be in the best position to recruit and retain vital and talented employees, we must pay competitive wages,' Weidman said.

So did "Brian Downs, director of media relations for Lehigh Valley Health Network," who worked for CEO Ronald W Swinfard, who pulled down $1.32 million,
'To attract and retain the highest caliber health care professionals needed to sustain the quality of care LVHN provides to our community, and to oversee the operation of a nearly $2 billion organization, we must offer compensation that is competitive with organizations we compete with for talent in the job market,' Downs said.
Note that several of these experts/ commenators worked directly for the very well compensated hospital system CEOs of interest, and the others apparently worked for firms that got financial support from these CEOs' hospital systems. 

No Questions Asked

While the Eagle quoted multiple proponents of high executive pay repeating all the talking points, the reporter apparently did not challenge any of them to justify any of the talking points in the context of interest.  In particular, no one provided any evidence that any of the particular executives are so brilliant, or as the article implies, why ALL local executives are brilliant.  How can there not be a single average one in the bunch?

In fact, a quick Google search reveals reasons to questions the brilliance of at least some of them.  For example, Hershey Medical Center, whose CEO was the highest paid of the group, has proposed a controversial merger which is the subject of strong opposition by the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC).  (See articles in Modern Healthcare and PennLive.  Per Modern Healthcare, the FTC is claiming that the merger would lead to "higher prices and diminished quality [of care]." Especially given that the FTC seemingly has a high threshold to challenge a hospital system merger, its opposition certainly suggests questions about current hospital management.  Also, Lancaster General Health, whose CEO was the second best paid of the group, had to pause a big expansion project because of cost overruns (see this article in Lancaster Online), and suffered a major outage of its electronic health record (EHR) system (see this article in Lancaster Online).  

Yet the Reading Eagle reporter did not raise these incidents, nor question anyone about the supposed brilliance of the leaders at the institutions that suffered them.

Furthermore, many of the points made on behalf of high executive pay raised obvious questions that were not asked.  For example,  Ms Morgan was not asked whether any executives actually have been recently "poached."  Ms Bergvall was not asked to name the for-profit organizations with which the hospital systems was competing for talent.   Strikingly, Ms Bergvall also was not asked to justify the assertion that it is the responsibility of hospital managers, not physicians, to make sure that "when I am on the procedure table, things are in place to take care of me."

Even more strikingly, Ms Bergvall was apparently not questioned further after she suggested that CEOs may command more pay simply because  they may feel entitled to a big dollop of all the money flowing throught he health care system
when nonprofit organizations bill for services, like hospitals do, they usually have the financial resources to compensate people well.  
'In the health care industry, you have an income stream that allows you to pay better,' Bergvall said.


Of course, many of the media reports on high executive compensation in health care do not report any cross-examination of its supporters.  Perhaps these advocates refused to respond to such questions, or the reporters felt too intimidated to challenge them.

But nearly all articles that try to delve into executive compensation at all at least quote some experts who are skeptical of current practices.  And there are real reasons to be skeptical.  As we discussed here, there is a strong argument that huge executive compensation is more a function of executives' political influence within the organization than their brilliance or the likelihood they are likely to be fickle and jump ship even bigger pay.  This influence is partially generated by their control over their institutions' marketers, public relations flacks, and lawyers.  It is partially generated by their control over the make up of the boards of trustees who are supposed to exert governance, especially when these boards are subject to conflicts of interest and  are stacked with hired managers of other organizations. 

This article included no such attempts at balance.  So it ended up more like propaganda for managers' current privileged position in health care than journalistic inquiry.  It is sad to see reporting about important health policy issues devolve into propaganda to support the status quo, and those who personally profit the most from it.  But perhaps those who work at the Reading Eagle hesitate to offend those who are making the most from the current system.  It appears that the newspaer is owned by the Reading Eagle Company, and this, in turn is owned by the Barbey family, which according to Politico also

controls the publicly-traded lifestyle clothier VF Corporation (Nautica, Jansport, Wrangler, Timberland, Lee, Vans, etc.) and is ranked no. 48 on Forbes' list of America's richest families.


Discussion

We will not make any progress reducing current health care dysfunction if we cannot have an honest conversation about what causes it and who profits from it.  In a democracy, we depend on journalists and the news media to provide the information needed to inform such a discussion.  When the news media becomes an outlet for  propaganda in support of the status quo, the anechoic effect is magnified, honest discussion is inhibited, and out democracy is further damaged.

True health care reform requires ending the anechoic effect, exposing the web of conflicts of interest that entangle health care, publicizing who benefits most from the current dysfunction, and how and why.  But it is painfully obvious that the people who have gotten so rich from the current status quo will use every tool at their disposal, paying for them with the money they have extracted from patients and taxpayers, to defend their position.  It will take grit, persistence, and courage to persevere in the cause of better health for patients and the public. 

Monday, 2 May 2016

Princess Health and Who Benefits?  - Hospital Profits and Quality May Fall, But Hospital Executives' Compensation Keeps Rising. Princessiccia

Princess Health and Who Benefits? - Hospital Profits and Quality May Fall, But Hospital Executives' Compensation Keeps Rising. Princessiccia

Despite recent attempts at health care reform, US health care dysfunction seems to proceed inexorably with ever rising costs, and continuing problems with access and quality.  A likely reason is that those who find the current system personally profitable are in a position to resist real reform.  The people who seem to gain the most from the status quo are top hired executives of big health care organizations.

In particular, stories about huge pay for hospital and hospital system managers continuously appear in the media.  For example, starting in October, 2015, we saw the following headlines:

- Pittsburgh, PA, October, 2015: "Former Highmark CEO Made Nearly $10 Million in 2014, Tax Records Show"
- Regarding Rochester General and Unity health systems in Rochester, NY, November, 2015: "Here's Why Execs Got Millions After Health Merger"
- Regarding the CEO of North Shore-LIJ Health System in NY, November, 2015: "This Guy Makes $10M a Year to Head a Nonprofit"
- In Idaho, February, 2016, "Pay for 9 Treasure Valley Nonprofit Hospital Employees Hits or Tops $1 Million"

Even more interesting are stories that show massive compensation of executives despite their hospitals' apparent poor performance.  Since October, 2015, we also found the following (in chronological order)


Let Go After "Uneven Financial Performance," CEO of Kaleida Health Got $1.6 Million of Severance in One Year, with More to Come

In November, 2015 the Buffalo (NY) New reported that James R Kaskie, the CEO of Kaleida Health, the "largest healthcare provider in Western New York," per its website, was "forced out" when

the board cited a need for a change in leadership amid an uneven financial performance for the system....

Nonetheless,

Kaleida Health paid $1.6 million in 2014 to its former CEO, James R. Kaskie, after forcing him out early last year, according to its most recent federal regulatory filing.

Also,

Kaleida will pay Kaskie 24 months of severance under the terms of Kaskie�s employment contract with the system, John R. Koelmel, chairman of the Kaleida board, told The Buffalo News on Thursday.

Kaskie was paid 10 months of severance plus deferred compensation, which is the $1.6 million reflected in the latest regulatory filing. He will be paid 12 months of severance in 2015 and a final two months of severance in 2016.

Mr Kaskie was paid even better the year before:

Kaskie earned $1.9 million in 2013, his last year as CEO.

Furthermore, other executives who were let go after Mr Kaskie's departure also were very well paid,

Dr. Margaret W. Paroski, former executive vice president and chief medical officer, who was replaced by Lomeo after he took over as CEO last year, $763,552.

Joseph M. Kessler, former executive vice president and chief financial officer, who was replaced by Lomeo, $608,454.
The article explained that

Hospitals, corporations and other entities negotiate severance agreements as part of the employment contracts when they hire top executives
So not only to these executives earn top dollar, but their earnings continue even if they lose their jobs because of poor performance. When asked to explain these levels of remuneration, and contracts that allow executives to get continuing pay even after being "forced out" for "uneven financial performance," John R Koelmel, the chairman of the system's board, said

Companies pay at market. To recruit the best talent, you need to pay at least market.

Public Hospital MetroHealth Medical Center Scored Below Average on Patient Satisfaction and Quality, but CEO Got $1.1 Million

In March, 2016, Cleveland Ohio television station NewsNet5 reported

MetroHealth Medical Center is a public hospital that is supported with $32.4 million of taxpayer money--roughly 5 percent of the hospital's budget.

Also,

a check with a federal database of patient satisfaction levels and quality measures at hospitals across the country found MetroHealth fell below the national average.

Nonetheless, its CEO, Dr Akram Boutos, got $1.1 million in salary, and presumably considerably more in bonuses.

Dr J B Silvers, '"a nationally recognized expert on hospital CEO compensation and professor at Case Western Reserve's business school," who is a MetroHealth board member,

insisted that Dr. Boutros is being fairly compensated when compared to his peers. 

Furthermore,

He admitted the salary is first tied to profits--then a series of other quality measures like patient care, diversity, hospital improvements and employee satisfaction.

But the ties to satisfaction and quality may not bind, because he then tried to explain away the quality and satisfaction data,

Silvers argues those surveys may be misleading.

'Populations like ours, Medicaid populations, uncompensated care--poor people tend to rate organizations lower,' said Silvers.

But then admitted it was really about the money,

'We have to have a target in terms of financial performance because if you don't make the money you can't be in business,' said Silvers.

In Massachusetts, "As Hospital Profits Fall, Executive Pay Soars"

In April, 2016, the Lowell (MA) Sun published a long report on local hospital executive compensation.  It started

It has been a lean couple of years for the region's hospitals.

Drawn by the higher reimbursement rates that insurers pay to academic teaching hospitals, such as those in Boston, more physicians are affiliating themselves with those institutions. Patients are following, and so is the money.

Some community hospitals, including Lowell General Hospital and Emerson Hospital in Concord, saw profit margins drop by more than half from 2012 to 2014.

Other hospitals' financial indicators, like ratios of assets to liabilities, are also weakening,...

However,

As they look to weather those storms and protect their space in a rapidly changing health-care landscape, the boards of directors of the region's hospitals have doubled down on a key investment: their executives.

'Each organization has to make its own decisions about how it can best compete in the marketplace,' said Gary Young, director of Northeastern University's Center for Health Policy and Healthcare Research.

Senior executives of hospitals and health-care systems -- there's a competitive market for that kind of talent ... some would say when organizations run into trouble, they need to spend more to get leaders.'

So,

At Lawrence General Hospital, compensation paid to top non-physician administrators increased 41 percent from 2012 to 2014, according to tax documents. President and CEO Dianne Anderson, who heads the list, was paid a total package of $884,092 in 2014.

Also,

From 2012 to 2014, Lahey Health's non-physician executives saw a compensation increase of 36 percent. A large part of that increase was in the salary of Dr. Howard Grant, who was promoted from president and CEO of Lahey Clinic to president and CEO of the entire Lahey Health system. The system includes facilities throughout northeastern Massachusetts and southern New Hampshire. Grant received $1.7 million in 2014.

In addition,

Lowell General Hospital's executives saw a slightly smaller increase during that three-year span, at 18 percent, although CEO Normand Deschene remains the highest-paid hospital executive in the region with a package worth $1.9 million in 2014. The hospital also pays the taxes on retirement benefits, which are worth hundreds of thousands of dollars, for Deschene and several other executives.

The justifications for these increases in times of financial trouble were similar.  For example, re Lawrence General Hospital,

'Because we're resource-limited, compared to (academic) hospitals, we're even more dependent in these challenging times to bring in somebody who can manage risk,' said Richard Santagati, chairman of Lawrence General's executive compensation committee. 'It takes a different breed and there's real competition for these people ... and once you have them there, you want to keep them because there's a learning curve there that is unique to each hospital.'

Re Lahey Clinic,

'Our executive compensation is comparable to the programs of other, similarly sized health networks and is reflective of the complex role of an executive leader at a leading health system,' Lahey Health said in a statement.

Finally, at Lowell General Hospital, the CEO defended his own pay:

'Lowell General has weathered significant changes in the delivery of health care,' Deschene said. 'At a time when many hospitals have failed, it's very crucial and critical that we have very talented individuals to lead the hospital.' 

The Usual Talking Points Again Invoked

Hospital management used the usual talking points to justify the pay they received,  As I wrote last year 

It seems nearly every attempt made to defend the outsize compensation given hospital and health system executives involves the same arguments, thus suggesting they are talking points, possibly crafted as a public relations ploy. We first listed the talking points here, and then provided additional examples of their use. here, here here, here, here, and here, here and here

They are:
- We have to pay competitive rates
- We have to pay enough to retain at least competent executives, given how hard it is to be an executive
- Our executives are not merely competitive, but brilliant (and have to be to do such a difficult job).
So in the stories above, we found, for example:

- Competitive Rates: "you need to pay at least market" (Kaleida), and "there's real competition for these people" (Lawrence General)
- Retention: "you want to keep them" (Lawrence General)
- Brilliance: "the best talent" (Kaleida),  "very talented individuals" (Lowell General)

It appears that those justifying huge executive payments have all been handed these same talking points.

Yet none of them quite make sense.  The brilliance argument is particularly suspect in cases like those above of CEOs whose hospitals' performance was clearly not brilliant according to the metrics supposedly used to judge them. 

Economists Challenge the Management Dogma Justifying Huge Executive Compensation

Furthermore, these talking points seem to derive from decreasingly credible current management dogma about executive compensation propagated by business schools.

The Invisible Hand, or A Hand on the Scales?

For example, writing in the Independent during January, 2016, Ben Chu questioned the market fundamentalist theory that all employees pay has been perfectly chosen by the infallible invisible hand of the market:

When confronted with an outburst of public anger over massive corporate pay for a privileged few, a common response of the libertarian right is to invoke the economics of the free market.

Such spectacular rewards, we�re informed, are delivered by individuals selling their labour in a free market. And because such pay levels were set through this natural process, no one has the moral right to question them. Further, to interfere with such natural processes would be economically inefficient, making us all worse off in the end.

Such contentions are based on

a venerable economic theory [that is] behind this kind of reasoning. At the end of the 19th century, the American economist John Bates Clark hypothesised that in a perfectly competitive economy, demand for labour is determined by its 'marginal productivity' and wage rates are determined by the 'marginal product' of labour.

To translate, if a firm can make a profit by adding another worker to its payroll, it will do so. And the amount a firm will be willing to pay for that labour in wages will be determined by the additional profit the individual worker adds to the company�s bottom line. So if a worker adds a lot of profit, he or she can command a lot of compensation. But if they add only a little profit, he or she will get only a little. This means people with low personal productivity get small amounts. But people with high personal productivity (chief executives for instance) receive big bucks.

For a start, how does a company know what the marginal product of an individual worker is, or will be? This isn�t something that is directly measurable. The vast majority of us work in teams; how is it possible for management to determine our individual contribution to the financial success of that team, or of that team to the company? How can a business know how much of the profit added was due to the individual�s particular skills? The conditions necessary for the Clark theory that everyone gets what they 'deserve' don�t exist.

But isn�t the marginal product of bosses, who make big strategic decisions, easier to measure? The ASI cites the late Steve Jobs of Apple as an employee who was clearly worth a lot. However, there are plenty of other chief executives whose individual contribution is impossible to measure. Yes, the company�s share price might have gone up. But was this because the boss was smart? Or just lucky?

Furthermore,

The economist Dani Rodrik, in his latest book Economics Rules, argues that such broad theories of income distribution by the market are best viewed as intellectual 'scaffolding', adding: 'They are shallow approaches that identify the proximate causes but need to be backed up with considerable detail'.

And there are other theories of wage determination that are likely to be relevant. One important one is bargaining theory. This suggests that those who have political power within a firm can extract more than those without it. Maybe the reason chief executives tend to get paid ever growing multiples of the pay of the average worker is not because they are 'worth it' but because they are powerful. As the economist JK Galbraith put it: 'The salary of the chief executive of a large corporation is not a market award for achievement. It is frequently in the nature of a warm personal gesture by the individual to himself.'

The Dangers of Pay for Performance

In a February, 2016, article in the Harvard Business Review, Cable and Vermeulen challenged the dogma that managers' (and in health care, physicians' and other professionals') pay should largely be based on "performance."

performance-based pay can actually have dangerous outcomes for companies that implement it.

They cited five points based on at least some research evidence to back up their contention.

1. Contingent pay only works for routine tasks. Companies should abolish contingent pay for their top executives because theirs is the least appropriate job for it. Decades of strong evidence make it clear that large performance-related incentives work for routine tasks, but are detrimental when the tasks is not standard and requires creativity.

***

2. Fixating on performance can weaken it. The goal of most executive incentive plans is to focus leaders on hitting goals and achieving outcomes. After all, that�s why it�s often called performance-based pay.' But as researchers have found, if you want great performance, performance is the wrong goal to fixate on.

Several studies have shown that when employees frame their goals around learning (i.e., developing a particular competence; acquiring a new set of skills; mastering a new situation) it improves their performance compared with employees who frame their work around performance outcomes (i.e., hitting results targets; proving competence; seeking favorable judgments from others).

***

3. Intrinsic motivation crowds out extrinsic motivation. When people feel intrinsically motivated, they do things because they inherently want to, for their own satisfaction and sense of achievement. When people are extrinsically motivated, they do things because they will receive bigger rewards. The goal of contingent pay is to increase extrinsic motivation � but intrinsic motivation is fundamental to creativity and innovation.

***

4. Contingent pay leads to cooking the books. When a large proportion of a person�s pay is based on variable financial incentives, those people are more likely to cheat. In academic terms, we would put it this way: extrinsic motivation causes people to distort the truth regarding goal attainment.

When people are largely motivated by the financial rewards for hitting results, it becomes attractive to game the metrics and make it seem as though a payout is due. For example, different studies have shown that paying CEOs based on stock options significantly increases the likelihood of earnings manipulations, shareholder lawsuits, and product safety problems. When people�s remuneration depends strongly on a financial measure, they are going to maximize their performance on that measure; no matter how.

***

 5. All measurement systems are flawed. Incentive plans demand that some metric be used as the trigger for a payout. The problem is that whatever package you construct � bonds, stocks, or bonuses � whatever performance criteria you decide on will be imperfect. For a complex job such as senior management, it is simply not possible to precisely measure someone�s �actual� performance, given that it consists of many different stakeholders� interests, tangible and tacit resources, and short- and long-term effects. Even with HR executives clamoring for enhanced �people analytics� (and technology companies bending over backwards to deliver them) any measure you choose is going to be an inadequate representation of how you would like your CEO to behave.
Note first that these points suggest that the increased use of performance based pay for health care organizations' top managers may explain why many health care organizations actually perform so badly, and point 4 may help explain why pay for performance may actually help increase health care corruption.  

Note further that pay for performance (P4P) for health care professionals has been strongly pushed by many health policy experts, yet all these points also seem applicable to that usage.

Conclusion - Change Will be Resisted

So even when non-profit hospitals and hospital systems perform poorly, their executives continue to receive ever greater remuneration.  The executives, their public relations flacks, and their often compliant boards of trustees continue to cite the same stale talking points to justify their pay.  Yet these talking points are based on market fundamentalist theory and business school dogma whose credibility is increasingly challenged.  In the absence of anyone willing to confront them with these criticisms, the apologists for soaring health care executive pay continue to prattle their tired talking points.    

Meanwhile, as corporate governance expert Robert A G Monks said in a 2014 interview,
Chief executive officers' pay is both the symptom and the disease.

Also,
CEO pay is the thermometer. If you have a situation in which, essentially, people pay themselves without reference to history or the value added or to any objective criteria, you have corroboration of... We haven't fundamentally made progress about management being accountable.


Moreover, top health care executives' power to make warm personal gestures to themselves correlates with the ability to defend this power, per Mr Monks,
People with power are very reluctant to give it up. While all of us recognize the problem, those with the power to change it like things the way they are.
So I expect that many hospital and health system CEOs, like leaders of other big health care organizations, may talk about health care reform, but will avoid talking about, and will likely oppose attempts at real reform using their command of their organizations' marketers, public relations flacks, lobbyists, and lawyers.


We need true health care reform that would enable leadership that understands the health care context, upholds health care professionals' values, and puts patients' and the public's health ahead of extraneous, particularly short-term financial concerns. We need health care governance that holds health care leaders accountable, and ensures their transparency, integrity and honesty.  What we will get is endless resistance to such reform from those who personally profit from the current dysfunctional, and increasingly corrupt system.

Friday, 25 March 2016

Princess Health and Will There Ever Be Enough Straws to Break Corporate Health Care Managers' Impunity's Back? - Novartis Settles Yet Again, This Time for Bribing Doctors. Princessiccia

Umpteenth verse, same as the first...

As just reported by Bloomberg,

Novartis AG said it agreed to pay $25 million to settle a U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission case that claimed the Swiss drugmaker paid bribes to health professionals in China to increase sales from 2009 to 2013.

In particular,

The SEC detailed a number of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations where Novartis employees provided items of value to health-care professionals in China, under the supervision of complicit managers. It also cited examples of how the company improperly recorded as legitimate expenses payments employees made for travel and entertainment, conferences, lecture fees, marketing events, educational seminars and medical studies.

For some vivid examples,

In one example cited in the SEC order on Novartis, a sales representative at the drugmaker�s Sandoz China subsidiary submitted a $1,154 receipt to buy holiday gifts for 25 health-care professionals, which was instead used to pay for their spa and sauna sessions. A regional sales manager approved the purchase, the SEC said.

The SEC order also cited how Sandoz China sponsored 20 health-care professionals to attend a 2009 medical conference in Chicago. During the trip, the company paid for the group�s recreational activities such as a Niagara Falls excursions, $150 in 'walking around' money for their spouses, and cover charges to a strip club. The group was accompanied by a Sandoz China senior manager and other staff, according to the SEC.

So, thus far, the allegations were that Novaris bribed Chinese physicians to use their products, and the bribes includes gifts, travel money, and admission to a strip club.  It is likely that these bribes induced the physicians to unnecessarily or excssively prescribe Sandoz drugs to patients, leading to excess expenses, overtreatment, and quite likely adverse effects that should have been prevented.

As per the Wall Street Journal, and as usually happens in such cases, Novartis was allowed to settle without "admitting or denying the findigs." In the Bloomberg article, a Novartis spokesperson gave the usual vague response,

'The issues raised by the SEC, which relate to our subsidiaries in China and go back as far as 2009, largely pre-date many of the compliance-related measures introduced by Novartis across its global organization in recent years,' Novartis spokesman Eric Althoff said in an e-mailed statement Thursday.

The implication was that the company no longer does these bad things, but did not include a promise not to do them. And, of course, just like in many, many other health care cases, and in many, many other cases involving big, powerful, or influential organizations, no one at a top management level went to jail, or even suffered any negative consequences, even for such sleazy allegations as those in this case.  Finally, partially because the amount of this settlement was so small related to the financial bulk of the company involved, this case was relatively anechoic, only reported in the small items in the business press.

Summary

As we are distracted by bloviating billionaires and other spectacles on the US 2016 campaign trail, we continue to accumulate evidence of the corruption of large health care organizations and the impunity of their leaders.  Yet this evidence remains anechoic, even given the apparent recidivism involved.  For example, it was only in last November that we discussed what were then the latest misadventures by Novartis and its leadership.  At that time, our post included these section headings covering 2014-15:

-  Japanese Health, Labor and Welfare Ministry Found that Novartis Concealed Serious Adverse Effects
- Novartis Executive Pleads Guilty to Bribing Polish Official
- Novartis Subsidiary Sandoz Settles Allegations that it Misrepresented Pricing Data to US Medicaid
- Express Scripts Settles Allegations that it Accepted Kickbacks from Novartis
- Novartis Settles US Allegations of Kickbacks to Enhance Sales of Multiple Drugs

Furthermore, in that post we also documented Novartis' previous record.   In March, 2014, we had noted:
- Italian authorities had fined Novartis and Roche for colluding to promote the use of an expensive opthamologic treatment
- the NY Times published interviews with physicians ostensibly showing how Novartis turned them into marketers for the drug Starlix
- Japanese investigators charged Novartis with manipulating clinical research
- Indian regulators canceled a Novartis import license, charging the company with fraud.

Also,  in 2013, Novartis was fined for anti-competitive practices in its marketing of Fentanyl by the European Commission (look here), and in 2011 its Sandoz subsidiary settled allegations of misreporting prices in the US for $150 million (look here)   Other Novartis misadventures from 2010 and earlier appear here.  So Novartis has quite an impressive, if not infamous record of ethical failures.

Yet no Novartis top manager suffered any negative consequences then (although one apparent mid-level company manager at the Polish subsidiary did plead guilty), and all these previous episodes apparently did not suggest a pattern of recidivism to US authorities this time sufficient to attempt to impose any negative consequences on higher level managers.  Meanwhile, Novartis executives continue to be paid handsomely.  The 2015 Novartis executive compensation report listed over 51 million Swiss francs paid

Also, this goes on while large health care companies continue to pay out dizzying amounts to physicians, health care professionals, hospitals and academic institutions, which partially may secure their loyalty.  Novartis, for example, which ProPublica lists as only the 28th biggest payer to physicians, paid out $31.7  million in 2013-14 just to US physicians.    The 2015 Novartis board of directors included Dr Nancy C Andrews, the Dean of the Duke Medical School and Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs at Duke University,  Dr Dimitri Azar, Dean of the College of Medicine at the University of Chicago, Illinois, and Dr Charles L Sawyers, a professor and department chair at Weill-Cornell Medical School.   I am unaware that anyone of them have publicly raised any concerns about Novartis' recent misadventures, although I am also unaware whether anyone has publicly asked them such questions. 

No wonder that ordinary US (and other countries' citizens) feel that they are trapped in a hopeless economic situation by rigged systems designed to benefit from the corrupt insiders.  No wonder that someone of them are seeking the protection of some of those powerful insiders.  But I digress...

In terms of health care, as we have said like a broken record (if anyone remembers what that means), or, if you prefer, where every verse is same as the first...

There seems to be increasing recognition that the continuing rise in US health care costs is unsustainable, and that these costs are not buying us good health care.  There are calls to avoid unnecessary, and sometimes harmful care.  Yet there is a persistent disconnect between how continuing dishonest behavior by health care organizations, impunity of their leaders, and lack of accountability by their board members fuel rising costs, shrinking access, and bad outcomes for patients.

To truly reform health care, we will have to at least recognize the causes of the current dysfunction.  Recognizing how health care dysfunction is created by unaccountable, dishonest leadership should lead to true reform that would promote well-informed, honest, accountable leadership that puts patients' and the public's health ahead of personal gain.

Our musical interlude ("second verse, same as the first,") Herman's Hermits, Henry VIII



Sunday, 7 February 2016

Princess Health and The Rich (Hospital Managers) Get Richer - Carolinas Healthcare Raises Executive Compensation Once Again. Princessiccia

Princess Health and The Rich (Hospital Managers) Get Richer - Carolinas Healthcare Raises Executive Compensation Once Again. Princessiccia

It's that time of year again.  Carolinas Healthcare has made public its executive compensation, and once again, its CEO got a big raise, and many other executives made more than a million dollars. And once again, the CEO's raise exceeds the rate of inflation, and seems totally unrelated to how well the health system fulfilled its mission.

The History of Executive Compensation at Carolinas Healthcare

About a year ago, we noted that CEO Michael Tarwater got $5.3 million in total compensation.  In fact, we have been following his compensation since 2009 (see also posts in 2011, 2012, and 2013).  It started big, and got bigger.

- $3.4 million in 2009
- $3.7 million in 2010
- $4.2 million in 2011
- $4.76 million in 2012
- $4.9 million in 2013
- $5.3 million in 2014

The Latest Increases

Now the yearly update by Karen Garloch writing in the Charlotte Observer:

-$6.6 million in 2015

That is a 26% increase in one year, and an almost 100% increase since 2009, increases far greater than inflation.  The 2015 compensation broke down as follows:

In 2015, Tarwater received a salary of $1.28 million, two bonuses totaling $5 million, and other compensation, including retirement and health benefits of $305,318....

In contrast, the bonuses given to non-management personnel by the system were orders of magnitude smaller:

Among nonmanagement employees, more than 22,000 in Carolinas HealthCare�s Charlotte-area hospitals received 2015 incentive bonuses of $1,000 each, and 7,674 others received bonuses of $300 or $600 each, Moore said. Another �special bonus� program benefited about 24,000 employees, who received $1,000 each, and 7,568 others, who got $300 or $600 each. Total bonuses for nonmanagement employees came to $53.4 million, in addition to annual pay raises that averaged 2 percent.

Although that total sounds large in isolation, consider that one person, the CEO, got a bonus equal to one-tenth of all the bonuses given to over 24,000 other employees.

Other top executives also did very well for themselves.  

? Joseph Piemont, former chief operating officer: $3,200,326
? Greg Gombar, chief financial officer: $2, 334,150
? Terrence Akin, CEO of Cone Health: $1,964,482
? Dr. Roger Ray, chief physician executive: $1,957,065
? John Knox, chief administrative officer: $1,507,984
? Paul Franz, executive vice president: $1,500,245
? Dennis Phillips, executive vice president: $1,400,487
? Keith Smith, general counsel: $1,317,919
? Debra Plousha Moore, chief human resources officer: $1,306,477

CHS hospital presidents - 2015
? Phyllis Wingate, president, CHS NorthEast: $1,045,784
 ? Spencer Lilly, president, Carolinas Medical Center: $868,610
? Christopher Hummer, president, CHS Pineville: $711,685
? Michael Lutes, president, CHS Union: $690,719
? Brian Gwyn, president, CHS Cleveland: $664,034
? William Leonard, president, CHS University: $530,493
? Peter Acker, president, CHS Lincoln: $475,758
? Alfred Taylor, president, Stanly Regional Medical Center: $455,665
? Robert Larrison, president, Carolinas Rehabilitation: $407,503
The Usual Talking Points for Justification

Hospital management used the usual talking points to justify the pay they received,  As I wrote last year 
It seems nearly every attempt made to defend the outsize compensation given hospital and health system executives involves the same arguments, thus suggesting they are talking points, possibly crafted as a public relations ploy. We first listed the talking points here, and then provided additional examples of their use. here, here here, here, here, and here, here and here

They are:
- We have to pay competitive rates
- We have to pay enough to retain at least competent executives, given how hard it is to be an executive
- Our executives are not merely competitive, but brilliant (and have to be to do such a difficult job).
So, as if on cue, according to an article in the Charlotte Business Journal,

Carolinas HealthCare said in a statement that its executive compensation program is 'designed to attract, recruit and retain high-performing executives by providing market-competitive, reasonable and fair compensation.'

It notes that recruiting and retaining talent enables the health-care system to pursue 'its mission, lead in the transformation of healthcare and provide best-in-class care to our communities.'
Despite Evidence of Less than High Performance


But some recent news articles suggested that Carolinas Healthcare management is not so high-performing.  For example, we found the following articles, discussed in chronological order,

"Lawsuit: Hospitals Cheated Medicare out of Millions" (Charlotte Observer, September 2, 2015)

A newly unsealed lawsuit alleges that Carolinas Medical Center and N.C. Baptist Hospital have fraudulently obtained tens of millions of dollars from Medicare and Medicaid through an arrangement that artificially inflated their expenses.

The federal suit, filed by Forsyth County whistleblower Joe Vincoli, contends that the two hospitals overstated their costs � and thereby extracted more money from Medicare � by using a company that they own to provide health benefits to their employees.

"Employee Satisfaction at Carolinas HealthCare System Dropped in 2015" (Charlotte Observer, November 6, 2015)

The system had been rated at the 99th percentile in 2012, the 95th percentile in 2013-4, and dropped to the 76th percentile in 2015. The article stated that employees blamed staffing issues and poor leadership.

"Rehab Center Drops Program" (WSOC-TV, January 5, 2016)

The inpatient drug treatment program at First Step at Carolinas Medical Center - Union was dropped for reasons said to be "part financial- and part research-based." The overseer of the local drug treatment court decried the loss of a "very valuable" program.

"Hospitals Failed to Report Outbreaks Linked to Tainted Scopes, Senate Report Says" (Los Angeles Times, January 22, 2016)

This article lead with the failure of Carolinas Medical Center to report an infection apparently caused by the use of an endoscope that later was implicated in multiple infections at multiple hospitals.  The article noted that

Federal law requires hospitals to report deaths from a medical device to the FDA within 10 days. If the device seriously injures a patient, the hospital must notify the manufacturer within 10 days. Both notices require hospitals to fill out what the FDA calls Form 3500A.

"Notice: 360 to Lose Jobs at Health Care Facility" (WSOC-TV, January 26, 2016)

The article noted layoffs at Carolinas Medical Center- Main Rehabilitation program but noted "it's not clear why the positions are being eliminated."

So instead of high performance, the recent track-record of hospital system management included allegations of defrauding the federal government, a marked decrease in employee satisfaction, the closing of an apparently valuable rehabilitation program, the failure to report apparent adverse effects of a medical device despite requirements in federal law, and layoffs at a rehabilitation facility.  

No wonder that Karen Garloch reported in her February, 2016 article,

On hearing about the latest CHS compensation report, Mecklenburg County commissioner Pat Cotham said, 'It�s kind of depressing. � Nothing against Mr. Tarwater personally. He�s led a successful organization. � Generally I struggle with these multimillion-dollar deals. Is anybody really that valuable?'

The question becomes more acute given that it is not even clear whether Carolinas Healthcare is a private non-profit organization or a government agency.  As we noted last year, per Ms Garloch,

The system is technically a hospital authority, created by state law in 1943, and is run by a self-perpetuating board that includes top community and business leaders whose nominations get approval from the commissioners� chairman. Over the years, chairmen have acknowledged that action is basically a rubber stamp.

A recently closed investigation by the U.S. Department of Labor focused on whether the hospital system is a governmental agency, as it claims. On Thursday, commissioner Bill James said that question remains open and might have bearing on compensation.

James said documents in the investigation included a statement by a lawyer for CHS who said hospital debts 'have been and will be backstopped by the County�s taxing power.' But James said state law has given commissioners no oversight role in connection with CHS.

'I don�t know how CHS can expect taxpayers to �backstop� their billions of debt with County tax dollars without any oversight over it,' James wrote in an email.

'I do not know what is just compensation for a hospital CEO,' James wrote. But he added that most government agencies have 'typical limitations on pay.'

You would think that all those people who loudly critique spending by the "gummint" would be loudly decrying pay at Carolinas Healthcare.  However, I can find no evidence of such protests.

Summary

Whether the top managers of Carolinas Healthcare are government bureaucrats or non-profit executives, they seem to manage to pay themselves more each year, regardless of what other employees are paid, regardless of inflation, and regardless of how well the organization is upholding its health care mission.  This is another example of ho hospital managers have become "value extractors."  The opportunity to extract value has become a major driver of managerial decision making.  And this decision making is probably the major reason our health care system is so expensive and inaccessible, and why it provides such mediocre care for so much money.

So to repeat, true health care reform would put in place leadership that understands the health care context, upholds health care professionals' values, and puts patients' and the public's health ahead of extraneous, particularly short-term financial concerns. We need health care governance that holds health care leaders accountable, and ensures their transparency, integrity and honesty.

Thursday, 21 January 2016

Princess Health and Health Care Managers as Ever More Effective Value Extractors - Following Up on Novant Health and Cape Cod Healthcare. Princessiccia

Princess Health and Health Care Managers as Ever More Effective Value Extractors - Following Up on Novant Health and Cape Cod Healthcare. Princessiccia

The ever increasing compensation of top managers of health care organizations provides incentives to continue business as usual.  We have frequently discussed executive compensation for top health care leaders that seems wildly disproportionate to their contribution to their organizations' health care mission.

Furthermore, not only does executive compensation seem to have anti-gravity properties, rising even at institutions facing financial challenges, or while other employees face salary cuts and job loss, but it continues even after the lack of justification for it has been called out.

Herein we discuss two examples of continuing anti-gravity compensation that occurred at institutions we have previously cited for similar problems.  These are discussed in the order of their appearance in the media.  


Novant Health
 
In 2011, we first noted that executives of Novant Health, headquarted in Winston-Salem, NC, were getting raises while they were laying off  more lowly employees.  Then in 2014, we posted about more raises going to Novant executives, again while more lowly employees had their pay cut.

Recently, in December, 2015, Richard Craver, writing for the Winston-Salem Journal, discussed the latest (2014) compensation figures from Novant Health.

Carl Armato, chief executive and president of Novant Health Inc., received a 14.4 percent jump in salary during fiscal 2014 to $1.19 million.

In addition,

Armato is in his fourth year as the system�s top executive. His salary has risen 70.9 percent since he took over as the top executive Jan. 1, 2012, following the retirement of Paul Wiles.

Armato�s incentive compensation increased less than 1 percent to $919,738. Altogether, Armato�s core compensation was $2.59 million.

Other top executives also did very well,

Jeff Lindsay, chief operating officer, received $709,856 in salary, $382,813 in bonus and incentive pay and overall core compensation of $1.23 million. Lindsay, former president of Forsyth Medical Center, was not listed among Novant�s top executives in fiscal 2013.

For the 27 listed current executives, as of Dec. 31, 2014, on Novant�s Form 990 filing with the Internal Revenue Service, the system spent $12.17 million on salaries and $8.73 million on bonuses and incentive pay.

Specifically,

Seven other listed Novant Health Inc. executives received at least $442,000 in salary and core compensation of at least $517,000 for fiscal 2014.

* Fred Hargett, chief financial officer, received a 15.9 percent raise in salary to $708,924, bonus and incentive pay of $565,120 and overall core compensation of $1.54 million.

* Jesse Cureton, chief consumer officer, received a 14.2 percent raise in salary to $573,683, bonus and incentive pay of $472,173 and overall core compensation of $1.07 million.

* Jacqueline Daniels, chief administrative officer, received a 3.9 percent raise in salary to $565,283, bonus and incentive pay of $518,631 and overall core compensation of $1.13 million.

* Sallye Liner, former chief clinical officer, received a 2.9 percent raise in salary to $516,171, bonus and incentive pay of $474,991 and overall core compensation of $1.05 million.

* Dr. Thomas Zweng, chief medical officer, received $470,217 in salary, bonus and incentive pay of $282,014 and overall core compensation of $790,191.

* John Phipps, president of Novant Medical Group, received $459,024 in salary, bonus and incentive pay of $377,219 and overall core compensation of $873,015.

* Peter Brunstetter, chief legal officer, received $442,116 in salary, bonus and incentive pay of $45,000 and overall core compensation of $517,765.

The hospital system trotted out some of the usual talking points used to justify very high pay for top executives.

Novant, like most health care systmes serving North Caroling, says high compensation levels are necessary to recruit and retain executives to run 'a very complex organization.'

That was nearly identical to what they said last year,

Novant, as do most not-for-profit health-care systems serving North Carolina, stresses high compensation levels are necessary to attract executives to run 'a very complex organization.'

Furthermore, the system's board of trustees say

bonuses and incentives are based on annual and three-year goals that 'focus on the quality and safety of health care, improving the patient experience, transforming to an electronic health record, financial stewardship and providing community benefit.'

To put that in perspective, the 27 top executives are about 0.1% of the system's total workforce of "about 25,000."  The $20.9 million used for their salaries, bonuses, and incentive pay (but apparently not retirement benefits and other perks) amounted to 0.55% of the system's total revenue (of about $3.79 billion) and approximately 1% of the approximately $2 billion the system spent on all employee salaries and benefits (according to the Novant 2014 financial statement).

However, just a month before, the Triad Business Journal and Mr Craver again in the Winston-Salem Journal covered a case that certainly questioned the "financial stewardship" of Novant top management, but did seem like some sort of parody of the "community benefit" they provided. Per the former,

Novant Health has reached a preliminary settlement with a group of current and former employees over handling of their retirement plans, with the health system agreeing to pay $32 million and make changes going forward.

The proposed settlement has been agreed to by Novant and the seven plaintiffs, which include a variety of doctors, nurses and other health care workers,...

The point of the litigation was

what plaintiffs claim are excessive fees associated with the system's retirement plan along with 'kick-backs' to a Triad businessman with a long-standing relationship with the health system.

The complaint alleged that during a three-year period starting in 2009, the plan paid excessive compensation of close to $18 million to Colorado-based Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. and brokerage firm D.L. Davis & Co., based in Winston-Salem and operated by CEO and President Derrick Davis.

Along with the allegations of excessive fees, the plaintiffs claimed that entities owned or controlled by Davis benefited from real estate and development deals with Novant Health.

Also,

The agreement would also bar Davis and his companies from being involved in the management of Novant Health retirement plans and would prohibit Novant from entering into any new real estate deals or business relationships with Davis and his companies for at least four years.

As is customary in such cases, a Novant statement said its leadership "do not agree with the claims in the lawsuit," but agreed to the large settlement and other stipulations apparently to avoid "a long and costly legal battle."  But if the complaint was unfounded, how would it be good stewardship not to contest it?  Of course, were it to be true, then there would be even more evidence of poor stewardship.

In fact, for full disclosure, I got to add my skepticism about how Novant recompenses its managers in the text of Mr Craver's December, 2015, article,

'Each organization seems to have their own set of metrics, often frequently adjusted, and that somehow always make their own executives seem good,' Poses said.

'Every organization thinks their executives are above average,' Poses said. 'There are no overseers willing to question executive pay, since boards are mainly executives of other organizations; and executives are always compared only with other executives.' 

Somehow, I doubt that any Novant executives or board members would care about what I said, or that Novant executive pay will not continue to climb, unless push comes to shove.

Cape Cod Healthcare

In January, 2015, we blogged about how the former CEO of Cape Cod Healthcare had been collecting severance pay for 3 years, totaling more than $3 million, after he abruptly left his  and after being sanctioned by the state medical board for faulty prescribing abusable psychoactive drugs (which he allegedly took himself) ; and it was revealed that there were concerns about financial mismanagement at the health care system which he formerly ran.  While CEO of Cape Cod he also presided over multiple layoffs, some of which were of clinical personnel.  At that time, of course, the system board of trustees defended his leadership because they said it improving system finances.

No, on January 14, 2016 the Cape Cod Times reported,

For the fourth year since abruptly leaving Cape Cod Healthcare, former CEO Dr. Richard Salluzzo pulled in a hefty paycheck, according to new financial reports filed with the state attorney general�s office.

Since parting ways with the nonprofit corporation in November 2010, Salluzzo has taken in about $3.5 million, including $407,371 for the most recent year on file, fiscal 2014.

In many ways, this report doubled down on the previous 2015 version. Dr Salluzzo did not merely preside over layoffs, but

During his tenure Salluzzo presided over what he called the largest job cut in Cape Cod Healthcare�s history, a layoff of about 200 employees, in addition to bringing about improvements such as better billing.

The chairman of the system's board of trustees did not merely defend Salluzzo's financial results, but

'The actual performance was just phenomenal,' [Chairman William] Zammer said. 'We have a healthy, vibrant health care system.'

The Cape Cod Times suggested that observers outside the hospital system begged to differ,

But a professor of business ethics at Bentley University in Waltham questioned the extent of Salluzzo�s 'golden parachute,' while the spokesman for a nurses union called it 'outrageous.'

'These post-employment payouts must have been in his initial contract,' said W. Michael Hoffman, executive director of the center for business ethics at Bentley.

'It does sound crazy and wrong given the amount of his golden parachute,' Hoffman said in an email.

'It�s unconscionable we�re still paying someone who left under questionable circumstances,' said David Schildmeier, spokesman for the Massachusetts Nurses Association.

Schildmeier said the money would be better spent on patient care, especially since Cape Cod Healthcare draws a large percentage of its patient revenue from taxpayer-funded Medicare and MassHealth programs.

Dr Salluzzo is gone, but I doubt that the board of trustees is listening to these critics, and again unless push comes to shove, I suspect the new CEO will find his position to be very remunerative.

Summary

As I said in 2015,...

 As health care organizations have become increasingly big and influential, their leadership has been increasingly in the hands of generic professional managers, not health care professionals.  These hired managers have commanded generous and ever increasing pay, which has been justified by the common talking points: managers have extremely hard jobs and are brilliant, and high pay is necessary in a competitive market to attract and maintain top leaders.

Yet none of the boosters of high pay for health care managers, who mainly seem to consist of the legal, marketing, and public relations personnel who answer to them, and occasionally the board members who also are hired manager, answer the obvious questions:
What is the evidence that managers are brilliant and their jobs are so hard, especially when compared to the highly-trained health care professionals at their own institutions?
Is their really a free market in hired managers, and why is it so isolated from the market for health care professionals and other people employed by health care organizations?

These justifications seem particularly ridiculous when managers whose results are obviously not brilliant, e.g., marked by deficits, losses, and lay-offs, are getting huge and increasing pay.  They also seem ridiculous when the "market" apparently dictates salary cuts and lay-offs for all employees other than the managers of a particular organization.

 Instead, it seems likely that hired health care managers make more and more because of the influence they have on their own pay.  This influence is partially generated by their control over their institutions' marketers, public relations flacks, and lawyers.  It is partially generated by their control over the make up of the boards of trustees who are supposed to exert governance, especially when these boards are subject to conflicts of interest and  are stacked with hired managers of other organizations.  Furthermore, per the dogma of pay for performance, their pay may be heavily tied to short-term financial results, rather than fulfillment of the patient care or academic mission.

Thus, as in the larger economy, non-profit hospital managers have become "value extractors."  The opportunity to extract value has become a major driver of managerial decision making.  And this decision making is probably the major reason our health care system is so expensive and inaccessible, and why it provides such mediocre care for so much money.

So to repeat, true health care reform would put in place leadership that understands the health care context, upholds health care professionals' values, and puts patients' and the public's health ahead of extraneous, particularly short-term financial concerns. We need health care governance that holds health care leaders accountable, and ensures their transparency, integrity and honesty.


So push needs to come to shove.  I just posted that generic management/ "managerialism" just drove physicians who are corporate employees of one big health care system to unionize and contest their working conditions and other outcomes of generic management.  I submit that to get true health care reform, physicians, health care professionals, and members of the public concerned about our ever more expensive, yet constantly declining health care system need to do more than just read angry blog posts.

But until they do, I guess I will have an infinite number of follow-up posts, like this one, to write.  

Wednesday, 16 December 2015

Princess Health and How Managerialsm/ Generic Management Damaged the American Red Cross. Princessiccia

Princess Health and How Managerialsm/ Generic Management Damaged the American Red Cross. Princessiccia

The American Red Cross is a storied non-profit organization.  It provides disaster relief, provides a major part of the US blood supply, and has important public health teaching functions, such as teaching cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (look here).  Nonetheless, its operations have become increasingly controversial.  ProPublica has been investigating them for years.  The latest ProPublica report, entitled "The Corporate Takeover of the Red Cross," showed how this renowned organization has suffered under generic management/ managerialism, providing another case study showing how bad generic management and mangerialism are for health care and public health.

We have frequently posted about what we have called generic management, the manager's coup d'etat, and mission-hostile management. Managerialism wraps these concepts up into a single package.  The idea is that all organizations, including health care organizations, ought to be run people with generic management training and background, not necessarily by people with specific backgrounds or training in the organizations' areas of operation.  Thus, for example, hospitals ought to be run by MBAs, not doctors, nurses, or public health experts.  Furthermore, all organizations ought to be run according to the same basic principles of business management.  These principles in turn ought to be based on current neoliberal dogma, with the prime directive that short-term revenue is the primary goal (sometimes in the for-profit sphere called the shareholder value principle, look here.)

The ProPublica article showed how the leadership of the American Red Cross was given over to generic managers; how they ran the organization based on generic business management principles; and how the results were bad for the organization's mission.  I will address each point with quotes from the article, and add the commentary that was lacking in a straight investigative journalistic report.

The New Leaders were Generic Managers

The New CEO is a Generic Manager who Specialized in Marketing

Gail McGovern became Red Cross CEO in 2008.  Her academic background was in the "quantitative sciences."  Her first job was as a computer programmer. Then,

McGovern climbed steadily through the ranks at AT&T. By the mid-1990s, she was head of the company�s consumer markets division....

Next,

McGovern left AT&T in 1998, then spent four years at Fidelity Investments, where she was promoted to be the head of the retail mutual fund and brokerage business. Then came six years as a marketing professor at Harvard Business School....

On the other hand, she apparently had no specific experience, training or expertise relating to the mission of the Red Cross, and specifically no experience, training or expertise in public health, health care, blood banking, or disaster relief.

She Believes in the Primacy of Marketing

Her academic writings spell out her theory of corporate leadership. 'In many organizations, marketing exists far from the executive suite and boardroom,' she and her coauthors wrote in an article for the Harvard Business Review. Companies that make this mistake are doomed to 'low growth and declining margins.'

One could argue that perhaps in the long run, a good product that sells itself might be better for a manufacturing firm than a temporarily persuasive marketing campaign.  Even so, the mission of the Red Cross is not first to grow and make more money, or even to sell products, but instead it is

The American Red Cross prevents and alleviates human suffering in the face of emergencies by mobilizing the power of volunteers and the generosity of donors.
She was Hired by the Red Cross to Promote Generic Management with Emphasis on Marketing

Ms McGovern was hired at a time when the dogma that business managers ought to run everything was becoming very prominent.

McGovern, selected after a global search by a headhunting firm, was seen as a candidate who would bring private-sector methods to the nonprofit. 'Isn�t it great that we have someone that really has had that business expertise in developing and working with a brand and recognizing the power of it?' [Red Cross Board Chairwoman Bonnie] McElveen-Hunter told the Washington Post at the time.

Note that the Chairwoman of the Board of Governors herself was

a wealthy Republican donor appointed by President George W. Bush in 2004

According to Wikipedia, she is a businesswoman whose undergraduate degree was in business, who worked for Bank of America and then founded Pace Communications, and who also has no discernable experience or expertise in health care, public health, or disaster relief.

The ProPublica article did not suggest that Ms McElveen-Hunter or anyone else really thought through how a generica manager practicing managerialism would actually benefit the mission of the Red Cross.

The CEO Recruited Other Generic Managers

Soon after she joined the Red Cross, McGovern recruited executives who had worked with her at AT&T and Fidelity....

Furthermore, 

As part of her effort to run the Red Cross more like a business, McGovern recruited more than 10 former AT&T executives to top positions. The move stirred resentment inside the organization, with some longtime Red Cross hands referring to the charity as the 'AT&T retirement program.'

Again, one would expert a generic manager to feel most comfortable amongst others of her ilk.  Again, any consideration of whether running the Red Cross "more like a business" would improve its success as a charity was not evident.

The New Generic Managers Relied on Generic Management Dogma

The new generic managers conceived of their job as "a corporate turnaround that would touch every aspect of the charity's finances and operations."

They Established Centralized Control

The work of the Red Cross was traditionally done by local chapters. The new generic managers sought to decrease their independence from "corporate."  So,

Each of the Red Cross� more than 700 chapters had its own bank account, tracked its own volunteers, and ran its own computer system. McGovern hoped to realize considerable savings by consolidating these back-office functions, creating what she dubbed 'One Red Cross.'

The notions that different chapters might face different challenges, and hence that flexible local control might do better addressing these challenges than would centralized top-down command were not apparently considered.

They Cut Costs, Particularly Through Cutting Employee Benefits and Laying Them Off

and hence tried to enhance short-term revenue:

She also got to work cutting costs: there was a round of layoffs; she killed the charity�s generous pension program and suspended matching contributions to employees� retirement accounts.

Also,

When McGovern was hired as CEO, there were over 700 Red Cross chapters across the country. Today, there around 250, though some former chapter offices stayed open even as they were folded into other chapters. The Red Cross declined to say how many offices it closed.

Over the course of McGovern�s tenure, the number of paid employees fell from around 36,000 to around 23,000 and the Red Cross today spends several hundred million dollars less a year than it did in 2008. (Most of the staff cuts were from local chapters, not the blood business, though the Red Cross declined to provide a breakdown.)

Cost-cutting, especially by cutting compensation to and benefits of line employees, is a central mantra of current business management.  The effects these cuts have on the morale and performance of the remaining employees, and the downstream effects on the organization are generally ignored.  The specific implications for a charity meant to uphold a mission were not discussed.  

They Focused on Marketing and Public Relations

Early on,

McGovern laid out a vision to increase revenue through 'consolidated, powerful, breathtaking marketing.'

'This is a brand to die for,' she often said.

In addition,

The Red Cross� chief of fundraising, a former colleague of McGovern�s from Fidelity, told the assembled officials that the organization should attract far more than the $520 million in donations it was bringing in annually. 'Strength of brand,' his PowerPoint said, 'justify results in $1-2 billion range.'

Also, CEO McGovern chose Jack McMaster to run the public health training operation,

 praising McMaster to Red Cross staff as a master marketer and a trusted former colleague [at AT&T].

As an aside, actually,

After leaving AT&T, he took a job in 1999 as CEO of a Dutch telecom company called KPNQwest. In just a few years, he had run it into what Reuters called a 'spectacular collapse,' prompting a bankruptcy, a storm of lawsuits, and comparisons to Enron. Just months before the company went under, McMaster publicly boasted that it was poised for dramatic growth.

This suggests that McGovern placed far more priority on hiring "master marketers" than finding trustworthy leaders.   Of course, a CEO who is mainly a professional marketer may see marketing as central to whatever organization she is running.  The notion that the Red Cross had such a wonderful brand because it used to do wonderful things did not apparently occur to the new generic marketers.  Furthermore, the notion that even "master marketing" may not hide the undermining of the organization's mission also did not occur.   

They Suppressed Opinions They Did Not Want to Here

As discontent among staff rose (see below), leading to anguish expressed on social media,

critical posts later disappeared from the Facebook page. Moderator Ryan Kaltenbaugh reminded participants that the group was intended to be 'a POSITIVE forum sharing ideas, stories, pictures, links, videos and more across our great country.'

'[P]lease (please) refrain from posting your negative personal views,' he continued.
To a leadership obsessed with marketing, appearance may have seemed to be everything.  Yet again, suppressing the bad news does not make what generated it disappear.

They Paid Themselves Very Well 

We have often discussed how executive compensation in health care now seems to rise beyond any level that could be justified by the executives' actions and performance.  A central problem with managerialism seems to be that now top managers can virtually set their own pay.  Thus, they have become value extractors, more focused on their own enrichment than their organizations' ultimate success.  The ProPublica article did not explicitly discuss executive compensation except after the failure of the expansion plans by the "master marketer" McMaster,

Amid layoffs in the division last year, bonuses given to McMaster and his team raised eyebrows within the Red Cross, a former headquarters official said.

In a statement, the Red Cross said the bonuses were appropriate because the division hit 'strategic milestones' including establishing 'a national tele-service platform and national sales and service delivery models.'


Regardless, the division failed to reach its real goal, expansion of its business.

Furthermore, there is evidence that during the reign of McGovern, the top managers as a group have been very well paid, especially given that they were running a charity whose good works are largely supported by contribuations and the taxpayers.  We noted in a 2011 post that

In 2009, then CEO Gail McGovern received over a million in total compensation, $1,032,022 to be exact. Its President for Biomedical Services got $850,489. Its Executive VP for Biomedical Services got $596,309. Twelve other executives got more than $250,000. Of those, ten got more than $350,000.

Since then, while Ms McGovern's compensation has actually declined, the number of very well paid managers has actually grown.  According to the organization's latest available IRS Form 990 filing, for 2013, Ms McGovern had total compensation of over $597,000, and 15 managers had total compensation over $250,000, of these, 10 were over $400,000.

So despite all the problems afflicting the Red Cross (see below, and the larger ProPublica series), the top managers still managed to pay themselves very well.

The Results were Bad

The Marketers' Best Laid Plans Led to Declining Contributions

The "master marketer" did not do so well.

McMaster laid out how the CPR unit would attract more customers while at the same time hiking prices for classes and training materials in CPR, swimming, and babysitting. He believed the Red Cross brand justified higher prices than were being charged around the country.

Customers voted with their wallets. When prices rose, many simply switched to lower-cost providers.

'We thought if we raised prices, American Heart [Association] would probably raise prices, and life would be good,' McGovern said at a 2013 employee town hall meeting, referring to the Red Cross� competitor in the CPR class business. 'Didn�t happen.'

Also,

 'A halfway competent market analysis would have told you that the bulk of our business was in selling to small businesses who viewed us as a business expense,' recalled one former chapter executive director. 'When the massive price increases arrived, it was too much and customers bailed.'

This illustrates that the generic managers did not even achieve their business goal, increasing sales and increasing revenue.  What did they care, though, if the bonuses still rolled in? 

Centralized Control, Benefit Cuts, Layoffs, and the Marketing Focus Wounded Employee Morale and Discouraged Volunteers

Those who push generic management practices often seem blind to their adverse effects.  So,   

 Many of those who taught classes � including volunteers who did the work for free � quit after being turned off by headquarters� poor communication and insistence on centralized control.

Also,

But much like the organization�s paid staff, many of its volunteers appear deeply disillusioned. An internal survey obtained by ProPublica found volunteers around the country had a satisfaction rate of 32 percent this year � down 20 points from last year.

Furthermore,

Driving the alienation, longtime employees and volunteers say, is a gulf that has opened up between McGovern�s executive suite and the rank and file who have spent decades in the mission-focused nonprofit world.

She has surrounded herself with a tight-knit group of former telecom colleagues, they say. 'They�re all people from the period when AT&T imploded,' said one former senior official. 'The priorities seem to be a reflection of what that team is comfortable with: sales and marketing.'

An internal assessment previously reported by ProPublica and NPR said national headquarters� focus on image slowed the delivery of relief aid during Hurricane Isaac and Superstorm Sandy. Officials engaged in 'diverting assets for public relation purposes,' according to the assessment. 
The Red Cross depends on its staff and volunteers to do the work.  What did the brilliant generic managers and master marketers think would happen if they fired lots of staff, drove volunteers to quit, and disillusioned those who remained?

Layoffs and Cutback Reduced Capacity to Respond to Disasters

One example was the response in West Virginia
 
In West Virginia, where several chapters have been shuttered, emergency management officials said the group�s response to recent disasters has been anemic. After a recent water shortage caused by a chemical leak, the charity declined to provide any help to residents, the Register-Herald of Beckley reported. Local officials described that as business as usual for the charity. When a tornado hit in the southern part of the state, the Red Cross� inadequate response left scores of victims without enough food, according to the newspaper.

Another was the response in northern California,

In Northern California last year, the Red Cross shuttered the Napa County chapter and laid off disaster relief staff, according to an internal PowerPoint presentation. Then, in September, a drought-fueled fire swept through the area, consuming more than 75,000 acres and 1,200 homes.

Because of the issues with the Red Cross� shelter, nearly all of 1,000 displaced people at the Napa County Fairgrounds � including the elderly, new mothers and children, and anyone with a pet � ended up sleeping outside in tents, cars or RVs. The problems were first reported by the Press Democrat newspaper.

Also,

Local officials were furious. They say the Red Cross showed up lacking basic supplies such as Band-Aids, portable toilets, and tarps to protect against the rain. Instead the group�s volunteers handed out Red Cross-branded bags of items that weren�t urgently needed like lip balm and tissues.

The Red Cross responders were inexperienced and, according to residents, not enough of them spoke Spanish, the language of many of the fire victims.


In general, as told by former Red Cross volunteer Becky Maxwell, a self-described "die-hard Red Cross person for 25 years," who quit after becoming increasingly frustrated,

'McGovern has fired almost all of the trained and experienced volunteers and staff,' Maxwell told ProPublica, replacing them 'with people who have absolutely no knowledge of what the Red Cross is or does in a disaster. Not only is she setting these people up to fail but she is compromising the service delivery that is so important to the clients.'


Summary

The Red Cross Board of Governors, largely composed of well paid business managers (e.g., a former Vice Chairman of Goldman Sachs, a senior vice president of Eli Lilly, the chief financial officer of Home Depot, the executive vice president of Target), decided that a generic manager using a managerialist approach could cure the organization's perceived ills.  The new CEO, who lacked any obvious experience or training relevant to the Red Cross mission, hired her former cronies at AT&T and Fidelity as managers.  The new team cut costs, laid off employees, centralized management, and focused on marketing.  The apparent results were fewer, less experienced, upset staff; fewer volunteers; declining interest in public health training products; and worsening disaster response.

Thus, once again, generic managers and managerialism have laid low a formerly proud charity.  Unfortunately, this one also happens to have vital public health and disaster relief roles that have now been severely compromised.

Based on previous experience, it should come as no surprise that generic managers who do not know much or care much about public health and health care, and who rely on a one-size fits all management dogma uninformed by the public health or health care context or public health or health care values will end up undermining patients' and the public's health.

The real surprise is that the generic managers have up to now had no problem maintaining the managers' coup d'etat, that is, their iron grip on the leadership of most public health and health care organizations.

To prevent our ongoing downward spiral, we need to reverse the managers' coup d'etat, and return leadership to those who understand health and health care, support their values, and are willing to be accountable for doing so. 

ADDENDUM (17 December, 2015) - This post was republished on the Naked Capitalism blog