Princess Health and Australian ED EHR Study: An End to the Line "Your Evidence Is Anecdotal, Thus Worthless?" .Princessiccia

Princess Health and Australian ED EHR Study: An End to the Line "Your Evidence Is Anecdotal, Thus Worthless?" .Princessiccia

AMIA healthcare IT anecdote Jon Patrick OHSU William Hersh

Gusty 06:55 Add Comment

At my Sept. 2010 post "The Dangers of Critical Thinking in A Politicized, Irrational Culture" I lamented that while my early mentor in biomedicine Victor P. Satinsky MD taught the wise credo "critical thinking always, or your patient's dead" in the 1970's, our culture had become so perverse that this credo had been largely supplanted with:

"Critical thinking anytime, and your career's dead."

That post was in reaction to continued heckling on a professional mailing list, the American Medical Informatics Association (AMIA) Clinical Information Systems Working Group (cis-wg). On this list, Oregon Health Sciences University professor William Hersh expounded on how the evidence of health IT dangers was largely "anecdotal" therefore to be discounted, and how I, specifically, "didn't know the literature on health IT."



In that post I put the lie to the latter figment. On the former prevarication Dr. Jon Patrick, author of the recent thorough dissection of problems with the ED EHR system being rolled out in public hospitals in New South Wales, Australia (see my Mar. 5, 2011 post "On an EMR Forensic Evaluation by Professor Jon Patrick from Down Under: More Thoughts"), hit the ball out of the park:

Prof. Patrick to AMIA cis-wg:



I think such defences are particularly unuseful especially with respect to the dismissal of personal stories and experiences as "anecdotes", hence committing them to the realm of folklore. I offer these notions as a counterpoint.



Discounting Anecdotes:



1. Is a perfidious and specious act.



2. It denies early warning signs of problems.



3. It denies a voice and disempowers the working clinical community who have to operationalise decisions made by others.



4. It denies a route to process improvement within an institution - which is most important for EBM and incremental review of local processes.



5. It defends software manufacturers from fault rectification - cuts off even a need to deliberate on it. Critics of the value of anecdotes are squarely on the side of the faulty and deficient manufacturer.



6. A rule of project management is that projects consist of 3 components, cost, quality and time and if their needs to be a compromise it has to be on quality. Anecdotes are early warning signs of such a compromise.

Prof. Patrick had to once again put the lie to this refrain at a comment on the HISTalk blog yesterday, where the anonymous proprietor had written in a review of Patrick's EHR study:

... On the other hand, I wouldn�t say it�s [Prof. Patrick's Cerner FirstNet study] necessarily unbiased, it focuses on implementation of a single department application that didn�t go well for a variety of reasons (despite many successful FirstNet implementations elsewhere), it uses the unchallenged anecdotal comments of unhappy users who make it clear they liked their previous EDIS better, and it nitpicks (I wasn�t moved to find a pitchfork when I learned that the primary keys in the Millennium database aren�t named consistently).



[Considering the complexity and changeability of healthcare and the corresponding software lifecycle, I duly note that that latter attitude about 'failing to find pitchforks' regarding breaches of sound software engineering practices seems to be a symptom of the larger health IT disease that Prof. Patrick writes about - ed.]

Dr. Patrick then knocked the ball out of the Southern Hemisphere with a comment of his own about anecdotalism and a link to an expansion of the aforementioned ideas he'd shared on "discounting anecdotes":

Prof. Patrick to HISTalk owner:



Your Comment �it uses the unchallenged anecdotal comments of unhappy users � is not only unfair but unreasonably inaccurate. The comments made by the users are the Directors of 7 EDs and so they have a right to carry authority by virtue of the experience but also the number of 6 out 7 presenting a view of Firstnet as unfit for purpose has numeric validity, which they justify with about 20+ pages of their comments � see Part 2 Appendix 2.



I would also point readers to my editorial about the role of personal experiences being the most useful information to understand the nature of socio-technical failures. http://aci.schattauer.de/en/contents/archive/issue/1124/manuscript/15463/show.html

The essay at that link, "The Validity of Personal Experiences in Evaluating HIT", is an editorial in Johns Hopkins informaticist Chris Lehmann's brilliant new journal "Applied Clinical Informatics."



The editorial is available free, and is a must-read for anyone in a decision-making or managerial role in mission critical domains, including our elected representatives.



In the editorial Dr. Patrick concludes. similarly to his earlier AMIA mailing list opinion:

... the denial of recounted personal experiences in discussion and analysis of HIT is biased and specious and has the effect of:



1. Denying early warning signs of problems.



2. Denying a voice for the working clinical community who have to operationalise decisions made by others and thus disempowers them.



3. Denying process improvement within an institution � which is most important for Evidence Based Medicine and incremental review of local processes.



4. Discourages staff from engaging in any form of process improvement hence worsening the sense of disenchantment.



Every legitimate personal experience of a HIT deserves to be considered on its merits lest we wish to retreat from process and product improvement. Mechanisms of censorship both implicit due to contrived processes of disinformation and disempowerment or explicit due to contractual specifications will lead to more waste, lost productivity, contempt for the providers, and distress among frontline staff rather than increased productivity and improved patient health and safety as we all desire.

In my view, the drivers or motivators for the "anecdotalist" accusation are these, singly or in combination:

• Too much "education" to see the nose on one's face, as in, to think zebras and unicorns instead of horses when hearing hoofbeats outside one's midwest U.S. abode (eggheads);
  
  
• Too little common sense (fools), as in Scott Adams' example: "IGNORING ALL ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE - Example: I always get hives immediately after eating strawberries. But without a scientifically controlled experiment, it�s not reliable data. So I continue to eat strawberries every day, since I can�t tell if they cause hives";
  
  
• Too much concern for the possible interruption of flow of money or power in one's direction (gonifs).
  
  

In conclusion, the anecdotalist refrain of "your evidence is anecdotal" [therefore of little or no value] when used repetitively against competent observers is the refrain of eggheads, fools and gonifs.



In healthcare, the end result is "your patient's dead."



My "anecdotal relative" injured in a mid-2010 HIT mishap is sadly an example.



[June 2011 addendum: my relative, after much suffering, has now died of complications of the "anecdotal HIT mishap" - ed.]



As for myself, I am a Markopolist (see my Sept. 2010 post "Health IT: On Anecdotalism and Totalitarianism").



-- SS

Princess Health and The Reappearance of a Ghost of Seasons Past. Princessiccia

Princess Health and The Reappearance of a Ghost of Seasons Past. Princessiccia

Actonel conflicts of interest ghost writing manipulating clinical research Procter and Gamble suppression of medical research University of Sheffield whistle-blowers

Gusty 08:01 Add Comment

About a year after we started Health Care Renewal, in late 2005, we wrote multiple posts about the complex and unfortunate case of Dr Aubrey Blumsohn's attempts to keep a research project honest. The early posts were here, here, here, and here. In this post, we summarized the case thus:

• Dr Aubrey Blumsohn, a senior lecturer at Sheffield University, and Professor Richard Eastell performed a research project on the effects of the drug risedronate (Actonel, made by Procter & Gamble Pharmaceuticals [P&G]) under a contract between P&G and the University.
• Although the research contract designated Blumsohn and Eastell as "Investigators" under whose direction the project would be carried out, Blumsohn was not given access to the original data collected by the project.
• Despite numerous requests, (like this one), P&G refused access to this data repeatedly.
  Blumsohn was concerned that he and Eastell could be accused of scientific fraud if they continued to make presentations and write articles and abstracts without access to the data which they were supposedly writing about.
• Blumsohn became suspicious that some of the analyses done by P&G could be misleading, especially related to a graph shown to him that omitted 40% of patient data.
• Blumsohn objected to P&G arranging for papers and abstracts to be written by a professional writer, but with Blumsohn listed as first author. Blumsohn was concerned that such ghost-written documents were mainly meant to convey "key messages" in support of P&G's commercial interests.
• Eastell warned Blumsohn not to aggravate P&G, because the company was providing a grant to the University which "is a good source of income."
• After repeated failed attempt to get the data, Blumsohn complained to numerous officials at Sheffield University, including Eastell, medical school Dean Tony Weetman, University Vice-Chancellor Robert Boucher, and the Head of the University's Department of Human Resources, Ms R Valerio.
• Still unable to get the data, he spoke with news reporters about his case. At this point, Sheffield suspended him, but then offered him a severance agreement if he signed a contract binding him not to make any detrimental or derogatory statements about the University and its leaders.

So the case involved suppression and manipulation of research, ghost-writing, institutional conflicts of interest, and attempts to silence a whistle blower. It provides lessons about the downsides of letting commercial firms sponsor and hence control human research designed to evaluate the products or services they sell; and of academic medicine becoming dependent on research money from such firms for such research. Although Health Care Renewal, being US based, most often writes about such issues in the US, this case is a reminder that they are global. (Note that we posted more about this case in 2006, here, here and here, but since then it has not gotten much public attention.)

Last weekend the (UK) Guardian returned to it:

The Guardian has learned that one of Britain's leading bone specialists is facing disciplinary action over accusations that he was involved in 'ghost writing'.

The General Medical Council will call Professor Richard Eastell in front of a fitness to practice committee. Eastell, a bone expert at Sheffield University, has admitted he allowed his name to go forward as first author of a study on an osteoporosis drug even though he did not have access to all the data on which the study's conclusions were based. An employee of Proctor and Gamble, the US company making Actonel, was the only author who had all the figures.

Experts believe the practice is widespread in Britain.

In a letter published in the Journal of Bone and Mineral Research, which carried the original study, he stated: 'In the original paper one of the authors, a statistician working for P&G, Ian Barton, had full access to all the data.' The authors had full access to all the analyses of the data that they requested, he said � but those analyses were carried out by the company.

The letter, published in 2007, also acknowledged flaws in the study. A later independent analysis of the data 'identified some errors and poor practice', he wrote. The study was designed to show the strengths of Actonel which was in fierce competition with a rival bone-strengthening drug called Fosamax, made by Merck.

Eastell's paper concerned a study carried out on behalf of Proctor and Gamble, comparing the bone density of women prescribed Actonel with others who were not. Only the company knew which women were on the drug and which were taking something else.

Eastell's colleague, Dr Aubrey Blumsohn, wanted the codes which would say which of the patients who suffered fractures had been on the drug. The company refused. Blumsohn took his concerns to Eastell, but in a conversation which Blumsohn says he taped , Eastell said he was concerned that persistent requests might damage the relationship they had with the company. Eastell is said to have told him: 'The only thing that we have to watch all the time is our relationship with P&G. Because � we have the big Sheffield Centre Grant [from P&G] which is a good source of income, we have got to really watch it.' .

So, after four years, this case has generated an official hearing of sorts. The hearing is obviously late, and seemingly will only be devoted to only one aspect of this case (ghost writing). However, at least our friends in the UK are doing something. I cannot recall a single case that resulted in any serious consideration of imposing negative consequences on anyone who was accused of suppressing research, manipulating research, endorsing ghost-writing, or intimidating a whistle-blower. In fact, many of the more troubling cases have never resulted in any sort of public discussion either at the institutions at which they occurred, or at any organization with relevant regulatory, or even just moral authority. So the GMC hearing is at least a step forward. Two cheers for the British GMC, and none for US universities, academic medical centers, professional societies, and government regulators.

(If anyone can remind me of a case in which there was a public discussion at the relevant institution, or some public consideration of the case by a regulatory agency, professional society, or some group with moral authority, please remind me of it, and I would be happy to post about it.)

Princess Health and Why Have Governing Boards Forsaken Their Duties? - Ideas from Silverglate and Malchow. Princessiccia

Princess Health and Why Have Governing Boards Forsaken Their Duties? - Ideas from Silverglate and Malchow. Princessiccia

boards of trustees conflicts of interest Dartmouth duty of care duty of loyalty duty of obedience finance governance

Gusty 08:46 Add Comment

We have posted frequently about the governance and leadership of academic medical organizations. While one would think that health care organizations, and especially academic health care organizations ought to be held to a particularly high standard of governance, we have noted how their governance is often unrepresentative of key constituencies, opaque, unaccountable, unsupportive of the academic and health care mission, and not subject to codes of ethics. How the governance of organizations with such exemplary missions and sterling reputations got this way has been unclear.

Now there are new insights from the ongoing discussion of one of the most interesting and controversial cases of disputed organizational governance. We have often come back to the example of Dartmouth College, of which Dartmouth Medical School is a significant component. We most recently discussed here an ongoing dispute about the extent that the institution's board of trustees ought to represent the alumni at large, or instead, ought to be a self-elected body not clearly accountable to anyone else. (For our take on this complex case, start here and follow the links backward.) The latest development in the case is a lawsuit filed by Dartmouth alumni challenging an increase in the number of self-elected, or "charter" trustees, which they charged broke an 1891 agreement that established numerical parity between alumni-elected and charter trustees.

Soon after this lawsuit was filed, an important article by Harvey Silverglate (one of the founders of FIRE, the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education) and Joseph Malchow appeared. For those interested in the case, the article includes extensive detail, with multiple citations, on all the twists and turns of the case, and is very much worth reading. (See this post on FIRE's Torch blog for more background and discussion.)

However, the article also features extensive scholarship on governance of US not-for-profit institutions, focused on academic institutions (including medical academia), and with relevance to other not-for-profit or non-governmental health care organizations. In particular, the article sheds light on how the governance of such organizations has become so degraded.

First, Silverglate and Malchow summarized the duties of governing boards:

Traditionally, fiduciary duty [of the board of trustees] has been understood as having two components: the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. The duty of loyalty requires a fiduciary to act in a manner he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the organization. The duty of care obliges directors to inform themselves of reasonably available information prior to making a business decision. More recently, courts have considered the duty to act in good faith [the duty of obedience] as a fiduciary requirement. This component, similar to the duty of care, is satisfied when a director makes informed decisions without conflicts of interest.

The question central to the dispute regarding Dartmouth governance is to what or to whom do fiduciaries owe their duty. Corporate directors have a relatively straightforward task of serving the corporation and its shareholders. In the case of a charitable trust, however, which generally does not have 'ascertainable beneficiaries who can enforce their rights,' the duty of fiduciaries is instead directed toward fulfilling or furthering the organization�s mission

So just to summarize, considerable discussion, scholarship, and I believe some some laws support the notion that the board of a not-for-profit organization is obliged to take reasonable care to make informed decisions free of conflicts of interest to uphold the organization's mission.

However, currently, many boards value deference to the organization's (usually hired) top managers and avoidance of internal conflict within the board more highly than these obligations:

Dartmouth, to be sure, is far from the only place where fealty to organizational leaders�and the notion of 'going along in order to get along' �has been placed before true fiduciary duty.

Silverglate and Malchow have some important ideas about how we came to this.

Not-for-profits became more like for-profit corporations:

During the 1980s, traditional nonprofit organizations supported by donations and governed by donors and volunteers became increasingly displaced by professionally staffed commercial nonprofits, supported by grants, contracts, and earned income, and governed by insider boards. The shift in governance was armored by progressively professionalized and entrepreneurial management, which was perceived to be more adept at control of the ebb and flow of funds in the American market.

Top hired not-for-profit executives assumed more power at the expense of other constituencies, including the professionals who did the work:

By the 1990s, with faculty power firmly institutionalized at colleges and universities, a notion that university presidents were bereft of power took hold. The AGB [Association of Governing Boards], in 1996, argued that university presidents needed to regain power with a pivotal document of its own: Renewing the Academic Presidency: Stronger Leadership for Tougher Times. Though this outlook was applied to varying degrees at colleges and universities, an imperative toward greater executive power in universities was thus established.

Presidential and professorial decision-making power, combined with the rise of the administrative bureaucracy in academia, have generally relegated trustees to a secondary role in campus affairs.

Attempts at reforming governance were inappropriately based on a for-profit corporate model, and particularly the need to project unity and avoid confrontation among the leadership trumped transparency:

Aligning academic boards with the cultural trends of increased critical oversight has obvious benefits, but some boards have moved to adopt the norms of for-profit corporate governance that are simply not applicable to the university context. Admittedly, this is a thin distinction when considered on a theoretical level. But in practical terms, misguided nonprofit reforms�some of which, upon close examination, actually violate an institution�s mission�are readily evident.

For example, some nonprofit boards have emphasized the adoption of formal nondisclosure pledges or confidentiality agreements that step well beyond nondisclosure of proprietary information. This is hardly uncommon in the business sector, where bottom-line strictures demand a certain degree of internal accord and non-transparency. And though there is evidence that nonprofit board directors have, from time to time, attempted to hush public dissent, only recently have dominant majorities of some nonprofit boards proposed and ratified binding pledges not to publicly air differences. According to a 2006 BoardSource publication, 'If a board member does not support a decision for whatever reason, [he or] she has a responsibility to remain silent or step down from the board.' (Recall the resignation offer made to Zywicki before his second term was denied.)

These directives, written in highly influential publications in the realm of university governance, disregard the important role that public discussion has on decision-making at universities and nonprofits in general. 'In the nonprofit context, nondisclosure agreements or the use of 'executive session' rules to curtail debates about policy and procedure depart from established norms. They shut down opportunities for public dialogue and for communication with other concerned and influential parties, including reporters,' nonprofit specialist Norman I. Silber wrote in the Oregon Law Review.

Emphasis on raising money rather than upholding the mission has lead to board deference to hired executives.

Fidelity to institutional leaders, rather than institutional mission, is now paramount in higher education, as deviation from accepted decisions is perceived as potentially shrinking the donor base. Administrators cringe at public disagreement; rather than focusing on the long-term likelihood that competing ideas will result in implementation of the fittest, they tend to focus on the short-term possibility that a particular alumni subset may be offended. This shortsighted outlook is not only an insult to the intelligence of alumni and other constituencies, but it is ultimately detrimental to the institution, as established ideas are enthroned and unchallenged. It is also based on false premises: as in the case of Dartmouth, there is no established correlation between public criticism and donor decline.

Boards are increasingly composed of executives of for-profit corporations, particularly in the finance field, who may grant the same deference to the organizations' leaders that they would like from their own board. That is, hired executives identify more with other executives than with the organizations they are supposed to be leading:

Judge Cabranes noted that trustees, especially business executives, tend to act toward university presidents as they wish their boards would act toward them�deferentially. And the phenomenon of board members believing they serve at the pleasure of the executive is what one nonprofit attorney and blogger, has termed 'upside down board.' The ascendance of the hedge-fund community, a peculiar province of graduates of elite institutions, has contributed to the prevalence of the upside down board....

The article suggests some issues that need to be addressed to make governance more accountable, transparent, ethical and honest. Boards need to be reminded of their duties, and that their loyalty should be to the mission, not the organization's executives, or the views of the board's majority. Transparency and open discussion are more important than projecting the (sometimes false) impression of unity. New board members should be chosen for their loyalty to the mission rather than their similarity to and congeniality with current board members.

I strongly suggest that anyone who cares about how health care organizations are run ought to read Silverglate and Malchow's full article. It should be required reading for current and would-be board members of academic and health care not-for-profit organizations (but I will not hold my breath waiting for them to read it.)

Princess Health and A "Safety-Net" Medical Center CEO Gets a Golden Parachute. Princessiccia

Princess Health and A "Safety-Net" Medical Center CEO Gets a Golden Parachute. Princessiccia

Boston Medical Center Boston University conflicts of interest executive compensation governance imperial CEO

Gusty 12:16 Add Comment

From theBostonChannel.com comes this story on executive compensation in a not-for-profit health care organization,

Boston Medical Center � a financially troubled hospital � gave its outgoing CEO a one-time, nearly $3.5 million payment, in addition to her $1.3 million annual salary, Team 5 Investigates reported Friday.

Elaine Ullian, 61, has led the city�s major 'safety net' hospital for the last 15 years. She recently announced she will retire when her contract expires in January.

The hospital's financial situation is such that hospital leaders say it could face closure in the years ahead. It is currently suing the Executive Office of Health and Human Services over how it gets paid for treating poor and uninsured patients.

Team 5 Investigates discovered, in a review of the hospital�s financial filings with the state, that Ullian was paid $3,466,458 'in recognition of exceptional performance over a period of 15 years.'

The nearly $3.5 million bonus was on top of Ullian�s 2008 compensation of $1,348,504 including salary and benefits.

In a written statement to Team 5 Investigates, Ted English, the chairman of BMC�s board said that Ullian�s 'compensation is set by a committee of the Boston Medical Center Board of Trustees who consult with independent compensation advisors. It is based on her performance evaluation and measurable goals that are reviewed annually.'

'The Board considers Elaine Ullian to be one of the most competent and successful hospital CEOs in the country and believes she is primarily responsible for the success of Boston Medical Center over the past 15 years,' English's statement said.

Boston Medical Center was formed by the merger of University Hospital (the Boston University teaching hospital), and Boston City Hospital, the legendary municipal hospital. (Note: I served as an internal medicine intern and resident in the University Hospital program, and rotated through Boston City frequently.) Thus, as noted above, BMC is the city's primary "safety net" hospital for the care of the poor. BMC has for its mission:

We will provide consistently excellent and accessible health services to all in need of care regardless of status or ability to pay � exceptional care, without exception.

Such generous pay seems inconsistent with this mission and the organization's not-for-profit status. Such a golden parachute seems inconsistent with the current threats to its finances.

Any worry about the CEO's retirement finances should further be reduced by her ongoing part-time work on the boards of directors of three public for-profit health care corporations, Hologic, a medical device company specializing in "womens' health," ThermoFisher Scientific, a manufacturer of laboratory equipment and supplies for health care and research, and Vertex Pharmaceuticals, a biotechnology company focusing on small-molecule drugs. For her work as a director of Hologic, she received $304,698 in total compensation in 2008, and owned 40,000 shares or equivalent of common stock (per the company's 2009 proxy statement). For her work for ThermoFisher Scientific, she received $275,319 total compensation, and owned 61,068 shares or equivalent (per the 2009 proxy statement). For her work for Vertex Pharmaceuticals, she received $337,480 total compensation, and owned 79,500 shares or equivalent (per the 2009 proxy statement). As Robert AG Monks put it, corporate directors are supposed to "demonstrate unyielding loyalty to the company's shareholders" [Per Monks RAG, Minow N. Corporate Governance, 3rd edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. P.200.] Therefore, Ms Ullian's directorships seem to pose conflicts with her primary employment as CEO of an academic medical center which must buy products used in womens' health, buy laboratory supplies, and implement basic and clinical research.

The BMC board chair's assertion that the CEO is "primarily responsible for the success" of the institution merits special comment. It seems obvious that the main determinant of the success of a medical center is the work done by its health care professionals and support personnel. A medical center cannot provide care, much less good care, without doctors, nurses, therapists and technicians, supported by supply, logistics, cleaning, maintenance, dietary, clerical, medical record, financial and yes, even health care information technology workers and systems (and if I left out an important group of support personnel, I apologize now.) The chair's assertion suggests the hubris central to the ethos of contemporary business managers, but is at odds with the clinical context. (Of course, if the CEO was primarily responsible for the organization's success, she should now shoulder primary blame for its current awkward financial situation, but such consistency may be the hobgoblin of minds too little to understand the gravitas of the C-level manager.)

A long time ago, in a galaxy far, far away, health care was a calling. Doctors once pledged to avoid all commercialization (see post here), and hospital directors or superintendents (not CEOs) did not earn riches, much less become "imperial." (See Ludmerer's Time to Heal.) But in the culture of wretched excess that spread from the financial world, hospital CEOs now seem to feel entitled to become wealthy, as they claim responsibility for all successes, while all failures are blamed on someone else. The current system has made hired managers into an ersatz aristocracy, entitled to fill their pockets while denying any responsibility for ever rising costs, declining access, poor quality and demoralized professionals. In my humble opinion, to achieve true health care reform, health care again must become a calling, lead by people who will put the mission ahead of the accumulation of wealth and power.

Princess Health and Physicians, Even Those Educated in IT and Informatics, Are Not "Real" IT People. Princessiccia

Princess Health and Physicians, Even Those Educated in IT and Informatics, Are Not "Real" IT People. Princessiccia

Healthcare IT failure

Gusty 09:23 Add Comment

I've been participating in the comment thread on the HisTALK heath IT industry news/gossip site at http://histalk2.com/2009/09/17/news-91809/ . At this time there are 40 comments - mine start at #4. (I've also archived the thread in Word format here.)

It's been quite interesting, demonstrating that many of the harmful attitudes of IT personnel about healthcare I observed more than a decade ago are still around.

An anonymous commenter under the title "Programmer" has been forthcoming with views I think are actually common in the health IT field about medicine, science, IT flaws and shortcomings, and physician involvement in HIT. I will let you read them for yourself at the above link.

Others have indicated in that comment thread and other threads that "Programmer" is an executive with a large HIT company, but I cannot confirm this.

Among other stunning views, this commenter exhibited:

• Serious errors in logic such as repeatedly and unshakably mistaking well-documented reports about known rates of IT project failure as a condemnation that all IT projects fail, perhaps reflecting a state of denial;
  
• Lack of understanding that in scientific fields such as biomedicine, conclusions generally should be supported by reasonable evidence, not "because I think so";
  
• Lack of understanding and dismissal of the value of the peer reviewed scientific literature on health IT, and further, a seeming inability or unwillingness to peruse the "references" section of scientific articles, a profoundly unscientific approach to the world;
  
• Dismissal of the written views of organizations such as the Joint Commission, US National Research Council, European Federation for Medical Informatics and others on HIT deficiencies;
  
• Perhaps most harmfully, dismissal of faulty conceptual and physical data models, inadequate workflow and cognitive support, and IT of poor user interaction design that presents a mission hostile user experience as a real problem in critical care areas such as Invasive Cardiology (specifically, in this case). Instead, this IT person dismissed physician dismay and rejection of such ill-designed and profoundly unusable IT as a mere "pissing contest" between IT and clinicians, consistent with narrow, territorial, paternalistic, indeed autocratic IT-centric views and a reversal of enabler (clinician) vs. facilitator (IT service provision) roles in patient care.

"Programmer" also attacks (from the perspective of arrogant ignorance) the "Health IT Project Success and Failure: Recommendations from Literature and an AMIA Workshop" white paper drawing together the thinking at a workshop attended by over fifty informatics experts from all areas of medicine and technology. The role of the medical informatics expert itself, and other issues as well relating to reasons for HIT failure and difficulty are attacked and dismissed.

(If the person is a fake or "sock puppet", they're doing a mighty accurate approximation of my own uncomfortably-common observations in managing health IT and biomedical research IT projects while working with non-biomedical IT personnel, see cases here.)

The crux of the matter came out towards the end where "Programmer" maintains in Comment #28 that I am "just someone who likes to talk about IT� and he is a �real IT person.�

A "real IT person?" I've heard that before: this is the "doctors don't do things with computers" (including medical informaticists) type of comment I've heard face-to-face periodically from healthcare IT personnel since I entered the field in the early 1990's, and commented upon a decade ago here.

I've emailed Tim, the proprietor of the HISTalk site [mr_histalk AT yahoo.com], to inquire if this poster was real or just a provocateur.

Tim's response: "He's real and has been around for awhile, although lately he seems to be enjoying an escalated level of confrontation when he can create one."

I maintain -- based on personal experience and that told me by others -- that this person's views are not all that rare in the HIT vendor and hospital IS communities.

I also opine that thinking such attitudes can be dealt with by logical argument and persuasion is a belief itself lacking in rigor.

IT personnel of views as in the HisTALK comments thread represent an older culture of data processing, dating from the days of card punch tabulators that ran businesses prior to computers. It is a culture that has failed to mature with the times.

As I wrote here, the unimaginative, process over results, tight fisted control, bureaucratic data-processing culture of the business IT (management information systems) world is the lineal descendant of IBM's patchcord plug-panel programmed, card tabulating machines from which IBM made a large portion of their profit in the days before the electronic computer:

Hollerith Type III Tabulator with its control panel exposed. Photo: MNRAS, Vol.92, No.7 (1932). Click to enlarge.

Fortunately, such personnel and their designer-centric, as opposed to user- and work-centric philosophies are starting to become obsolete. This can be observed (as an example) via the mission of the iSchool consortium, of which my organization, the Drexel College of Information Science and Technology, is a member:

The iSchools are interested in the relationship between information, people and technology. This is characterized by a commitment to learning and understanding the role of information in human endeavors. The iSchools take it as given that expertise in all forms of information is required for progress in science, business, education, and culture. This expertise must include understanding of the uses and users of information, as well as information technologies and their applications. [the order of these priorities is pertinent - ed.]

Unfortunately, the data processing culture and its adherents are not becoming obsolete quite fast enough. There are still too many in the upper echelons of management, including health IT vendors, hospitals and pharmaceutical R&D environments.

Finally, IT personnel with such attitudes as displayed in the comments, from the lowliest programmer to the CEO and Board, have no place anywhere near where patient care is conducted, or where information systems serving clinical medicine are designed and built.

In line with other character types one encounters in healthcare that are often discussed on Healthcare Renewal, clinicians should not accommodate such IT personnel and these types of views.

-- SS

Addendum:

The final (at this time) comment, #40, left by the above commenter states:

#40 Programmer: If I decide to become a medical informatproctolicist, I�m going to specialize in sardonicology.

IT personnel of such views bring to life Lecia Barker's paper "Defensive climate in the computer science classroom":

�Defensive climate in the computer science classroom� by Barker et al., Univ. of Denver. Link here (subscription required). May help explain the control-seeking culture of IT personnel. As part of an NSF-funded IT workforce grant, the authors conducted ethnographic research to provide deep understanding of the learning environment of computer science classrooms. Categories emerging from data analysis included 1) impersonal environment and guarded behavior; and 2) the creation and maintenance of informal hierarchy resulting in competitive behaviors. These communication patterns lead to a defensive climate, characterized by competitiveness rather cooperation, judgments about others, superiority, and neutrality rather than empathy.

-- SS

Princess Health and Wyeth, Ghostwriting, Dr. Joseph Camardo and a Big Liquor Store With a Little Grocery Department. Princessiccia

Princess Health and Wyeth, Ghostwriting, Dr. Joseph Camardo and a Big Liquor Store With a Little Grocery Department. Princessiccia

ghost writing health care ethics Wyeth

Gusty 06:32 Add Comment

Ghostwriting is a topic covered extensively at Healthcare Renewal, including at my post "Wyeth: Ghostwritten Papers Fake, But Accurate" here, Roy Poses' "Wyeth's Industrial Scale Ghost-Writing" here, and many others about Wyeth and other pharmas that can be viewed via this link: http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/ghost writing.

A story in the Philadelphia Inquirer yesterday about Wyeth and ghostwriting brought to mind my medical school days at Boston University, in a metaphorical and rather negative way, regarding an oddity reflecting today's pharma industry.

In those years I lived next to Boston City Hospital on the top floor of a 29-story high rise at 35 Northampton Street, at that time one of the toughest and highest crime neighborhoods in the region if not the country (I was careful and lucky, and only got mugged at gunpoint once.) I had an excellent bird's-eye view of the urban decay in the area, reflective of ethical decay in the community.

35 Northampton St., next to Boston Medical Center (formerly Boston City Hospital)

Across the street from the high rise was an oddity - a very large liquor store named Blanchard's. Inside Blanchard's was a very small grocery department of all things. Have a snack with your booze! (I went in only twice; once to see what it was all about, and again during the Blizzard of '78 to get some needed food when all transit in the city was shut down and several feet of snow -- and neighborhood guns -- inhibited foot travel.)

The area has much improved in the past three decades, but according to Google street view the liquor store is still there:

In the 1970's "Liquor Land" was a large liquor store with a small grocery department named "Blanchard's." Click to enlarge.

Why does this odd store remind me of Wyeth, and more generally today's pharmaceutical industry?

Because that industry has turned from what used to be a biomedical research & development industry with decent ethics and a small marketing arm, to large marketing industry with poor ethics and a small R&D arm.

(Or, perhaps more accurately, a large marketing industry with poor ethics and a busywork section disguised to look like R&D. As a colleague noted in my post "Pfizer/Wyeth Merger And Sacrificing The Future: Laying Off Scientific Staff All Over The Place" here, a small fraction of prime scientist intellectual horsepower and time is actually spent on true R&D today, the rest wasted on feeding the bureaucratic corpulence that is the modern pharma research lab. He observed that "what we today call pharmaceutical R&D is in reality busywork disguised to look like R&D, in effect a well engineered, well managed, massively expensive failure.")

Here is what led to my "pharmas have become large marketing firms with a small R&D effort" metaphor. It was a story in the local newspaper on ghostwriting.

The glib quotes from Dr. Joseph Camardo, Wyeth's senior vice president of global medical affairs, on the practice of ghostwriting are simply stunning:

Philadelphia Inquirer

Ghosts in the medical machine

Was drug research infected by ghostwriters? With Paxil suit in court, a Chadds Ford firm says it was ethical.

Sun, Sep. 20, 2009

By Miriam Hill

Inquirer Staff Writer

When GlaxoSmithKline P.L.C. marketers looked for doctors to promote the antidepressant Paxil, they called the project CASPPER. The name was more than just an offbeat tribute to the friendly cartoon ghost. It was a wink and a nod to "ghostwriting," a questionable practice in which scientists put their names on research written by someone else, usually a writer paid by a drugmaker.

Ghostwriting critics say it disguises marketing material as scientific research.

Charges of ghostwriting have been lobbed against many companies in recent years, including Glaxo, Wyeth, AstraZeneca P.L.C., and Merck & Co. Inc., often arising in lawsuits from consumers claiming a drug hurt them.

... Documents released in connection with 8,000 lawsuits filed against Wyeth over Premarin and Prempro show that the company, which employs several thousand people in Collegeville, paid a medical-writing firm to produce articles from 1998 to 2005 that allegedly downplayed the risks of hormone treatment and emphasized benefits.

In 2002, researchers stopped a landmark federal study after finding that menopausal women who took certain hormones had an increased risk of breast cancer, heart disease, and stroke.

"Ghostwriting was used to sway physician opinions to favor hormone use as disease prevention long after that was a scientifically defensible position," Fugh-Berman [writer Adriane Fugh-Berman - ed.] said.

Joseph Camardo, Wyeth's senior vice president of global medical affairs, called Fugh-Berman's view "baseless." Medical opinion evolves, he said, and the papers in question reflected scientific understanding then. He also said the authors alone controlled the content and writing of the papers, though some did have outside help paid for by Wyeth.

"It's really being misrepresented as something we wrote and paid for that said what we thought it should say," Camardo said. "But the authors were not paid, and the authors had the final say."

... Studies on ghostwriting have suggested that anywhere from 8 percent to 75 percent of articles in medical journals may involve the practice.

Aside from the point I raised in my post "Has Ghostwriting Infected The Experts With Tainted Knowledge, Creating Vectors for Further Spread and Mutation of the Scientific Knowledge Base?" here regarding possible severe contamination of the literature and therefore of "expert knowledge" as it exists today, Camardo's response raises a cornucopia of questions.

Regarding "Medical opinion evolves, he said, and the papers in question reflected scientific understanding then":

• Whose scientific opinion do they reflect, exactly?
• Does Camardo believe these ghostwritten papers, usually written by party "A" but with authorship claimed by party "B" (usually prominent academic physicians often nurtured by the industry into the role of "key opinion leaders", KOL's) are objective?
• Does Camardo actually believe most of the content comes from party "B" rather than party "A" in these papers?
  
• Does Camardo understand that paying a MECC (Medical education & communications company) or other firm to write scientific papers puts the author(s) of those papers in a conflict of interest position relative to the paying sponsor, injurious to objectivity?
• Is Camardo that naive to believe a paid writer would "diss" the holder of his or her paycheck?

Regarding "the authors alone controlled the content and writing of the papers, though some did have outside help paid for by Wyeth":

• Which authors is he referring to?
  
• The ghostwriters?
• Wyeth scientists?
• Academics claiming authorship?
  
• Was the "outside help" from Wyeth "authors" to the ghosts, or from the ghosts to Wyeth "authors", or from Wyeth to the academics claiming authorship, or what?
• Can Camardo produce statistics on what % of article content on ghostwritten articles Wyeth sponsored were written by the ghost vs. written by Wyeth scientists and/or the claimed academic author? If not, why not? And if not, why should any intelligent person not assume the papers are, say, 99% the product of the hired guns?

Regarding "the authors were not paid, and the authors had the final say":

• Again, which author(s) is he referring to?
• In terms of the ghosts, I assume they were not working for the MECC's for free.
• In terms of the academics and KOL's claiming authorship, they (maybe!) were not paid in money, but instead in the valuable academic currency of a publication in a major biomedical journal.
  

To claim the KOL's were "not paid" is disingenuous. In fact, I find his entire argument disingenuous, a play on words, PR "spin" completely callous to the needs for scientific objectivity, the advancement of science, and ultimately to patient's lives.

This is marketing, with poor ethics, in the extreme.

Being somewhat familiar with authorship issues as former Director of Published Scientific Information Resources and The Merck Index (of Chemicals, Drugs & Biologicals), 13th ed. at Merck Research Labs, I further pointed out in my post "Wyeth: Ghostwritten Papers Fake, But Accurate" here, that:

... in addition to the violation of accepted practices of authorship, such as specified by NIH and the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, among others, such lucky authors [i.e., those who claim authorship of ghostwritten papers] get to "count" such papers in their academic portfolios, presumably also in violation of their own institutional policies and guidelines for fair attribution and intellectual honesty, e.g., here [Harvard - ed.]

These industry practices and Camardo's position may be based on:

• Ignorance of accepted practices of authorship of the NIH, the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, and most academic institutions, or perhaps:
  
• Cavalier dismissal of these practices for pecuniary reasons.

Is Camardo informed and upfront? Inept? Disingenuous and dishonest? That is up to the reader to decide.

In my aforementioned post "Wyeth: Fake but Accurate" I'd also noted Wyeth attorney Stephen Urbanczyk acknowledging that the ghostwritten articles were part of a marketing effort. But he said that they were also "fair, balanced, and scientific." More spin.

This raises the following observation. It is said that you can judge people by the company they keep. I also believe that:

You can judge companies by the people they keep.

This raises the following very serious questions:

• Is the presence of a senior vice president of global medical affairs and a lawyer with such views on ghostwriting representative of the senior executive leadership's views on dissemination of biomedical scientific information?
  
• Is their presence reflective of the views of Wyeth's Board of Directors?

If so, then the objectivity of any article about Wyeth drugs is called into question, and physicians and patients should utilize Wyeth drugs (and literature on them) with great caution.

-- SS

Addendum: this from the Medical Ethics blog:

Recently released court documents in a lawsuit against drug giant Wyeth, thanks to a court action by the New York Times and PLoS Medicine, are now searchable at a University of California, San Francisco web site.

The Wyeth documents are the latest made searchable at the Drug Industry Document Archive, or DIDA, which archives the documents from several high-profile cases.

... The documents were first made available last month on the PLoS web site, but were not searchable and difficult to sort through. The DIDA site now make it possible to search for documents by name, type or content.

Also see "Ghostwriting: Why they do it" at that blog.

-- SS

Princess Health and UPMC Fouls Another One Off. Princessiccia

Princess Health and UPMC Fouls Another One Off. Princessiccia

marketing mission-ignorant management UPMC

Gusty 13:56 Add Comment

It's almost World Series time in the US, so here's a baseball story, courtesy the Pittsburgh Business Times,

University of Pittsburgh Medical Center lobbyist Leslie McCombs used Pittsburgh Pirates baseball tickets purchased by UPMC�s insurance arm to entertain film executives and others to promote the creation of a state film tax credit, according to the State Ethics Commission.

The commission fined McCombs $5,025 for failing to promptly register as a lobbyist for Lions Gate Entertainment Corp. and omitting a daytime phone number in registering as a lobbyist for UPMC, according to a commission ruling reached on July 22. The confidential decision was disclosed Sept. 9 by The Associated Press.

McCombs, who works for UPMC as a consultant, received permission from UPMC President and CEO Jeffrey Romoff to lobby on behalf of Lions Gate, which she described in a February 2007 e-mail to him as the, 'largest independent producer and distributor of motion pictures and television in the country.'

Romoff cleared her work with Lions Gate after consulting with UPMC legal counsel and assured by McCombs in the e-mail that, 'UPMC signs will be prominently featured throughout the (�Kill Pit� television) series.'

Filming for the eight-part miniseries, which was renamed 'The Kill Point,' began in March 2007 in Pittsburgh. Gov. Ed Rendell signed the Film Production Tax Credit bill into law in July 2007, which provided for a 25 percent film tax credit to offset production expenses.

Also,

From 2005 to 2006, McCombs was director of public relations for UPMC Health Plan, a for-profit subsidiary of the nonprofit hospital network. She was then named senior consultant with UPMC�s government relations department.

The State Ethics Commission lists 18 baseball games where McCombs treated Lions Gate and government officials using UPMC tickets.

In addition, she attended a June 15, 2007, matchup against the Chicago White Sox with Rendell and his wife, Marjorie, and Romoff and his wife, Stefania, according to the commission.

It�s not clear from the commission report whose interests McCombs was representing at that game, but Rendell later reimbursed $960 for the tickets to the five games that he attended, which was returned to the health plan.

In 2007, UPMC Health Plan bought $61,440 worth of Pittsburgh Pirates tickets, which were available to employees of the insurer 'in the performance of their duties,' the report states. The sum included a $20,000 seat license.

So did you get all that? The director of public relations for the UPMC Health Plan, the managed care subsidiary of UPMC, a large academic medical center, lobbied the state governor for the enactment of a tax credit for television and movie production, partially so that the UPMC logo would appear in a television series, and entertained the governor using a few of the more than $60,000 worth of baseball tickets the medical center purchased for employee use. Amidst the complication, the public relations director violated state lobbying rules. None of these shenanigans had anything directly to do with health care, or medical education and research. The only conceivable advantage accruing to the institution would be the appearance of the UPMC logo in a television series. But most likely everyone had good times at the ball game.

This story again suggests that managers of health care organization are more focused on playing marketing and political games than on health care, and generally are more focused on benefiting themselves than upholding their organizations' mission. The amounts of money involved in this case may be small, but do not underestimate the collective effects on health care access, cost and quality of managers who have their eyes on the wrong balls.

UPMC has provided grist for the Health Care Renewal mill before, see earlier posts here, here, here and here.