Wednesday, 10 December 2014

Princess Health and The Tenth Anniversary of Health Care Renewal. Princessiccia

Princess Health and The Tenth Anniversary of Health Care Renewal. Princessiccia

Today is the tenth anniversary of Health Care Renewal.

To commemorate, I have republished our introductory post...(with links added)

Health care around the world is beset by rising costs, declining access, stagnant quality, and increasingly dissatisfied health care professionals. Discussions with physicians and other professionals revealed pervasive concerns that the core values of health care are under seige. Patients and physicians are caught in cross-fires between conflicting interests, and subject to perverse incentives. Free speech and academic freedom are threatened. Psuedo-science and anti-science are gaining ground. Causes include the increasing dominance of health care by large organizations, often lead by the ill-informed, the self-interested, and even the corrupt. (1) However, such concentration and abuse of power in health care has rarely been discussed openly. This blog is dedicated to the open discussion of health care's current dysfunction with the hopes of generating its cures.

1. Poses RM. A cautionary tale: The dysfunction of American health care. Eur J Int Med 2003; 14: 123-130.

You heard it here first.

Health Care Renewal is written by voluntary bloggers.  We have a small amount of financial support from our poor but honest non-profit, the Foundation for Integrity and Responsibility in Medicine (FIRM).  Please help us by contributing to FIRM, a US 501(c)3.  All contributions are US tax deductible as provided by US law. Our address is 16 Cutler St, Suite 104, Warren, RI, 02885. Email info at firmfound dot org for questions or comments.

Tuesday, 9 December 2014

Princess Health and Stryker Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to Selling Adulterated Devices, Former CEO of Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to Fraud, Stryker's Track Record Goes Unremarked. Princessiccia

Princess Health and Stryker Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to Selling Adulterated Devices, Former CEO of Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to Fraud, Stryker's Track Record Goes Unremarked. Princessiccia

The US Thanksgiving Day parade is over, so it must be time for the march of legal settlements to begin again. Our next example was best described by Bloomberg and by NJcom, but brief articles from the Associated Press, Reuters, and the Wall Street Journal have also appeared.

The Basic Facts

The Bloomberg lede was,

Stryker Corp. OtisMed unit pleaded guilty to selling devices used in knee-replacement surgeries in September 2009 without regulatory approval and will pay more than $80 million to resolve the case.

The conduct in question was,

The company admitted it never obtained U.S. Food and Drug Administration approval to sell 18,000 custom-built devices used by surgeons from 2006 to 2009 to make accurate bone cuts to implant prosthetic knees. OtisMed applied for FDA approval in October 2008, and the agency said 13 months later the company hadn�t shown it was safe and effective. [OtisMed CEO Charlie] Chi then shipped 218 devices to surgeons, overruling his advisers and board.

Furthermore, in this case, there was some information about who actually did what,

After a conference call with OtisMed directors on Sept. 9, 2009, Chi talked to two employees about ways to hide the shipments from the FDA, including taking them to an off-site shipping location, using Chi�s personal Federal Express account, and backdating shipping documents, court records show.

The NJ.com report clarified to what charges the guilty pleas referred,

Charlie Chi, 45, pleaded guilty to three misdemeanor counts of fraud linked to the September 2009 shipment of 218 OtisMed devices to surgeons throughout the U.S., including 16 in New Jersey.

Also,

OtisMed, which was acquired by Stryker Corp., pleaded guilty to a felony charge of distributing adulterated medical devices into interstate commerce.... 

So, a company acquired by large medical device manufacturer Stryker admitted and pleaded guilty to charges that it fraudulantly marketed an unapproved device, and that this marketing was lead and facilitated by the company's CEO.  The CEO pleaded guilty to misdemeanor fraud charges.

The Penalties

Per Bloomberg,

OtisMed will pay a fine of $34.4 million and forfeit $5.16 million in a criminal case, while paying a civil fine of $41.2 million. The company pleaded guilty today in federal court in Newark, New Jersey, where former Chief Executive Officer Charlie Chi also pleaded guilty.

Chi has not yet been sentenced, but according to NJ.com,

Chi, of San Francisco, faces up to three years in prison when he�s sentenced on March 18, 2015.

Bloomberg noted that,

The $80 million payment is almost three times the total revenue that OtisMed got for all of the knees the company sold, according to Fishman.

However, the amount could also be compared to the approximate annual revenue of Stryker Corp, which was most recently about $8 billion per Google Finance, or its net income, about $1 billion.

Furthermore,

OtisMed was barred from Medicare, Medicaid and all other federal health-care programs for 20 years. Stryker, based in Kalamazoo, Michigan, wasn�t barred.

This case was unusual in that a health care corporate CEO was actually charged and pleaded guilty to crimes connected to illegal marketing practices, and in that his company not only admitted wrongdoing and pleaded guilty, but also agreed to disbarment from federal programs.  However, by the time the case was thus decided, the CEO was no longer CEO, his company had been acquired by a larger health care corporation, and that corporation, while letting its new subsidiary agree to a fine and disbarment, was not itself disbarred from anything. 

Stryker's Track Record 

The Bloomberg noted that Stryker did not have unblemished track record,


In 2007, New Jersey�s U.S. attorney at the time, Chris Christie, reached an agreement with four makers of hip- and knee-implants that paid $310 million to settle U.S. claims they paid kickbacks to surgeons who used their products. Stryker, a fifth company, received a non-prosecution deal. Christie, a possible Republican presidential candidate in 2016, is now governor.

In fact, that year, we posted (here, here, here, and here) about the payments, often huge, that five manufacturers of prosthetic joints (Biomet, DePuy Orthopaedics (a unit of Johnson & Johnson), Stryker Orthopedics,a unit of Stryker Inc, Zimmer Holdings, and Smith & Nephew) revealed they made to orthopedic surgeons and various academic and other organizations. We also noted that some of the leadership of the major orthopedic societies have received substantial amounts from these companies, as have the societies themselves.

However, there is much more to the Stryker track record,

In 2013, we noted that Stryker paid $13.2 million to settle charges that it bribed doctors in various countries to use its devices, violating the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) (look here).

In 2012, we noted that Stryker paid a $15 million fine after pleading guilty to a federal count of misbranding a medical device. Government prosecutors alleged the company conspired to defraud surgeons into combining two of its products, contrary to their labeled usage, and possibly harming patients (look here).

In 2010, we noted that Stryker paid $1.35 million to settle charges that it marketed bone growth products without FDA approval (look here).

In 2009, we noted that two Stryker sales representatives pleaded guilty to charges they promoted off-label use of Stryker bone growth products although they knew such use could endanger patients (look here).  

So the larger corporation that paid fines that appeared large, but were actually small given its size, and that let its subsidiary and its subsidiary's former CEO otherwise take the raps, had a long track record of similarly questionable behavior.  That track record did not apparently inform the resolution of the current case.


Summary

So here we go again. A large medical device company resolved charges of wrongdoing by paying a fine that appears large to the common person, but in fact was small compared to its revenue.  The case was unusual in that the company did admit wrongdoing, but in a way that seemed to reflect the blame onto one of its subsidiaries.  The case was further unusual in that a CEO was charged and pleaded guilty, but it was not the CEO of the large corporation, but the former CEO of the acquired company.  The case was yet further unusual in that a company was disbarred from transactions with the federal government, but the company was just the subsidiary of the larger company, which otherwise could continue business as usual. 

Thus while the penalties meted out in this case seemed more severe than usual, on examination they left the big parent corporation relatively unscathed.  No one still in management at that corporation, including anyone involved in the acquisition of the wayward subsidiary, apparently will suffer any negative consequences.  Furthermore, that larger corporation turns out to have a substantial track record of previous misbehavior.  Yet that did not apparently affect the outcome of this case, and little of this track record was even reflected in the reporting of the current case.

While we have often - some might say ad infinitum - discussed the march of legal settlements by large health care organizations, and how these settlements seem to impose relatively small penalties on the corporations, and leave their hired managers untouched, these settlements seem to produce few echoes.  Like many other examples of unpleasantness that might reflect badly on the leaders of large health care organizations, even those who may have personally profited from the unpleasantness, they remain largely anechoic.  So we would urge the reporters who cover the next settlements by big health care organizations at least look to see if the organizations had been involved in similar settlements in the past

Finally, as we have said all to often,...   The failure of the current limp legal efforts against such corruption is evident by how many corporations have become ethical repeat offenders.  Pervasive bad behavior by large health care organizations has got to be a major cause of our ongoing health care dysfunction.  So, to really deter bad behavior, those who authorized, directed or implemented bad behavior must be held accountable. As long as they are not, expect the bad behavior to continue.

Wednesday, 3 December 2014

Princess Health and A new "Better EHR" book and an observation re: health IT regulation, health IT amateurs, and user centered design (UCD) - "responding to user feature requests or complaints?". Princessiccia

Princess Health and A new "Better EHR" book and an observation re: health IT regulation, health IT amateurs, and user centered design (UCD) - "responding to user feature requests or complaints?". Princessiccia

A new book has appeared on improving usability of electronic health records.  The result of government-sponsored work, the book is available free for download.  It was announced via an AMIA (American Medical Informatics Association, http://www.amia.org/) listserv, among others:

From: Jiajie Zhang [support@lists.amia.org]
Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 6:00 PM
To: implementation@lists.amia.org
Subject: [Implementation] - New Book on EHR Usability - "Better EHR: Usability, Workflow, and Cognitive Support in Electronic Health Records"

Dear Colleagues,

We are pleased to announce the availability of a free new book from the ONC supported SHARPC project: "Better EHR: Usability, Workflow, and Cognitive Support in Electronic Health Records".The electronic versions (both pdf and iBook) are freely available to the public at the following link:https://sbmi.uth.edu/nccd/better-ehr/


First, this book appears to be a very good resource at understanding issues related to EHR usability.  I particularly like the discussion of cognitive issues.

However, this book also holds messages about the state of the industry and the issue of regulation vs. no regulation, and impairment of innovation:

I think it axiomatic that user-centered design (UCD) is a key area for innovation, especially in life-critical software like clinical IT.  (I would opine that UCD is actually critical to safety and efficacy of these sophisticated information systems in a sociotechnically complex setting.)

I think it indisputable that the health IT industry has been largely unregulated for most of its existence, in the manner of other healthcare sectors such as pharma and traditional medical devices.

Yet, even in the absence of regulation, the book authors found this, per Section 5 - EHR Vendor Usability Practices:

a)  A research team of human factors, clinician/human factors, and clinician/informatics experts visited eleven EHR vendors and conducted semi-structured interviews about their UCD processes. "Process" was defined as any series of actions that iteratively incorporated user feedback throughout the design and development of an EHR system. Some vendors developed their own UCD processes while others followed published processes, such as ISO or NIST guidelines.

Vendor recruitment. Eleven vendors based on market position and type of knowledge that might be gained were recruited for a representative sample (Table 1). Vendors received no compensation and were ensured anonymity.
and

b)  RESULTS
Vendors generally fell into one of three UCD implementation categories:

Well-developed UCD: These vendors had a refined UCD process, including infrastructure and the expertise to study user requirements, an iterative design process, formative and summative testing. Importantly, these vendors developed efficient means of integrating design within the rigorous software development schedules common to the industry, such as maintaining a a network of test participants and remote testing capabilities. Vendors typically employed an extensive usability staff.

Basic UCD: These vendors understood the importance of UCD and were working toward developing and refining UCD processes to meet their needs. These vendors typically employed few usability experts and faced resource constraints making it difficult to develop a rigorous UCD process.

Misconceptions of UCD: These vendors did not have a UCD process in place and generally misunderstood the concept, in many cases believing that responding to user feature requests or complaints constituted UCD. These vendors generally did not have human factors/usability experts on staff. Leadership often held little appreciation for usability.

About a third of our vendor sample fell equally into each category.

In other words, a third of health IT sellers lacked the resources to do an adequate job of UCD and testing; and a third did not even understand the concept.

Let me reiterate:

In an unregulated life-critical industry, a third of these sampled sellers thought 'responding to user feature requests or complaints constituted UCD'.  And another third neglected UCD due to a 'lack of resources'.

I find that nothing short of remarkable.

I opine that this is only possible in healthcare in an unregulated healthcare sector.

Regulation, for example, that enforced good design practices and good manufacturing practices (GMP's) could, it follows, actually improve clinical IT innovation considering the observations found by these authors, through ensuring those without the resources either found them or removed themselves from the marketplace, and by making sure those sellers that did not understand such a fundamental concept either became experts it UCD, or also left the marketplace.

I can only wonder in what other fundamental(s) other sellers are lacking, hampering innovation, that could be improved through regulation.

As a final point, arguments that regulation hampers innovation seems to assume a fundamental level of competency and good practices to start with among those to be freed from regulation. In this case, that turns our to be an incorrect assumption. 

As a radio amateur, I often use the term "health IT amateurs" to describe persons and organizations who should not be in leadership roles in health IT, just as I, as a radio amateur, should not be (and would not want to be) in a leadership role in a mission-critical telecommunications project.

I think that, inadvertently, the writers of this book section gave real meaning to my term "health IT amateurs."  User centered design is not a post-accident or post-mortem activity.

-- SS

12/4/2014 Addendum:

I should add that in the terminology of IT, "we don't have enough resources" - a line I've heard numerous times in my CMIO and other IT-related leadership roles - often meant: we don't want to do extra work, to reduce our profits (or miss our budget targets), or hire someone who actually knows what they're doing because we don't really think that the expertise/tasks in question are really that important.

In other cases, the expertise is present. but when those experts opine an EHR product will kill people if released, they find the expert 'redundant', e.g., http://cci.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/?loc=cases&sloc=lawsuit.

Put in more colloquial terms, this is a slovenly industry that has always made me uncomfortable, perhaps in part due to my experience having been a medical safety manager in public transit (SEPTA in Philadelphia), where lapses in basic safety processes could, and did, result in bloody train wrecks.

Perhaps some whose sole experience with indolence and incompetence-driven catastrophe has been in discussions over coffee in faculty lounges cannot appreciate that viewpoint.

Academic organizations like AMIA could do, and could have done, a whole lot more to help reform this industry, years ago.

-- SS

Princess Health and Is Meat Unhealthy? Part IV. Princessiccia

In this post, I'll address the question: does eating meat contribute to weight gain?

Non-industrial cultures

I'll get right to the point: humans living in a non-industrialized setting tend to be lean, regardless of how much meat they eat. This applies equally to hunter-gatherers, herders, and farmers.

One of the leanest populations I've encountered in my reading is the 1960s Papua New Guinea highland farmers of Tukisenta. They ate a nearly vegan diet composed almost exclusively of sweet potatoes, occasionally punctuated by feasts including large amounts of pork. On average, they ate very little animal food. Visiting researchers noted that the residents of Tukisenta were "muscular and mostly very lean", and did not gain fat with age (1, Western Diseases, Trowell and Burkitt, 1981).

!Kung man gathering mongongo fruit/nuts.
From The !Kung San, by Richard B. Lee.
Another remarkably lean hunter-gatherer population is the !Kung San foragers of the Kalahari desert. The !Kung San are so lean that many of them would be considered underweight on the standard body mass index scale (BMI less than 18.5). Average BMI doesn't exceed 20 in any age category (The !Kung San, Richard Lee, 1979). Is this simply because they're starving? It is true that they don't always get as much food as they'd like, but on most days, they have the ability to gather more food than they need. The fact that they are able to reproduce normally suggests that they aren't starving. Richard Lee's detailed work with the !Kung San indicates that approximately 40 percent of their calories came from animal foods during his study period in the 1960s. This was mostly meat, with occasional eggs when available.

Read more �

Monday, 1 December 2014

Princess Health and The Hospital CEO as Scrooge - Hired Managers Get Raises While Presiding Over Deficits, Layoffs and Pay Cuts . Princessiccia

Princess Health and The Hospital CEO as Scrooge - Hired Managers Get Raises While Presiding Over Deficits, Layoffs and Pay Cuts . Princessiccia

Million dollar plus managers of non-profit hospitals and health systems are now -forgive me - a dime a dozen. Payments to top managers continue to rise, faster than inflation, and faster than the pay given to other people in the health care field.

Top Hired Managers' Pay Increases Far Faster than Pay of Other Employees

For example, last August, Modern Healthcare published a summary article which included

Total cash compensation grew an average of 24.2% from 2011 to 2012 for the 147 chief executives included in Modern Healthcare's analysis of the most recent public information available for not-for-profit compensation. Of those 147 CEOs, 21, or 14.3%, saw their total cash compensation rise by more than 50%.

Another 51, or 35.7%, received total cash compensation increases of 10% or higher.

Furthermore,

The survey results suggest hospital system CEOs received increases in their base compensation that was about four times greater than average workers, who have gotten annual pay hikes of less than 2% in recent years. Of the 143 analyzed, 37, or 25.9%, received raises in their base compensation that were 10% or higher; another 69, or 48.3%, had raises between 2% and 9.9%; and just 23 of the group, or 16.1%, saw a decline in their base compensation, according to Form 990s.
The Talking Points Remain Unchanged

Yet the justification given for such munificent pay of the top hired managers of non-profit organizations that are supposed to put patient care (and sometimes teaching and research) ahead of personal enrichment never seem to go beyond the talking points we have previously discussed.

 It seems nearly every attempt made to defend the outsize compensation given hospital and health system executives involves the same arguments, thus suggesting they are talking points, possibly crafted as a public relations ploy.   We first listed the talking points here, and then provided additional examples of their use here, here here, here, here, and here, and here

They are:
- We have to pay competitive rates
- We have to pay enough to retain at least competent executives, given how hard it is to be an executive
- Our executives are not merely competitive, but brilliant (and have to be to do such a difficult job).

True to form, the Modern Healthcare article also included,

The "Competitive Rates" Talking Point

Hospital systems, their boards and outside compensation consultants justify these raises as adjustments necessary to keep pace with what the market dictates and to compete for talent that might flee to more-lucrative for-profit positions.

The "Retention" Talking Point

'We want to make sure we can recruit and retain the highest quality of staff, while balancing benefits and the salaries that are reasonable as compared to other organizations,' Mayo's [chief human resources officer Jill] Ragsdale said.

The "Brilliant Executive, Difficult Job" Talking Point

Jill Ragsdale, Mayo Clinic's chief human resources officer  [said] 'We want to make sure we can recruit and retain the highest quality of staff.'

Also,

'Not everyone can step up and step into running a healthcare system with 25 to 50 hospitals,' said Tom Flannery, a partner with consulting firm Mercer. 'It's a heck of a complex job.'

Questions Begged


Always left unsaid, and left unsaid in this article are answers to questions like:

Why are so called market comparisons limited to other CEOs or top managers, and never take into account other hospital employees, especially the health care professionals who actually provide the health care?

Why is the complexity of the managers' jobs never compared to complexity of other health care jobs, like the care of complex patients with multiple diseases, or neurosurgery, for example?

How is the "brilliance" of the managers measured, and compared to the brilliance of other employees, especially health care professionals?

These questions become more pointed when the size and rate of increase of executive, that his hired managers' pay seems obviously disproportionate to the trajectory of the financial performance, much less clinical quality of the hospitals the managers run.

In the recent months, we have found some striking examples of non-profit hospital executive pay that seems ridiculous in the context of what is going on at these managers' institutions.  Very briefly, some recent examples, alphabetical by state, include...



California - Washington Hospital Health System CEO Got Total Compensation Near $1 Million After Hundreds of Layoffs, and Charges of Conflicts of Interest and Poor Organizational Transparency

This story appeared in late September, 2014, in the Silicon Valley Business Journal, and noted that a local chapter of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) was protesting the pay of the hospital's CEO,

Washington Hospital CEO Nancy Farber�s $593,000 salary ... [was] coupled with benefits that push compensation closer to $1 million

However, three months before,

an Alameda County grand jury report noted several potential conflicts of interest and poor organizational transparency at the institution, which the hospital's administration has since refuted or vowed to fix.

Furthermore,

The hospital laid off 200 workers two years ago and another 31 earlier this month. Washington Hospital�s most recent federal tax filing available show net assets of negative $16 million, plus expenses of $31.8 million, which outpaced revenue by $1.3 million during 2011.

The 2014 controversy over Ms Farber's pay is particularly notable since her pay has been raising concerns, and hackles, for more that 10 years, as we discussed in this 2013 post.  (In 2003, a local newspaper decried her 10% raise and her then $406,000 base salary.)  Yet none of these concerns seems to have affected her continuing generous remuneration despite ongoing problems at her small, partially publicly funded institution.  


Massachusetts - UMass Memorial Health Care CEO Received $4.8 Million Compensation Months Before Hospital Announced $55 Million Operating Loss

In this story from the August, 2014, Boston Globe, the contrast was between the CEO's rising remuneration and the hospital's worsening losses.  

The departing chief of UMass Memorial Health Care in Worcester earned $4.8 million in 2012, topping the list of Massachusetts hospital executives who received healthy increases in seven-figure pay packages � even as they faced growing pressure to bring costs under control.

John G. O�Brien, who retired in February 2013 after more than a decade at UMass Memorial, nearly doubled his compensation from 2011, when he earned $2.4 million as head of the biggest health care system in Central Massachusetts. Much of his 2012 compensation included retirement benefits earned during his tenure.

O�Brien�s payout came several months before UMass Memorial reported a staggering $55 million operating loss for the fiscal year ending September 2013.

Not only was the hospital losing a lot of money, soon after Mr O'Brien departed with his riches, it began laying off employees.

The system has since laid off hundreds of workers and made other changes to close the gap under the new chief, Dr. Eric W. Dickson.

The justification came from the system's top lawyer, included an example of the "our executives are brilliant" talking point,

Douglas Brown, UMass Memorial�s chief legal counsel, said O�Brien helped expand the health system and did 'a remarkable job' as chief executive.
Note that Mr Brown's official title is "Senior Vice President for Member Hospitals and Chief Legal Officer," per the UMass website, and thus was also a top hired manager who reported to Mr O'Brien.

To gloss over the counter-factual nature of this justification, Brown came up with an example of a double standard that was brilliant in its own way,

'It is true we suffered a lot in 2013,' Brown said. 'We certainly don�t blame that on John O�Brien.  We look at his [entire] tenure.'

So Mr O'Brien got credit for, and millions of dollars justified by all the good things that were said to have happened at UMass Memorial in the past, but somehow got to avoid responsibility for the recent financial losses.  That makes no sense.

Just to gild the lilly, Mr Brown added the "we have to be competitive" talking point, while reaffirming the "brilliant manager" talking point,

Brown added that the health system, which employs 12,000 and collects $2.5 billion in revenues, needs to pay well to attract top talent. 'We want to pay competitively with the markets so that we can get the best,' he said.

Of course, he did not present any facts showing why Mr O'Brien was "the best." But top hired counsel and top hired managers are paid well to come up with such creativity.

North Carolina - Novant Health Executives Got Raises While Core Revenue Drops, and Later Low Level Employees Got Pay Cut 

This story was in the Winston-Salem Journal by Richard Craver in August, 2014,

The top executive of Novant Health Inc., Carl Armato, received $1.05 million in salary during 2013, an 11.8 percent increase during a year in which the system had a slight dip in operating income.

Armato is in his third year as the system�s chief executive and president. His salary has risen 49.4 percent since taking over as top executive Jan. 1, 2012, following the retirement of Paul Wiles.

Armato�s incentive compensation rose 33.6 percent to $917,964. Altogether, what Armato received in direct compensation was $1.96 million, up 20.9 percent. He also received $39,372 in compensation, mostly nontaxable, company-paid insurance benefits. 

Other top executives also did well,

[Chief administrative officer Jacqueline] Daniels received a 1.2 percent raise in salary to $543,607 and an 11.9 percent increase in incentive pay to $545,680 [total direct compensation, $1,089,287]. Fred Hargett, chief financial officer, received a 10.1 percent salary increase to $611,703 and a 22.4 percent increase in incentive pay to $561,004 [$1,172,707].

Sallye Liner, chief clinical officer, received a 3.5 percent increase in salary to $501,462 and a 3 percent increase in incentive pay to $507,094 [$1,008,556]. Dr. Stephen Wallenhaupt, chief medical officer, received a 2.5 percent salary increase to $517,755 and a 12.3 percent in incentive pay at $523,518 [$1,041,273].

In addition, because of a one-time change in the corporate retirement program for top executives, all these managers also received large lump sum payouts, for example,


Making the change required Novant to close out the defined benefit plan, including paying out all the money owed to qualified executives in a lump sum.

For example, Armato received a $6.11 million payout � the second highest of 13 Novant qualified executives. The most, $8.66 million, was paid to Jacqueline Daniels, its chief administrative officer who has been with Novant 31 years. 
Note that this is not the first time we have discussed opulent pay for Novant managers.  As discussed in 2013, the previous CEO got $5.1 million in his last year. 

The article included the usual talking points to justify all this money going to a handful of top managers,

Novant, as do most not-for-profit health-care systems serving North Carolina, stresses high compensation levels are necessary to attract executives to run 'a very complex organization.' 

That was a mixture of the "competitive pay" and "brilliant executive, difficult job" talking points.  However, no one at the organization apparently was willing to explain how the increasing compensation related to what appears to be declining financial performance,

For fiscal 2013, Novant�s total operating revenue was up 1.1 percent to $3.59 billion, and total operating expenses rose 3.6 percent to $3.19 billion. Altogether, income from core health-care operations was down 40.6 percent to $109.8 million.

A few months after these munificent payments to top executives were disclosed, another Winston-Salem Journal article by Richard Craver reported that more lowly workers were taking pay cuts,


Novant Health Inc. confirmed Tuesday that it will reclassify the titles and duties for medical-unit secretaries in early January, as well as cut their pay.

The implementation of electronic health records at Novant facilities over the past year has led to a reduced workload for the medical secretaries, Novant said. Employees were told about the changes last week.

'The total number of individuals affected is 157, which includes employees in both Charlotte and Winston-Salem,' Novant spokeswoman Robin Baltimore said. 'We do not have the specific number broken down by market.'

The Charlotte Observer reported the pay cut could be up to 10 percent.

So Mr Armato's management allowed him and his fellow hired managers to make millions, and get raises, while he cut the pay of lowly unit secretaries because their jobs had supposedly become easier. 
This must be one of those difficult decisions that the CEO and his friends among top management get paid so much to make.  Maybe Mr Armato will get to play Scrooge in some version of A Christmas Carol this year.


Texas - El Paso University Medical Center CEO, Managers Gets Bonuses Despite Budget Deficit, Layoffs


A story from television station KVIA in mid-November noted that challenges for El Paso's University Medical Center,


According to UMC, El Paso Children�s Hospital owes it $70 million, which forced UMC to lay off 56 employees earlier this year.

And the hospital�s relationship with Texas Tech has been rocky.

So, no one at the hospital got a raise this year.  However,

[CEO Jim]Valenti�s base salary is $460,000.

But he did get a bonus because he met goals outlined in his contract. The board awarded him a $119,000 bonus. The El Paso Times reported in 2012 that Valenti received a $117,401 incentive bonus in 2010.

The explanation for giving the CEO a bonus under these circumstances fit the usual pattern.  There was this version of the "our CEO is brilliant" talking point,

board members praised the way Valenti has improved patient care at UMC and his work with medical reimbursements.

They said he�s a masterful manager of talent.

This was actually more specific than the usual "brilliance" argument, but hardly detailed enough to explain why he was apparently "brilliant" enough to deserve a bonus at a time when base pay for less exalted employees was frozen  (Actually, a later story in the El Paso Times suggested that while pay was frozen for the more plebian employees, 26 top managers got bonuses, although Mr Valenti's was the biggest.)  

And there was this version of the "we have to be competitive" talking point, courtesy the UMC board chairman, William Hanson,

'It's reasonable in the context of the market that Mr. Valenti works in,' Hanson said. 

Hanson says the pay is comparable to the salaries of other hospital CEOs around the region.

Again, it was not clear whether the supposed "market" for Mr Valenti's talents would not demand a discount for the leader of a hospital with frozen pay and a history of recent layoffs, or why the market for managerial employees was so different than the market for other employees .  


Washington - EvergreenHealth CEO Pay Up 18%, Average Employees Pay Up 1%

This story was from the Seattle Times in July, 2014,

Union members at EvergreenHealth medical center Thursday highlighted the comparison between the 1 percent pay raise they say the Kirkland hospital is offering them versus the 18 percent raise received by the CEO of the public hospital district facility last year.

Specifically,

[CEO Robert]  Malte�s pay, including retirement and benefits, went from $843,236 in 2012 to $996,268 for 2013.

 The only justification offered by Kay Taylor, the hospital's "vice president for communication," (that is, chief of its public relations department), was the usual "we have to pay competitive rates" talking point,

'Regarding our CEO�s compensation, it is important to remember that our board of commissioners benchmark CEO compensation to other similar organizations and create compensation that is at or near the 50th percentile,' Taylor said. 'With our CEO�s recent raise, his compensation is still on par � if not below � other CEOs of similar-sized healthcare organizations.'

Why it was imperative to compare the CEO's pay to that of other CEOs of other hospitals, meanwhile ignoring the obvious comparison of the size of the increase of the CEO's pay to that of other employees was not clear.

Summary

As health care organizations have become increasingly big and influential, their leadership has been increasingly in the hands of generic professional managers, not health care professionals.  These hired managers have commanded generous and ever increasing pay, which has been justified by the common talking points: managers have extremely hard jobs and are brilliant, and high pay is necessary in a competitive market to attract and maintain top leaders.

Yet none of the boosters of high pay for health care managers, who mainly seem to consist of the legal, marketing, and public relations personnel who answer to them, and occasionally the board members who also are hired manager, answer the obvious questions:
What is the evidence that managers are brilliant and their jobs are so hard, especially when compared to the highly-trained health care professionals at their own institutions?
Is their really a free market in hired managers, and why is it so isolated from the market for health care professionals and other people employed by health care organizations?

These justifications seem particularly ridiculous when managers whose results are obviously not brilliant, e.g., marked by deficits, losses, and lay-offs, are getting huge and increasing pay.  They also seem ridiculous when the "market" apparently dictates salary cuts and lay-offs for all employees other than the managers of a particular organization.

 Instead, it seems likely that hired health care managers make more and more because of the influence they have on their own pay.  This influence is partially generated by their control over their institutions' marketers, public relations flacks, and lawyers.  It is partially generated by their control over the make up of the boards of trustees who are supposed to exert governance, especially when these boards are subject to conflicts of interest and  are stacked with hired managers of other organizations.  Furthermore, per the dogma of pay for performance, their pay may be heavily tied to short-term financial results, rather than fulfillment of the patient care or academic mission.

Thus, as in the larger economy, non-profit hospital managers have become "value extractors."  The opportunity to extract value has become a major driver of managerial decision making.  And this decision making is probably the major reason our health care system is so expensive and inaccessible, and why it provides such mediocre care for so much money. 

So to repeat, true health care reform would put in place leadership that understands the health care context, upholds health care professionals' values, and puts patients' and the public's health ahead of extraneous, particularly short-term financial concerns. We need health care governance that holds health care leaders accountable, and ensures their transparency, integrity and honesty.

But this sort of reform would challenge the interests of managers who are getting very rich off the current system.  So I am afraid the US may end up going far down this final common pathway before enough people manifest enough strength to make real changes.

ADDENDUM (30 December, 2014) - This post was reposted on the Naked Capitalism blog on 2 December, 2014, and  on OpEd News on 29 December, 2014.
Princess Health and Recent Interviews. Princessiccia

Princess Health and Recent Interviews. Princessiccia

For those who don't follow my Twitter account (@whsource), here are links to my two most recent interviews.

Smash the Fat with Sam Feltham.  We discuss the eternally controversial question, "is a calorie a calorie"?  Like many other advocates of the low-carbohydrate diet, Feltham believes that the metabolic effects of food (particularly on insulin), rather than calorie intake per se, are the primary determinants of body fatness.  I explain the perspective that my field of research has provided on this question.  We also discussed why some lean people become diabetic.  Feltham was a gracious host.

Nourish, Balance, Thrive with Christopher Kelly.  Kelly is also an advocate of the low-carbohydrate diet for fat loss.  This interview covered a lot of ground, including the insulin-obesity hypothesis, regulation of body fatness by the leptin-brain axis, how food reward works to increase calorie intake, and the impact of the food environment on food intake.  I explain why I think proponents of the insulin-obesity hypothesis have mistaken association for causation, and what I believe the true relationship is between insulin biology and obesity.  Kelly was also a gracious host.  He provides a transcript if you'd rather read the interview in text form.