The American Red Cross is a storied non-profit organization. It provides disaster relief, provides a major part of the US blood supply, and has important public health teaching functions, such as teaching cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (look
here). Nonetheless, its operations have become increasingly controversial. ProPublica has been
investigating them for years. The latest ProPublica report, entitled "The Corporate Takeover of the Red Cross," showed how this renowned organization has suffered under generic management/
managerialism, providing another case study showing how bad generic management and mangerialism are for health care and public health.
We have frequently posted about what we have called
generic management, the
manager's coup d'etat, and
mission-hostile management. Managerialism wraps these concepts up into a single package. The idea is that all organizations, including health care organizations, ought to be run people with generic management training and background, not necessarily by people with specific backgrounds or training in the organizations' areas of operation. Thus, for example, hospitals ought to be run by MBAs, not doctors, nurses, or public health experts. Furthermore, all organizations ought to be run according to the same basic principles of business management. These principles in turn ought to be based on current
neoliberal dogma, with the prime directive that short-term revenue is the primary goal (sometimes in the for-profit sphere called the shareholder value principle, look
here.)
The ProPublica article showed how the leadership of the American Red Cross was given over to generic managers; how they ran the organization based on generic business management principles; and how the results were bad for the organization's mission. I will address each point with quotes from the article, and add the commentary that was lacking in a straight investigative journalistic report.
The New Leaders were Generic ManagersThe New CEO is a Generic Manager who Specialized in MarketingGail McGovern became Red Cross CEO in 2008. Her academic background was in the "quantitative sciences." Her first job was as a computer programmer. Then,
McGovern climbed steadily through the ranks at AT&T. By the mid-1990s, she was head of the company�s consumer markets division....
Next,
McGovern left AT&T in 1998, then spent four years at Fidelity Investments, where she was promoted to be the head of the retail mutual fund and brokerage business. Then came six years as a marketing professor at Harvard Business School....
On the other hand, she apparently had no specific experience, training or expertise relating to the mission of the Red Cross, and specifically no experience, training or expertise in public health, health care, blood banking, or disaster relief.
She Believes in the Primacy of MarketingHer academic writings spell out her theory of corporate leadership. 'In many organizations, marketing exists far from the executive suite and boardroom,' she and her coauthors wrote in an article for the Harvard Business Review. Companies that make this mistake are doomed to 'low growth and declining margins.'
One could argue that perhaps in the long run, a good product that sells itself might be better for a manufacturing firm than a temporarily persuasive marketing campaign. Even so,
the mission of the Red Cross is not first to grow and make more money, or even to sell products, but instead it is
The American Red Cross prevents and alleviates human suffering in the face of emergencies by mobilizing the power of volunteers and the generosity of donors.
She was Hired by the Red Cross to Promote Generic Management with Emphasis on MarketingMs McGovern was hired at a time when the dogma that business managers ought to run everything was becoming very prominent.
McGovern, selected after a global search by a headhunting firm, was seen as a candidate who would bring private-sector methods to the nonprofit. 'Isn�t it great that we have someone that really has had that business expertise in developing and working with a brand and recognizing the power of it?' [Red Cross Board Chairwoman Bonnie] McElveen-Hunter told the Washington Post at the time.
Note that the Chairwoman of the Board of Governors herself was
a wealthy Republican donor appointed by President George W. Bush in 2004
According to Wikipedia, she is a businesswoman whose undergraduate degree was in business, who worked for Bank of America and then founded Pace Communications, and who also has no discernable experience or expertise in health care, public health, or disaster relief.
The ProPublica article did not suggest that Ms McElveen-Hunter or anyone else really thought through how a generica manager practicing managerialism would actually benefit the mission of the Red Cross.
The CEO Recruited Other Generic ManagersSoon after she joined the Red Cross, McGovern recruited executives who had worked with her at AT&T and Fidelity....
Furthermore,
As part of her effort
to run the Red Cross more like a business, McGovern recruited more than
10 former AT&T executives to top positions. The move stirred resentment inside the organization, with some longtime Red Cross hands referring to the charity as the 'AT&T retirement program.'
Again, one would expert a generic manager to feel most comfortable amongst others of her ilk. Again, any consideration of whether running the Red Cross "more like a business" would improve its success as a charity was not evident.
The New Generic Managers Relied on Generic Management DogmaThe new generic managers conceived of their job as "a corporate turnaround that would touch every aspect of the charity's finances and operations."
They Established Centralized ControlThe work of the Red Cross was traditionally done by local chapters. The new generic managers sought to decrease their independence from "corporate." So,
Each of the Red Cross� more than 700 chapters had its own bank account, tracked its own volunteers, and ran its own computer system. McGovern hoped to realize considerable savings by consolidating these back-office functions, creating what she dubbed 'One Red Cross.'
The notions that different chapters might face different challenges, and hence that flexible local control might do better addressing these challenges than would centralized top-down command were not apparently considered.
They Cut Costs, Particularly Through Cutting Employee Benefits and Laying Them Off and hence tried to enhance short-term revenue:
She also got to work cutting costs: there was a round of layoffs; she killed the charity�s generous pension program and suspended matching contributions to employees� retirement accounts.
Also,
When McGovern was hired as CEO, there were over 700 Red Cross chapters across the country. Today, there around 250, though some former chapter offices stayed open even as they were folded into other chapters. The Red Cross declined to say how many offices it closed.
Over the course of McGovern�s tenure, the number of paid employees fell from around 36,000 to around 23,000 and the Red Cross today spends several hundred million dollars less a year than it did in 2008. (Most of the staff cuts were from local chapters, not the blood business, though the Red Cross declined to provide a breakdown.)
Cost-cutting, especially by cutting compensation to and benefits of line employees, is a central mantra of current business management. The effects these cuts have on the morale and performance of the remaining employees, and the downstream effects on the organization are generally ignored. The specific implications for a charity meant to uphold a mission were not discussed.
They Focused on Marketing and Public RelationsEarly on,
McGovern laid out a vision to increase revenue through 'consolidated, powerful, breathtaking marketing.'
'This is a brand to die for,' she often said.
In addition,
The Red Cross� chief of fundraising, a former colleague of McGovern�s from Fidelity, told the assembled officials that the organization should attract far more than the $520 million in donations it was bringing in annually. 'Strength of brand,' his PowerPoint said, 'justify results in $1-2 billion range.'
Also, CEO McGovern chose Jack McMaster to run the public health training operation,
praising McMaster to Red Cross staff as a master marketer and a trusted former colleague [at AT&T].
As an aside, actually,
After leaving AT&T, he took a job in 1999 as CEO of a Dutch telecom company called KPNQwest. In just a few years, he had run it into what Reuters called a 'spectacular collapse,' prompting a bankruptcy, a storm of lawsuits, and comparisons to Enron. Just months before the company went under, McMaster publicly boasted that it was poised for dramatic growth.
This suggests that McGovern placed far more priority on hiring "master marketers" than finding trustworthy leaders. Of course, a CEO who is mainly a professional marketer may see marketing as central to whatever organization she is running. The notion that the Red Cross had such a wonderful brand because it used to do wonderful things did not apparently occur to the new generic marketers. Furthermore, the notion that even "master marketing" may not hide the undermining of the organization's mission also did not occur.
They Suppressed Opinions They Did Not Want to HereAs discontent among staff rose (see below), leading to anguish expressed on social media,
critical posts later disappeared from the Facebook page. Moderator Ryan Kaltenbaugh reminded participants that the group was intended to be 'a POSITIVE forum sharing ideas, stories, pictures, links, videos and more across our great country.'
'[P]lease (please) refrain from posting your negative personal views,' he continued.
To a leadership obsessed with marketing, appearance may have seemed to be everything. Yet again, suppressing the bad news does not make what generated it disappear.
They Paid Themselves Very Well We have often
discussed how executive compensation in health care now seems to rise beyond any level that could be justified by the executives' actions and performance. A central problem with managerialism seems to be that now top managers can virtually set their own pay. Thus, they have
become value extractors, more focused on their own enrichment than their organizations' ultimate success. The ProPublica article did not explicitly discuss executive compensation except after the failure of the expansion plans by the "master marketer" McMaster,
Amid layoffs in the division last year, bonuses given to McMaster and his team raised eyebrows within the Red Cross, a former headquarters official said.
In a statement, the Red Cross said the bonuses were appropriate because the division hit 'strategic milestones' including establishing 'a national tele-service platform and national sales and service delivery models.'
Regardless, the division failed to reach its real goal, expansion of its business.
Furthermore, there is evidence that during the reign of McGovern, the top managers as a group have been very well paid, especially given that they were running a charity whose good works are largely supported by contribuations and the taxpayers. We
noted in a 2011 post that
In 2009, then CEO Gail McGovern received over a million in total compensation, $1,032,022 to be exact. Its President for Biomedical Services got $850,489. Its Executive VP for Biomedical Services got $596,309. Twelve other executives got more than $250,000. Of those, ten got more than $350,000.
Since then, while Ms McGovern's compensation has actually declined, the number of very well paid managers has actually grown. According to the organization's
latest available IRS Form 990 filing, for 2013, Ms McGovern had total compensation of over $597,000, and 15 managers had total compensation over $250,000, of these, 10 were over $400,000.
So despite all the problems afflicting the Red Cross (see below, and the larger ProPublica series), the top managers still managed to pay themselves very well.
The Results were BadThe Marketers' Best Laid Plans Led to Declining ContributionsThe "master marketer" did not do so well.
McMaster laid out how the CPR unit would attract more customers while at the same time hiking prices for classes and training materials in CPR, swimming, and babysitting. He believed the Red Cross brand justified higher prices than were being charged around the country.
Customers voted with their wallets. When prices rose, many simply switched to lower-cost providers.
'We thought if we raised prices, American Heart [Association] would probably raise prices, and life would be good,' McGovern said at a 2013 employee town hall meeting, referring to the Red Cross� competitor in the CPR class business. 'Didn�t happen.'
Also,
'A halfway competent market analysis would have told you that the bulk of our business was in selling to small businesses who viewed us as a business expense,' recalled one former chapter executive director. 'When the massive price increases arrived, it was too much and customers bailed.'
This illustrates that the generic managers did not even achieve their business goal, increasing sales and increasing revenue. What did they care, though, if the bonuses still rolled in?
Centralized Control, Benefit Cuts, Layoffs, and the Marketing Focus Wounded Employee Morale and Discouraged VolunteersThose who push generic management practices often seem blind to their adverse effects. So,
Many of those who taught classes � including volunteers who did the work for free � quit after being turned off by headquarters� poor communication and insistence on centralized control.
Also,
But much like the organization�s paid staff, many of its volunteers appear deeply disillusioned. An internal survey obtained by ProPublica found volunteers around the country had a satisfaction rate of 32 percent this year � down 20 points from last year.
Furthermore,
Driving the alienation, longtime employees and volunteers say, is a gulf that has opened up between McGovern�s executive suite and the rank and file who have spent decades in the mission-focused nonprofit world.
She has surrounded herself with a tight-knit group of former telecom colleagues, they say. 'They�re all people from the period when AT&T imploded,' said one former senior official. 'The priorities seem to be a reflection of what that team is comfortable with: sales and marketing.'
An internal assessment previously reported by ProPublica and NPR said national headquarters� focus on image slowed the delivery of relief aid during Hurricane Isaac and Superstorm Sandy. Officials engaged in 'diverting assets for public relation purposes,' according to the assessment.
The Red Cross depends on its staff and volunteers to do the work. What did the brilliant generic managers and master marketers think would happen if they fired lots of staff, drove volunteers to quit, and disillusioned those who remained?
Layoffs and Cutback Reduced Capacity to Respond to DisastersOne example was the response in West Virginia
In West Virginia, where several chapters have been shuttered, emergency management officials said the group�s response to recent disasters has been anemic. After a recent water shortage caused by a chemical leak, the charity declined to provide any help to residents, the Register-Herald of Beckley reported. Local officials described that as business as usual for the charity. When a tornado hit in the southern part of the state, the Red Cross� inadequate response left scores of victims without enough food, according to the newspaper.
Another was the response in northern California,
In Northern California last year, the Red Cross shuttered the Napa County chapter and laid off disaster relief staff, according to an internal PowerPoint presentation. Then, in September, a drought-fueled fire swept through the area, consuming more than 75,000 acres and 1,200 homes.
Because of the issues with the Red Cross� shelter, nearly all of 1,000 displaced people at the Napa County Fairgrounds � including the elderly, new mothers and children, and anyone with a pet � ended up sleeping outside in tents, cars or RVs. The problems were first reported by the Press Democrat newspaper.
Also,
Local officials were furious. They say the Red Cross showed up lacking basic supplies such as Band-Aids, portable toilets, and tarps to protect against the rain. Instead the group�s volunteers handed out Red Cross-branded bags of items that weren�t urgently needed like lip balm and tissues.
The Red Cross responders were inexperienced and, according to residents, not enough of them spoke Spanish, the language of many of the fire victims.
In general, as told by former Red Cross volunteer Becky Maxwell, a self-described "die-hard Red Cross person for 25 years," who quit after becoming increasingly frustrated,
'McGovern has fired almost all of the trained and experienced volunteers and staff,' Maxwell told ProPublica, replacing them 'with people who have absolutely no knowledge of what the Red Cross is or does in a disaster. Not only is she setting these people up to fail but she is compromising the service delivery that is so important to the clients.'
SummaryThe
Red Cross Board of Governors, largely composed of well paid business managers (e.g., a former Vice Chairman of Goldman Sachs, a senior vice president of Eli Lilly, the chief financial officer of Home Depot, the executive vice president of Target), decided that a generic manager using a managerialist approach could cure the organization's perceived ills. The new CEO, who lacked any obvious experience or training relevant to the Red Cross mission, hired her former cronies at AT&T and Fidelity as managers. The new team cut costs, laid off employees, centralized management, and focused on marketing. The apparent results were fewer, less experienced, upset staff; fewer volunteers; declining interest in public health training products; and worsening disaster response.
Thus, once again,
generic managers and
managerialism have laid low a formerly proud charity. Unfortunately, this one also happens to have vital public health and disaster relief roles that have now been severely compromised.
Based on previous experience, it should come as no surprise that generic managers who do not know much or care much about public health and health care, and who rely on a one-size fits all management dogma uninformed by the public health or health care context or public health or health care values will end up undermining patients' and the public's health.
The real surprise is that the generic managers have up to now had no problem maintaining the
managers' coup d'etat, that is, their iron grip on the leadership of most public health and health care organizations.
To prevent our ongoing downward spiral, we need to reverse the managers' coup d'etat, and return leadership to those who understand health and health care, support their values, and are willing to be accountable for doing so.
ADDENDUM (17 December, 2015) - This post was republished on the
Naked Capitalism blog.
