Tuesday, 11 March 2008

Princess Health and BLOGSCAN - Key Opinion Leaders. Princessiccia

Princess Health and BLOGSCAN - Key Opinion Leaders. Princessiccia

On the Clinical Psychology and Psychiatry blog is a pithy discussion of the use of "Key Opinion Leaders," (KOLs) to provide a veneer of apparent respectability to drug marketing. One KOL claimed, "trust me. I don't make that much," but it turned out had been paid $180,000 over two years to give talks about childhood bipolar disorder, a disease whose existence ought to be controversial.
Princess Health and BLOGSCAN - Throwing Money at Zetia Marketing. Princessiccia

Princess Health and BLOGSCAN - Throwing Money at Zetia Marketing. Princessiccia

On the Question Authority blog, Dr Peter Rost takes some time off from having fun discussing the Emperors Club VIP, i.e., the organization which NY Governor Eliot Spitzer allegedly patronized, to his downfall, to address Schering-Plough's alleged new marketing campaign for Zetia. He has a great anonymous post from someone who may be a Schering-Plough drug rep, "throwing money at a problem is not the way to fix things - it will only make matters worse. Have the company come clean about the study, give us some good (or even not so good) evidenced based medicine - and let us earn back the business the right way." Hear, hear.

Monday, 10 March 2008

Princess Health and Cancer Screening, CT Scans, and Patent Applications. Princessiccia

Princess Health and Cancer Screening, CT Scans, and Patent Applications. Princessiccia

We are getting to this story a bit late, but perhaps can provide some new insight.

In 2006, an article that supported the value of CT scans to screen for lung cancer caused quite a stir. [The International Early Lung Cancer Action Program Investigators. Survival of patients with stage I lung cancer detected on CT screening. N Engl J Med 2006; 355: 1763-1771. Link here.]

The article reported a case series of over 30,000 patients who were entered into a program using annual CT scans to screen for lung cancer. Over 10 years of enrollment, 484 patients were found to have cancer. The investigators estimated the10-year lung-cancer specific survival of these patients was 80%, concluding "annual spiral CT screening can detect lung cancer that is curable."

A few days later, the article's lead author, Dr Claudia Henschke, was quoted in the New York Times as not understanding why CT screening was not the standard of care, "'I don�t get what the resistance is,' Dr. Henschke said. To her, it is a matter of simple logic: the earlier cancer is found, the better the odds of a cure. CT finds lung cancer early. So why not use it?"

In line with that sentiment, advocacy for widespread screening using CT scanning has continued under the auspices of the Lung Cancer Alliance. (See their news release, "Lung Cancer Alliance stands behind CT screening for lung cancer" from last fall.) The LCA asserted, "the mounting evidence which continues to mature from the largest international, protocol-driven screening effort (I-ELCAP) [is] showing that CT screening in a high risk population has the potential to reverse the current 15% five year survival rate." Furthermore, as reported in the May 4, 2007 edition of the Cancer Letter, legislation providing funding for screening using I-ELCAP protocols has been introduced in several state legislatures.

Of course, this seems to be another example of the introduction of an expensive, high-technology intervention that could save lives, but once again driving up the already staggering cost of health care. But these sorts of advances seem inevitable, don't they?

Maybe not. Dr Henschke's enthusiasm for screening seemed to go well beyond the data her study provided. In fact, the multiple flaws of the study were nicely summarized in a special article in the Archives of Internal Medicine [Welch HG, Woloshin S, Schwartz LM et al. Overstating the evidence for lung cancer screening: the International Early Lung Cancer Action Program (I-ELCAP) study. Arch Intern Med 2007; 167: 2289-2295. Link here.]


  • A Case-Series, not a Randomized Controlled Trial - Because the study did not contain a control group, it is impossible to tell whether its apparently favorable results were due to the intervention, to the selection of patients with unusually good prognoses, or to chance. As Welch et al put it, "The I-ELCAP study design is a case series. Because there was no control group, readers cannot know what would have been observed in the absence of screening."
  • Lead-Time Bias - The major result of the NEJM study was that patients with cancer seemed to live longer after their diagnosis than experience suggests is the norm for lung cancer patients. However, this could have been due to lead-time bias. Per Welch et al, "because survival is measured from the time of diagnosis, any screening test that advances the time of diagnosis will bias the measure of survival�the lead-time bias." For example, consider a person who developed cancer at age 60, was diagnosed at age 65, and died at age 66. His survival after diagnosis was one year. But if he had been diagnosed at age 60, and died at age 66, his survival after diagnosis would have been six years, but his life-span would not have been altered.
  • "Overdiagnosis Bias" - This means that more intensive efforts at diagnosis may reveal cases of disease with more favorable prognoses. For example, it is well known that some patients who appear to have early prostate cancer will never have progressive disease. But detecting such patients by screening will not improve their survival. Welch et al noted that previous studies that used chest x-rays to screen for lung cancer demonstrated improved survival after diagnosis, presumably as a result of combined lead-time and overdiagnosis biases, since overall survival was not improved in patients who were screened compared to controls.
  • Failure to Assess Harms of Screening and Subsequent Treatment - Welch et al noted problems with how the I-ELCAP study assessed deaths due to surgical treatment of cancer. The study also failed to report adverse effects of invasive diagnostic efforts for patients who had positive CT scans, most of whom did not prove to have cancer. For example, needle biopsy of lesions found by CT scan can cause pneumothorax (lung collapse), but these events were not reported in the NEJM article.

Also, a series of letters to the editor of the NEJM brought up similar concerns, plus additional flaws, e.g., although the I-ELCAP study reported 10-year disease specific survival, it only followed patients for a median of 40 months, and less than one-fifth of subjects were followed for five years or more. A response by lead author Henschke and two other authors failed to reassure. It first seemed to simply deny the importance of lead-time bias,

Screening for cancer is supposed to provide for lead time in diagnosis and treatment. A bias is introduced when one compares relatively short-term survival rates as of diagnosis to assess the effectiveness of treatment with lead time relative to treatment without lead time. We did not do this.


Henschke et al also seemed to misunderstand overdiagnosis bias. They responded to the relevant critique by asserting that all cases of cancer were confirmed by pathology. This begged the question, because pathological diagnosis does not necessarily determine whether a tumor will progress.

Finally, they seemed to deny that randomized controlled trials are necessary to assess screening programs.



Berg and Aberle remark that our study had no comparison group, but unlike interventional research, diagnostic research does not inherently require a comparison, much less a comparison group. The attainable frequency of diagnoses of stage I tumors can be assessed only in the framework of screening, and our principal diagnostic result was the 85% frequency of diagnoses of clinical stage I tumors among all diagnoses. The principal interventional result was the 92% cause-specific 10-year survival rate after prompt treatment of stage I tumors. The relevant comparison group would consist of patients who received early diagnoses but were treated late, principally to learn about the timing of deaths from lung cancer.


Every scientist tends to be an enthusiast about his or her own work, but I was struck by how Henschke et al seemed to shrug off their study's obvious methodologic problems.

(It might seem to be beating a dead horse, but I found even more problems with the I-ELCAP article beyond those noted above: failure to describe the clinical characteristics of the patient population; not blinding assessment of whether deaths were cancer-related; failure to have a credible method to verify that patients who did not have a positive CT scan did not have cancer; and failure to report loss to follow-up.)

More concerns about the origins of the I-ELCAP investigators' enthusiasm, which seems to have infected such groups as the Lung Cancer Alliance, were raised by a new report in the Cancer Letter, (from Jan 18, 2007, but not available without a subscription, and just made available to me last week),



The leaders of a research consortium that advocates computed tomography scanning to detect early-stage lung cancer have built an estate of 27 patent applications worldwide covering technologies and methods of screening.

According to publicly available databases, the leaders of the International
Early Lung Cancer Action Project are listed as inventors on patent applications
and one issued U.S. patent that cover innovations in lung cancer screening,
from clinical trial methodology, to software for interpretation of scans, to
technology of biopsy needles.


The first of these patent applications was submitted on April 11, 2000. In the U.S., group leaders are listed as inventors on one patent and 10 published applications. At least one of the inventions has been licensed by General Electric, a maker of CT scanners, and, in another instance, patent rights were reportedly exchanged for stock of a start-up company that markets lung biopsy devices.

Disclosure statements that accompanied the publications by the group�s leaders didn�t reflect these activities as potential conflict of interest, a literature
search shows
.

Furthermore,



Both GE and Cornell declined to disclose the details of a licensing agreement covering Henschke�s and Yankelevitz�s inventions.

'We do have a license agreement with the Cornell Research Foundation for certain CT lung cancer patents,' Corey Miller, a spokesman for GE Healthcare Americas,
said to The Cancer Letter.

'The researchers�Henschke and Yankelevitz� have received some royalty payments from GE for a computer algorithm equation that they developed to detect lung cancer on diagnostic scans,' Miller said. 'That is, as far as I know, the extent of our relationship with those two.'

Note that the 2006 NEJM article included no disclosures of conflicts of interest.

Finally, the Cancer Letter noted that I-ELCAP investigators have worked actively with the Lung Cancer Alliance to promote screening.



As they spar with skeptics, I-ELCAP scientists work closely with LCA, a group that advocates for screening former and current smokers in accordance with I-ELCAP protocols.


So here we go again. Flawed research that supports an expensive, high-technology intervention for which millions of people would be eligible appears in a major journal. The intervention is hyped in news articles, and by a grass roots patient advocacy group. Politicians soon jump on the bandwagon. Citing the potential for saving lives, enthusiasts ignore the flaws in the data that started it all. Only much later do we find out that the researchers who wrote the flawed study may stand to make money if the high-technology intervention is widely adopted.

At the minimum, this case suggests that academic medicine's current method of managing conflicts of interest through disclosure is not working well. Further, in the absence of such disclosure, it seems that individual clinical decisions and public policy may too often be based on apparently unbiased research that in fact is being purveyed not merely by enthusiasts, but by people who may make more money when the results turn out a certain way.

People have been wringing their hands about ever rising health care costs for a long time. Expensive high-technology interventions are often cited as responsible, but not further addressed, apparently due to the assumption that their costs are an inevitable reflection of their advantages. Yet maybe this is not so inevitable. We may have placed to much credence in research that exaggerated the value of high tech gizmos because it was done by by people who stood to gain from the sale of such gizmos.

At the very least, we need to make sure we know when clinical research to evaluate screening methods, diagnostic tests, drugs, or devices was done by people with financial interests in their success. It might be, however, that the only way to get unbiased evaluations of drugs and devices is to have the evaluation done by people who have no financial interest in the results turning out one way or the other.

See this editorial in the Boston Globe by Dr Jerry Kassirer, and this post in the WSJ Health Blog for earlier discussion of what the Cancer Letter revealed.

ADDENDUM (11 March, 2008) - See also previous comments after publication of article by Welch et al by Merrill Goozner in GoozNews blog.

Friday, 7 March 2008

Princess Health and British Government Concludes GSK Suppressed Paxil (Seroxat) Data. Princessiccia

Princess Health and British Government Concludes GSK Suppressed Paxil (Seroxat) Data. Princessiccia

Last year, we summarized the results of a BBC investigation broadcast on the television program Panorama that charged that GlaxoSmithKline "distorted trial results of an anti-depressant, [Seroxat in the UK, Paxil in the US, chemical name paroxetine] covering up a link with suicidal teenagers." (See also the links in that post to extensive discussion on the Clinical Psychology and Psychiatry Blog.)

The UK Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) has just completed an investigation, and it is fitting to quote the BBC story about its results.

It comes after the drugs regulator announced GlaxoSmithKline would not face criminal proceedings over claims it withheld information on Seroxat.

But they warned GSK should have been quicker to raise the alarm on the risk of suicidal behaviour associated with the antidepressant in the under-18s.

GSK has rejected claims it improperly withheld drug-trial information.

The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) received data from clinical trials in May 2003 showing that patients under 18 had a higher risk of suicidal behaviour if they were treated with Seroxat than if they received a placebo.

Data also showed that Seroxat was not effective for treating depression in children and adolescents.

But Professor Kent Woods, MHRA chief executive said they were disappointed GSK had not given them information earlier and that drugs firms had an "ethical responsibility".

"I remain concerned that GSK could and should have reported this information earlier than they did.

"All companies have a responsibility to patients, and should report any adverse data signals to us as soon as they discover them.

The government decided not to pursue criminal charges, mainly because of "important weaknesses in drug safety legislation in force at the time."

Also,

Health minister Dawn Primarolo said the government would take immediate steps to secure a strengthening of the law in the UK and Europe.

She also said they wanted to make it clear to all pharmaceutical companies that, "notwithstanding the limitations that may exist in the law, they should disclose any information they have that would have a bearing on the protection of health".

The Guardian reported the forceful opinions of the [UK] Mental Health Foundation chief executive, Andrew McCulloch,

It is totally unacceptable to hear that, when information can be made available at speed, young people may have taken their own lives due to a lack of transparency by a pharmaceutical company.

Woods further commented in another article in the Guardian,

I really feel there is an ethical obligation that pharmaceutical companies ought to recognise and it seems to have been lost. Twenty years ago I was a prescribing doctor and I took it for granted that if there was information relevant to the drug I was going to prescribe, then it would be available. We're talking about something which has direct relevance to health and safety.

The Guardian also noted that Woods "could not rule out the possibility that other companies were sitting on unpublished data that could cause them commercial damage."

So, in case there was any doubt, based on this UK government report, it seems very clear that GSK suppressed data about the adverse effects of Seroxat in an effort not preserve sales. This was a blatant effort to put company profits ahead of patient well-being and a slap at the integrity of the clinical science data base. This has hardly been the only case of suppression of clinical research data because it reflected poorly on some company's products or services.

And pharmaceutical executives wonder why no one trusts them anymore?

I doubt there is any way to secure the integrity clinical research short of banning all involvement by corporations with vested interests in having specific research studies come out in ways that favor their products or services.

See also the forceful comments by Dr Aubrey Blumsohn on the Scientific Misconduct Blog. He called it "a day of shame."

Thursday, 6 March 2008

Princess Health and Fat Chance: Conflicts of Interest and Calorie Counting. Princessiccia

Princess Health and Fat Chance: Conflicts of Interest and Calorie Counting. Princessiccia

Stephanie Saul in the New York Times, and Karl Stark in the Philadelphia Inquirer have covered the curious story of the downfall of the president-elect of the Obesity Society. Last month, Ms Saul set the stage,


New York City�s new rules for menu labels at chain restaurants have set off a food fight among the nation�s obesity experts.

Most support the theory of the city�s health commissioner that forcing chain restaurants to list the calories alongside menu items � flagging that a Double Whopper With Cheese has 990 calories, for example � will make patrons think twice about ordering one. The rules are set to take effect at the end of March.

There is a countertheory, however, set forth by Dr. David B. Allison, the incoming president of the Obesity Society, a leading organization of obesity doctors and scientists. An affidavit he recently submitted to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York has ignited a controversy within his organization.

In the filing, Dr. Allison argues that the new rules could backfire � whether by adding to the forbidden-fruit allure of high-calorie foods or by sending patrons away hungry enough that they will later gorge themselves even more.

It might be only a scientific debate among nutrition experts, except for the fact that Dr. Allison was paid to write the document on behalf of the New York State Restaurant Association, which is suing to block the new rules.

Dr. Allison�s role in the debate has angered some members of the Obesity Society, setting off an e-mail fury since word of his court filing began to circulate. Some have pointed to Dr. Allison�s other industry ties, which have included advisory roles for Coca-Cola, Kraft Foods and Frito-Lay.

Many of the group�s 1,800 members are �completely mad that a president-elect of the Obesity Society, an organization that cares about obesity and cares about healthy eating, wants to hold back information from people that helps them make healthy choices,� said Dr. Barry M. Popkin, a member of the organization, who is director of the Interdisciplinary Obesity Center at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

Dr. Allison, a professor of biostatistics and nutrition at the University of Alabama, Birmingham, is scheduled to start a one-year term as president of the Obesity Society in October. He has defended his affidavit. In a telephone interview, he said he did not take a position for or against menu labeling in the document but merely presented the scientific evidence that the labeling might deter over-eating but might not and, in fact, might be harmful.

He also defended his work for the restaurant industry, but would not disclose how much he was paid for his efforts.

�I�m happy to be involved in the pursuit for truth,� Dr. Allison said. �Sometimes, when I�m involved in the pursuit for truth, I�m hired by the Federal Trade Commission. Sometimes I help them. Sometimes I help a group like the restaurant industry. I�m honored that people think my opinion is sufficiently valued and expert.�

The executive vice president for the restaurant association�s metropolitan New York chapters, E. Charles Hunt, said that Dr. Allison was retained by the association�s lawyers. �Obviously, a lot of it was in favor of our position,� Mr. Hunt said, �although he didn�t come right out and say that.�


So this sounds like yet another story about conflicts of interest, and their possible effects influencing the publicly expressed opinions of a prominent academic. As usual, the conflicted party angrily denied that his financial relationships could have affected his scientific judgment. As we have noted before, this is undoubtedly a sincere belief, but psychological evidence and common sense suggests that having financial ties to organization x may influence one to take positions in line with organization x's interests, even if these influences do not reach conscious thought.

The variant here seems to be that the academic had a financial relationship not with a drug, biotechnology or device company, the usual suspects, but with an association of restauranteurs.

But wait, Mr Stark added more in his story in the Philadelphia Inquirer,

The relationship between academic researchers and industry is a front-burner issue in many fields. Several congressional inquiries are looking at drug-firm support for the American College of Cardiology, the national cardiology group, and the American Heart Association.

Compared with those groups, the Obesity Society, based in Silver Spring, Md., would seem like a tiny outpost with its $2.1 million budget. But the group's 1,800 members include many influential researchers, physicians and dietitians.

The society relies heavily on industry money, raising about $1 million in the last year from various companies, said Morgan Downey, the group's executive vice president. The biggest corporate donors were drugmakers sanofi aventis, GlaxoSmithKline and Allergan as well as the health-care conglomerate Covidien, he said.

About $230,000 of the corporate money funded a conference in September for health advisers to presidential candidates, Downey said.

Fast forward to this week, when Ms Saul reported in the New York Times that Dr Allison is giving up his leadership position for the Obesity Society,


A dispute over food industry influence has resulted in the resignation of the incoming president of the Obesity Society.

Dr. David B. Allison, who was to take over the society, a national group of obesity doctors and researchers later this year, submitted his resignation from that position on Friday.

So what happened? Did the Obesity Society cast out a leader because he had conflicts of interest that interfered with his ability to advance science, education and clinical practice? Or did the Obesity Society cast out a leader because he was aligned with commercial interests opposed to the commercial interests that provide most of the society's support? That is, was he cast out not because he had conflicts of interest, but because he did not have the same conflicts of interest as the society?

Who can tell?

Once again, this case is an illustration of the pervasiveness of conflicts of interest affecting health care organizations. It also shows how the pervasiveness of such conflicts sometimes makes it impossible to discriminate debates about science and health policy from the claims of conflicting pitchmen.

Full disclosure of these conflicts beforehand would at least have given warning that the nature of the debate was ambiguous.

But to figure out the best answer in the current policy debate, that is, whether it really is a good idea to have legislation to put calorie counts on restaurant menus, would really require the input from people who are not paid by either restauranteurs, or those selling obesity treatments. Fat chance that will happen soon.
Princess Health and Money for Nothing: More Guilty Pleas at UMDNJ, but Anechoic Effect Continues. Princessiccia

Princess Health and Money for Nothing: More Guilty Pleas at UMDNJ, but Anechoic Effect Continues. Princessiccia

We have done a long series of posts about the troubles at the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey (UMDNJ), the largest US health care university. The university was operating under a federal deferred prosecution agreement under the supervision of a federal monitor (see most recent posts here, here, here, here and here.) We had previously discussed allegations that UMDNJ had offered no-bid contracts, at times requiring no work, to the politically connected; had paid for lobbyists and made political contributions, even though UMDNJ is a state institution; and seemed to be run by political bosses rather than health care professionals. (See posts here, and here, with links to previous posts.) More recent were some reports of amazingly wasteful decisions by UMDNJ managers leading to spending millions of dollars for real-estate that now stands vacant (see post here). There was the indictment of a powerful NJ politician for getting a no-work job in the system, and the indictment of the former dean of the university's osteopathic medicine school for giving him the job (see post here). We found out that UMDNJ had named one of its teaching hospitals for a pharmaceutical company in 2001 (see post here), that the federal monitor accused the dean of one of the UMDNJ campuses of fixing students' grades (see post here), and that the monitor found even more bizarre financial practices at the university (see post here). Although the monitoring ended this year, his most recent report found previously undisclosed problems with the university's research compliance (see post here).

Over a year ago, it was reported (see post here with links to previous posts) that UMDNJ gave paid part-time faculty positions to some community cardiologists in exchange for their referrals to the University's cardiac surgery program, but not in exchange for any major academic responsibilities. Last week, the Newark Star-Ledger provided some f0llowup,

Two cardiologists yesterday admitted signing on to high-paying, no-show jobs at the state's medical university in return for funneling patients to the school's troubled heart surgery program.

As part of the kickback scheme, the two were hired as clinical assistant professors at the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, despite having no research credentials. They gave no lectures, taught no classes and acknowledged that they essentially did nothing more than refer patients for cardiac procedures while receiving hundreds of thousands of dollars in salary over three years.

The doctors -- Bakul Desai, 52, of Livingston and Laxmipathi Garipalli, 59, of Colts Neck -- are cooperating with the U.S. Attorney's Office and the FBI in a two-year criminal investigation that so far has implicated more than a dozen other part-time cardiologists and several top UMDNJ administrators. The scheme was hatched as part of an increasingly desperate effort to beef up a failing cardiac surgery program then on state probation, according to court records and reports by a federal monitor.

No university officials or any other physicians have been charged, although UMDNJ's chairman of medicine was forced to step down after the initial revelations became public.

In proceedings yesterday before U.S. District Judge Stanley R. Chesler in Newark, the doctors pleaded guilty to embezzling approximately $840,000 in payments from the university. The physicians stood quietly, answering questions with simple 'Yes' or 'No' answers. Both face possible jail time and suspension or revocation of their medical licenses.

U.S. Attorney Christopher Christie said others will be held accountable.

'UMDNJ has a culpable role in all of this,' Christie said. 'Don't take from these two guilty pleas today (the idea) that the institution itself is off the hook, because I will say quite clearly it is not.'

A university spokeswoman said UMDNJ and its board have 'worked aggressively' to restructure and reform the community cardiology program since concerns were first raised in 2006, including a reduction in the number of community cardiologists and changes in salaries and reporting requirements.

Desai and Garipalli should have known from the start that they were taking money for doing nothing, Christie said.

'They continued to do nothing and they continued to get paid in what is a classic New Jersey no-show government job scam,' Christie said during a news conference afterward. 'Extraordinary fraud and waste and abuse and illegality that was occurring with public money at UMDNJ.'

So here is even more documentation about the muck in which UMDNJ is mired.

We will wait and see whether there are more criminal charges in this case. In cases of health care corruption, it often seems that any penalties incurred affect those lowest on the totem pole, in this case, the two unfortunate cardiologists. Those higher up all too often get to walk away. This suggests how health care has come to be run by a power elite that do not have to follow the rules to which mere mortals are subject. I hope Mr Christie is able to buck this trend.

In the UMDNJ case, it seems obvious that someone in the management of UMDNJ had to have been involved in this scheme. It is hard to see how it could have occurred otherwise. So we wait and see if any such people are identified, much less convicted.

Another striking feature of the UMDNJ case is its manifestation of the anechoic effect. I put in a fairly long summary above at the beginning of this post emphasizing the magnitude, importance, and complexity of this case. I did so because many people, including many health care professionals and health policy makers, may be totally unfamiliar with the UMDNJ case. It has only been discussed in the news media in New Jersey (and to some extent the neighboring states of New York and Pennsylvania) and in Health Care Renewal. It has not, repeat not ever been discussed in any medical, health care, health services research, or health policy journal. It has not, repeat not appeared in any prominent medical. (I repeated the relevant searches today, of Medline, Google Scholar, and of the American Medical News, JAMA, and MedPage.)

An entire health care university admitting guilt, being subject to a deferred prosecution agreement, operating under a federal monitor, while all sorts of mismanagement and unethical behavior were uncovered, and NO ONE thinks it is worthy of discussion in any medical, health care, health services research, or health policy journal or newsletter?

The anechoic effect lives. And as long as it lives so vigorously, we make no progress in attacking the pervasive mismanagement, conflicts of interest, and outright corruption afflicting the management of health care. If we cannot even talk about these problems, how are we going to solve them?

Talking about them, however, might disturb the power elite that personally profits so much from their domination of health care. Hence, most health care professionals who are lower in status realize that to even mention such topics in public is to imperil one's career.

But as long as we cannot discuss the recent unpleasantness, things will continue to get even more unpleasant.

Fight the anechoic effect. Take back the future.