Tuesday, 18 March 2008

Princess Health and The Peril to Leaders "Who Accept Their Own Myth". Princessiccia

Princess Health and The Peril to Leaders "Who Accept Their Own Myth". Princessiccia

In the Washington Post, E J Dionne wrote about the recent collapse of the sub-prime mortgage market, and near collapse of at least one prominent investment banking firm, but what he wrote was also highly relevant to how US health care currently operates (I realize that some of Dionne's opinions may have an ideological slant, but I believe the point goes beyond the usual left/right dichotomy).


Never do I want to hear again from my conservative friends about how brilliant capitalists are, how much they deserve their seven-figure salaries and how government should keep its hands off the private economy.

The Wall Street titans have turned into a bunch of welfare clients. They are desperate to be bailed out by government from their own incompetence, and from the deregulatory regime for which they lobbied so hard. They have lost "confidence" in each other, you see, because none of these oh-so-wise captains of the universe have any idea what kinds of devalued securities sit in one another's portfolios.

So they have stopped investing. The biggest, most respected investment firms threaten to come crashing down.

But if this near meltdown of capitalism doesn't encourage a lot of people to question the principles they have carried in their heads for the past three decades or so, nothing will.

We had already learned the hard way -- in the crash of 1929 and the Depression that followed -- that capitalism is quite capable of running off the rails. Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal was a response to the failure of the geniuses of finance (and their defenders in the economics profession) to realize what was happening or to fix it in time.

As the economist John Kenneth Galbraith noted of the era leading up to the Depression, "The threat to men of great dignity, privilege and pretense is not from the radicals they revile; it is from accepting their own myth. Exposure to reality remains the nemesis of the great -- a little understood thing."

But in the enthusiasm for deregulation that took root in the late 1970s, flowered in the Reagan era and reached its apogee in the second Bush years, we forgot the lesson that government needs to keep a careful watch on what capitalists do. Of course, some deregulation can be salutary, and the market system is, on balance, a wondrous instrument -- when it works. But the free market is just that: an instrument, not a principle.


In the last 20 years, for-profit health care corporations seem to have turned their leaders into imperial CEOs. Their organizational cultures have been turned into cults of personality extolling the wisdom of their fearless leaders. Such brilliant leaders of course deserved equally brilliant compensation. So there have been plenty of CEOs of for-profit health care corporations who have had seven-figure-plus compensation. But sometimes, that compensation seemed not very proportional to their competence. (Remember the examples of the "brilliant" former CEO of UnitedHealth, or the former CEO of Pfizer Inc.)

Furthermore, the leaders of not-for-profit health care organizations have also become objects of personality cults, which suggested that they too deserved lavish, often seven-figure salaries and to live the high life at the expense of organizations whose missions are ostensibly to treat disease and reduce suffering, and/or to train students and pursue science. (See our latest example of the leaders of the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center.)

We have often suggested that leaders who are more focused on their own wealth, power, and privilege may not be good at improving patient care, or advancing academic medicine.

So let us quote Galbraith again, and remember what he said applies well to leaders of health care organizations.

The threat to men of great dignity, privilege and pretense is not from the radicals they revile; it is from accepting their own myth. Exposure to reality remains the nemesis of the great -- a little understood thing.
Far too many leaders of health care have accepted their own myth. Thus it is likely that all too soon, some important part of the health care system will come crashing down like Bear Stearns unless health care professionals and patients can shred these myths in time.

A big hat tip to Dr Peter Rost on the Question Authority Blog.

Monday, 17 March 2008

Princess Health and Living the High Life in Academic Medical Center Leadership. Princessiccia

Princess Health and Living the High Life in Academic Medical Center Leadership. Princessiccia

We had posted awhile back about how a not-for-profit, state supported academic medical center, University of Texas- Southwestern Medical Center, had created an "A list" of local notables who were to be given special treatment, including enhanced access to physicians. This seemed to imply some slippage from the institution's mission (see post here). It turned out that the practice may not be unique, but neither is is universal (see this post).

The local television station that uncovered this practice, "CBS 11," has been keeping an eye on the medical center. Late last year it found out its top officials had quite a taste for expensive wine.


Top state officials at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center in Dallas spent tens of thousands of dollars in donations on luxury wines from prestigious New York wine merchants.

A CBS 11 News investigation of charges to the university's credit cards found that President, Dr. Kern Wildenthal, and his right hand assistant, Vice President, Cyndi Bassel, spent more than $125,000 on wine.

A UT Southwestern spokesman says the state healthcare institution purchased the wine with money from unrestricted donations and not tax funds. John Walls explained the wine expenses in a written statement, 'The purchases from New York dealers were for hard-to-find wines not readily available in local retail shops, which were especially appropriate for individual commemorative gifts and special recognition events.'

The TV station's reporters also found that the Medical Center was using restricted donated funds to wine and dine its top executives, although the funds were meant for very different purposes.

Upon his death in 1986, [Jesse] Brittain left his life savings of more than $390,000 to UT Southwestern. Brittain's endowment agreement specified that the money was to be used 'for the sole purpose of enhancing the business operation of UT Southwestern giving priority to the professional development of personnel in the business operation, including training courses, books, seminars, etc.'

Instead,

CBS 11's hidden camera was there to record how the state university has been using money from the Jesse Brittain Memorial Fund.

The family of the late donor says the money was intended to help train employees and not for what CBS 11's investigation found.

The undercover video captured an annual holiday party held for a select group of the university's business administrators.

The state officials gathered in a luxurious penthouse dining room on the University's North Campus. It is a rarified atmosphere with a half million dollar collection of sleek tables designed by the internationally recognized Spanish architect Santiago Calatrava and a breathtaking night vista of twinkling lights on the Dallas skyline.

A white jacketed chef carved slices of herb crusted sirloin from a $450 side of beef. A waiter strolled through the party serving risotto crab cakes that cost $316 and artichoke hearts filled with goat cheese that cost $316.

Tables of silver serving trays filled with specialty appetizers were decorated with large gingerbread houses.

Partygoers bellied up to an open bar where more than $1000 worth of drinks were served.

The party that CBS 11 found in full swing is one of three annual holiday parties that have been paid for with more than $15,000 from the Jesse Brittain Memorial Fund.

In general,


CBS 11's review of financial records obtained under the Public Information Act indicates that more than $40,000 was spent on meals and refreshments which were paid for with money from Brittain's Memorial Fund over the past two years.

Finally, CBS 11 documented how the Medical Center CEO was living high on the hog supported by tax-exempt donations.


Dr. Kern Wildenthal, the President of the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center in Dallas, spent tens of thousands of donors' dollars on European trips, meals at five star restaurants, parties and expensive gifts, according to CBS 11's review of the state university's records.

CBS 11 uncovered more than $500,000 in expenses charged over the past two years to credit cards issued to Wildenthal and Cynthia Bassel, UTSW's Executive Vice President for External Relations. Financial records obtained under the Public Information Act indicate that most of the expenses were paid for with money that was donated to the medical institution.

The Southwestern Medical Foundation, the university's fundraising arm, paid for the bulk of the credit card expenses including:
--$533 for a donor dinner at a five star restaurant at the Hotel Meurice in Paris, France, for Wildenthal, his wife Margaret, British opera singer Robert Lloyd and his spouse and Andre Dunstetter, a Parisian social figure with ties to Dallas.
--$783 for Wildenthal's two most recent annual memberships in Mosimann's Dining Club, an exclusive restaurant in London.
--$459 for collectible Woodland Eagle dinnerware, including a platter and four mugs from Crow's Nest Trading Company, for two donors in April of 2007.
--$13,000 for tulip arrangements sent to donors for Valentine's Day over the past two years. A note on the 2007 order instructs the florist to deliver a half-dozen of the arrangements to Wildenthal's home.
etc, etc, etc

Also,


Both Wildenthal and Bassel have charged thousands of dollars to the credit cards for memberships in social and civic organizations. CBS 11's review found that donors' money from the Southwestern Medical Foundation was used to pay for Wildenthal's 2007 membership dues in the Dallas Symphony ($3500); Dallas Museum of Art ($5000); Nasher Sculpture Garden ($5000); British North American Committee ($6000); Dallas Women's Club ($850); and the SMU Town and Gown Club ($140).

As we noted earlier, the UT Southwestern mission statement is [with italics added for emphasis]:


* To improve health care in our community, Texas, our nation, and the world through innovation and education.
* To educate the next generation of leaders in patient care, biomedical science and disease prevention.
* To conduct high-impact, internationally recognized research.
* To deliver patient care that brings UT Southwestern's scientific advances to the bedside � focusing on quality, safety and service.

Somehow, I don't see anything about fancy wines, opulent dinners, and luxurious trips for the top leaders.

Once again, it appears that the leaders of large health care organizations fancy themselves different from you and me. They seem to feel entitled to membership in the power elite, to lead the high life (and not the version from a Miller beer commercial) while leading organizations that are supposed to focus instead on the community and to bring quality care to all patients' bedsides. I have no objection to good pay for people who work hard on behalf of the mission. But it is unseemly for leaders of not-for-profit health care organizations to live like minor nobility while so many health care needs remain unmet.

By the way, it may not be that what the University of Texas - Southwestern Medical Center was doing is unusual. In a summary of the case just published in the Nonprofit Quarterly, Rick Cohen wrote,


As studies from the General Accounting Office and the Congressional Research Service show, these nonprofit indulgences are frequently standard operating practice. The hospital has dismissed all criticisms by pointing out that UT Southwestern�s fundraising and expenditure patterns are right in line with nonprofit hospital practices nationally, including the proportion and nature of expenditures on fundraising including gifts for donors. They further suggest that donors to the UT Southwestern foundation fundraising arm know full well that their donations�classified as unrestricted�will be used for expenses that aren�t particularly focused on medical care or research, but for the CEO�s club memberships, upscale dinners and gifts for donors and bigwigs, and flower arrangements sent to the CEO�s home. Therein may be the real issue, not that UT Southwestern is behaving out of the norm, but that it is exactly within the mainstream of big nonprofit hospitals. And no one seems all that put out, because this is what is expected of big corporate institutions, for-profit, nonprofit, hospitals, universities, corporations, it really doesn�t matter all that much.

So it would surprise me not at all to find out that many executives of many academic medical centers and teaching hospitals are similarly living the high life. This, of course, goes along with many discussions on Health Care Renewal of health care leaders who seem to put their pocketbooks ahead of their patients. If this is as widespread as Rick Cohen and I think it is, why are we wondering why health care is increasingly expensive and inaccessible, while its quality declines, and health care professionals get ever more disgruntled?

Friday, 14 March 2008

Princess Health and Hacking an ICD - A Dual Medical Informatics/Ham Radio Perspective. Princessiccia

Princess Health and Hacking an ICD - A Dual Medical Informatics/Ham Radio Perspective. Princessiccia

Roy Poses wrote at "Hacking an ICD" that:

An ICD is a device whose correct operation is critical for the health and safety of patients in whom it is implanted. One would think that the managers responsible for the design of such devices would have pushed to make sure that the operation of such devices could not be hacked or accidentally altered in ways that could put patients' health and lives at risk.

Indeed.

It is probably not well known that in addition to being a Medical Informaticist, I am also a ham radio enthusiast, licensed at the Extra class. I know more about electronics than most physicians - and most IT people in hospitals to boot, although that often didn't matter in the dysfunctional world of hospitals and health IT.

As a medical informaticist and ham radio operator, I am concerned by the possibility of long(er) range hacking of implantable medical devices than that accomplished by researchers recently.

Apparently ICD's use a frequency of about 175 kHz for data communications. 175 kHz is in a band known as longwave. For comparison and orientation, the bottom of the familiar medium wave band -- a.k.a. ordinary AM radio-- is 520 kHz.

(An aside for those interested: shortwave starts at about 1,800 kHz or 1.8 MHz and extends to about 30,000 kHz or 30 MHz, and is called "shortwave" for historical reasons; the actual wavelengths are appx. 160 meters to 10 meters. These wavelengths were considered "short", comparatively speaking, in the early days of radio. The shortwaves have the property, under proper conditions, of being refracted back to earth by the earth's ionosphere and can be reflected by the earth itself. This allows the waves to do "multiple hops" and propagate over great distances far in excess of line-of-sight, even around the world. Hence the ability of ham radio enthusiasts to talk to people all over the world on the shortwave bands allocated to them.)

When I was 13 years old I built a one-transistor transmitter on a cigar box from a plan by Heathkit that transmitted low power morse code at a frequency of about 550 kHz. It ran off a few AA batteries and used a short wire as an antenna. It was easily receivable on a radio across the house.

The first cordless phones ca. early 1980s, wireless baby monitors, and other devices operated at about 1,700 kHz, just above the AM radio band. They were very low power devices with short antennas relative to wavelength (~175 meters) but were usable at dozens of feet from their base units.

Using an antenna, say, the size of a CB whip (properly loaded electrically to resonate at 175 kHz, not very efficient but usable), or even better, a directional loop antenna, plus a transmitter of 5 or 10 or, perhaps, 100 watts of power (not very hard to build), and using a sensitive receiver designed for those frequencies (my $150 retail Grundig Yacht Boy is an example, http://www.eham.net/reviews/detail/816) with modifications and a suitable low-noise receiving antenna, would potentially extend the range of communications with RF-controlled implantable devices.

Not to miles with any type of portable equipment, I should add, due to efficiency issues with very short antennas (relative to wavelength) and the low power of the ICD's transmitter, but tens of feet might be possible. Throw in digital signal processing on the hacker's receiver, which is available via common, cheap, off-the-shelf DSP chips and algorithms, and even more range would be likely. You would be surprised at what a DSP-equipped and/or computer-enhanced receiver can pull out of the "ether" even under extremely poor signal conditions.

One wonders if any ICD's transmitter and receiver are encrypted in any way - apparently the devices tested were not. My car FOB is, although even those can be hacked (e.g., "Prius Security System Cracked", http://www.treehugger.com/files/2007/08/a_talk_given_at.php):

A talk given at the computer security conference, CRYPTO 2007, explained how the key-fob system installed on the Toyota Prius has been cracked. The KeeLoq auto anti-theft cipher is used in common devices made by Microchip Technology Inc, which are also used by Chrysler, Daewoo, Fiat, General Motors, Honda, Volvo, Volkswagen, and Jaguar. The attack requires that the thief gets within range of your RFID keyfob, in order to break the encryption. This could mean stealing your keys, or just sitting next to you in a cafe with a laptop. The cipher used in these devices is 64 bit, which has always been theoretically possible to break, but has now been shown to be breakable in about an hour. This is important, because the shorter the amount of time required with the key, the more likely this attack is to become used outside of a research lab.

May I add that while encryption is not foolproof, lack of encryption seems the work of fools.

On a somewhat unrelated note, you can buy a wrist watch that picks up time-setting signals from an atomic clock via station WWVB, Fort Collins, Colorado (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WWVB) at long wave frequency 60 Khz for $30. I have one and in Philadelphia, it works well.

Some hams bounce signals off the moon for earth-moon-earth communications. They use high power, high gain antennas, and very low noise receivers. It works quite well.

Never underestimate what can be done at RF.

On one (predictable) industry response:

Medtronic's Rob Clark said the company's devices had carried such telemetry for 30 years with no reported problems. 'This is a very low-risk event for patients that have these devices,' Clark said in a telephone interview."

It would have been just a bit harder to hack a computerized device 30 or 20 or even 10 years ago. When kids can buy a laptop with computing power exceeding that of the Cray supercomputer for $500 and crack into, say, the Pentagon's systems, we are indeed living in different times.

Dr. Poses also wrote that:

The most charitable explanation for why they [the manufacturers] did not think to [engineer ICD's to be exceptionally hacker-proof] is that they really did not understand the clinical context in which this device would be used.


I think a better explanation is that the manufacturers' management has little imagination and underestimate the capabilities of people much smarter and more creative than themselves (e.g., tech-savvy kids). It would not surprise me to find engineering memos warning management that more safeguards needed to be incorporated, only to be asked "What's the ROI?"

The bottom line is: manufacturers might need to work a little harder when they deploy wireless devices, as hacking of gadgets and computerized equipment such as cell phones seems to be an increasingly common pastime for today's youth. (It's too bad ham radio is itself losing numbers as the previous generation ages and dies out.) The internet itself is used to spread techniques and malicious code among hackers.

One can imagine the consequences of a malicious RF device hacker or smart-but-delinquent kid in, say, a crowded shopping mall.

Finally, ham radio experimenters worldwide are not unfamiliar with longwave experimentation. Note in particular the bolded statement below:

With no Amateur Radio low-frequency [longwave -ed.] allocation in North America, stations operating under FCC Part 5 Experimental licenses in the US or under special experimental authorizations in Canada nonetheless continue to research the nether regions of the radio spectrum. By and large, LF experimentation is occurring in the vicinity of 136 kHz--typically 135.7 to 137.8 kHz--where amateur allocations already exist elsewhere in the world. The FCC rejected the ARRL's 1998 petition for LF allocations at 135.7 to 137.8 kHz and 160 to 190 kHz, however, after electric utilities objected that ham radio transmissions might interfere with power line carrier (PLC) signals used to control the power grid.

"Most of the new LF activity of Part 5 licensees has been in the shared 137 kHz amateur allocation available in some parts of the world," says low-frequency experimenter Laurence Howell, KL1X/5. "Although not in the Amateur Radio Service, these Part 5 experimental stations continue to add to our knowledge on propagation and engineering."

The holder of Part 5 Experimental license WD2XDW, Howell who's also GM4DMA, previously operated LF from Alaska. He's since relocated to Oklahoma, and has now resumed his LF work on 137.7752 and 137.7756 kHz. Already he's reporting some spectacular success, despite antenna limitations. On October 28, New Zealand LFer Mike McAlevey, ZL4OL, copied WD2XDW's 137 kHz carrier "bursts" over a path of more than 13,000 km (8000 miles).


The take-away message is that:

  • In biomedicine, the most meticulous resilience engineering is never a bad idea.

When drug and device manufacturers understand this fully, perhaps we will no longer have incidents of bad health informatics that can kill.

-- SS
Princess Health and Hacking an ICD. Princessiccia

Princess Health and Hacking an ICD. Princessiccia

Implantable cardiac defibrillators (ICDs) are battery-powered, computerized electronic devices implanted in the body. They are designed to detect dangerous heart rhythms and administer a shock to the heart to stop these them. We have discussed these devices before, including a story about how one manufacturer suppressed data that suggested some of their ICDs were less reliable than heretofore thought.

It appears that a new, and potentially worrisome adverse effect of these devices has just been discovered.

An article to be published in the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy [Halperin D, Heydt-Benjamin TS, Ransford B et al. Pacemakers and implantable cardiac defibrillators: software radio attacks and zero-power defenses. IEEE Symposium Security Privacy 2008; in press. Link here.] demonstrated the vulnerability of an implantable cardiac defibrillator to computer hacking.

Let me set the stage. ICDs, and other implantable devices may need to be tested, and sometimes their functional parameters need to be adjusted. Obviously, it would be cumbersome and hazardous to remove such a device after it was implanted to check and adjust it. So the devices incorporate methods to check and adjust them remotely. It appears most do so using "wireless" means. Wireless, of course, is the traditional UK term for radio.

Halperin et al found that they could communicate with a representative ICD, the Medtronic Maximo DR VVE-DDDR model via radio. Note that the ICD they tested was not implanted in a patient, but sitting on a bench, and that their radio equipment used to "hack" it was in close proximity to it.

Once they figured out how to communicate, the found that they could:
- Discover patient data such as name, date of birth, medical ID number, and medical history
- Monitor electrophysiological telemetry data
- Turn off specific ICD functions
- Induce the ICD to deliver a shock, potentially one that could cause a severe rhythmn disturbance
- Increase the power consumption of the ICD so that its battery would fail prematurely.

Further, they found that they could overcome a design feature of the ICD meant to prevent anyone from communicating with it from more than a very short distance. The ICD is not supposed to respond to radio signals unless it is first exposed to a strong local magnetic field which triggers a magnetic switch in the device. But the investigators found, "in order to rule out the possibility that proximity of the magnet ... is necessary for the ICD to accept programming commands, we tested each ... attack with and without a magnet near the ICD. In all cases, both scenarios were successful."

Thus, this article suggested this ICD could be hacked, and that hacking it could pose significant risks to patients who had the ICD implanted.

Some people doubted that such hacking could actually take place in real-life, as opposed to laboratory settings. For example, per the AP story, FDA spokesperson Pepper Long "acknowledged a hacker could use specialized software and a small antenna to intercept transmissions from a defibrillator. But she said the chance of that happening � or of a defibrillator being maliciously reprogrammed using a technique similar to the one a doctor would use to program it � was 'remote.'" Furthermore, per the Reuters story, "Medtronic's Rob Clark said the company's devices had carried such telemetry for 30 years with no reported problems. 'This is a very low-risk event for patients that have these devices,' Clark said in a telephone interview."

In my humble opinion, however, the problems that Halperin et al found with the Medtronic ICD have real importance. Let me first note that both the FDA and Medtronic representatives treated the issue epidemiologically. They based their pronouncements on the assumption that an adverse event that has not happened in the past due to a device in wide use is not likely to happen in the future. That does not make sense if the potential adverse event would involve conscious, malicious human action. Just because hackers have not yet attacked an ICD does not mean they will not do so in the future, especially after the possibility of doing so has gotten wide publicity.

Another way some have minimized the practical importance of their findings is that the experiment by Halperin et al was carried out on an ICD on a bench, using equipment that was in close proximity. Some may thus feel that the possibility of hacking carried out from longer range is low. I strongly believe that is not a good assumption. Many features of the ICD and its radio communication system suggest that hacking could be carried out from considerably longer range. There are hints in the Halperin et al article that could suggest to anyone moderately knowledgeable about radio how this could be done. I do not want to discuss these in any more detail, because I do not want to facilitate such long-ranging hacking. But I believe it is a real danger.

But why is this relevant to Health Care Renewal? It seems glaringly obvious that the risk of hacking could have been substantially reduced had the ICD been designed so it would not respond to any radio communication that did not have an appropriate authorization code, and/or if communication with it were encrypted. In fact, Halperin et al suggested some relatively simple measures that could be used to increase the security of these devices. Yet the Medtronic ICD, and presumably other ICDs and implantable devices, were not designed with such elementary security precautions in mind. As security expert Bruce Schneier wrote (reported in Information Week),

Of course, we all know how this happened. It's a story we've seen a zillion times before: The designers didn't think about security, so the design wasn't secure.

But an ICD is a device whose correct operation is critical for the health and safety of patients in whom it is implanted. One would think that the managers responsible for the design of such devices would have pushed to make sure that the operation of such devices could not be hacked or accidentally altered in ways that could put patients' health and lives at risk. The most charitable explanation for why they did not think to do so is that they really did not understand the clinical context in which this device would be used.

This is yet another reminder that those who run health care organizations often fail to think about patients' welfare first instead of other considerations. We need to change the culture of health care organizations to put patients first. Until we do so, we are going to get hacked.

Wednesday, 12 March 2008

Princess Health and Article Ties Together Pogo and Anechoic Effects. Princessiccia

Princess Health and Article Ties Together Pogo and Anechoic Effects. Princessiccia

Ever wonder how the anechoic effect--why many, especially in the academy, sit idly by when questionable practices emerge from industry--fits in with the Pogo Effect ("we have met the enemy and he is us")?

In the article, "Allied Against Reform: Pharmaceutical Industry-Academic Physician Relations in the United States, 1945-1970," forthcoming in the Bulletin of the History of Medicine, but in March 2008 available (after registration) for download in preprint here , Dominique Tobbell of Penn and the Chemical Heritage Foundation supplies some of the connective tissue.

In this exceptionally well-researched article Tobbell argues convincingly that pharmaceutical reform in the 1960s was very much in the air--so much so that industry sought concertedly to create new alliances to blunt its impact. Capitalizing on concerns, not just within the AMA but also in the academy, about government oversight, industry representatives found new alliances in both places.

An expert advisory body, the Drug Research Board, to "guide government officials on pharmaceutical policy," was the result. "By positioning themselves as pharmaceutical experts, this alliance circumvented the FDA�s new authority," she argues, "[challenging] the efforts of pharmaceutical reformers to further increase the government�s role in drug development and practice."

Tobbell shows that the impulse to forge these alliances came, not just from industry, but also from the most rarefied reaches, such as Harvard, as early as the 1940s. When it became apparent that the government's influence on research was the Next Big Thing, individuals in both places, industry and medical schools, made common cause, she shows, to limit the authority of the FDA.

(Of course, the academy played on both sides. Funding is funding.)

Tobbell shows how it all came to a head in the more reformist 1960s and '70s, with issues swirling not just around research but around the then-emerging threats to directly-impacted revenue streams, such as proposals in favor of generic drug-substitution legislation.

Echo, anyone?

Well worth reading.

Tuesday, 11 March 2008

Princess Health and BLOGSCAN - Key Opinion Leaders. Princessiccia

Princess Health and BLOGSCAN - Key Opinion Leaders. Princessiccia

On the Clinical Psychology and Psychiatry blog is a pithy discussion of the use of "Key Opinion Leaders," (KOLs) to provide a veneer of apparent respectability to drug marketing. One KOL claimed, "trust me. I don't make that much," but it turned out had been paid $180,000 over two years to give talks about childhood bipolar disorder, a disease whose existence ought to be controversial.
Princess Health and BLOGSCAN - Throwing Money at Zetia Marketing. Princessiccia

Princess Health and BLOGSCAN - Throwing Money at Zetia Marketing. Princessiccia

On the Question Authority blog, Dr Peter Rost takes some time off from having fun discussing the Emperors Club VIP, i.e., the organization which NY Governor Eliot Spitzer allegedly patronized, to his downfall, to address Schering-Plough's alleged new marketing campaign for Zetia. He has a great anonymous post from someone who may be a Schering-Plough drug rep, "throwing money at a problem is not the way to fix things - it will only make matters worse. Have the company come clean about the study, give us some good (or even not so good) evidenced based medicine - and let us earn back the business the right way." Hear, hear.